Action cause and volition by Sen, Jharna
A C T I O N  C A U S E  A N D  V O L I T I O N
Jharna Sen
ProQuest Number: 10107344
All rights reserved
INF0RMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest 10107344
Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346
I should like to thank Dr. A.R. Lacey, without whose patience, 
kind supervision and constant encouragement, this thesis would 
never have been possible.
L0NB1ÎV
Abstract
The aim of the thesis is to defend the view that mental entities like
wants, desires etc., can be the causes of actions.
In the introduction the problem of causal exp>lanation of action is 
introduced, together with the main outline of the views of different 
philosophers who are opponents of the causal theory of action. It includes
a short introduction to the arguments produced by the opponents of the
causal theory of action, and an outline of the project of the thesis.
Chapter I is concerned with thé question as to whether causal 
explanation is synonymous with mechanical explanation. In this connection 
R.S. Peterà* view is discussed.
Chapter II is concerned with the traditional theory of volition as a 
causal explanation of action. In part I, the question of whether all 
actions are preceded by an act of will is discussed in the context of G. 
Ryle*s criticism of the concept of volition. In part II, the question of 
the empirical identifiability of an act of will is discussed, together with 
the views of V/. James, G.N.A. Vesey and R.A. Imlay on the matter.
Chapter III consists of the defence of the view that wants, desires 
etc., can be the causes of actions.
In Chapter 17 the question of the indescribability of desires, wants
etc., without reference to actions is discussed with special reference to 
A.I. Melden.
Chapters V and 71 are concerned respectively with the Humean
contention that a cause must be an event, and that a causal explanation
needs a generalisation.
Chapter VII concentrates on the question whether reason-action 
statements are incorrigible and therefore not causal.
In conclusion, I have given a short summary of the outcome of the 
various arguments discussed in the thesis.
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Introduction
I Background of the problem
The problem of the causal explanation of human action is a vital 
problem of philosophy. Philosophers have seldom been able to take a 
detached metaphysical attitude towards the problem because of its signif­
icant ethical bearings. Formulation of any theory for the explanation of 
human action is almost impossible without getting over-cautious at every 
step lest we lose our notion of moral responsibility. Any one who deals 
with this problem works under the impact of two different influences. One 
is the evidences of modern scientific discoveries in the field of psychology 
and neurology, and the other is the concept of moral responsibility. The 
concept of cause and the concept of moral responsibility are taken to be so 
antagonistic that if something is caused it is considered to be outside moral 
jurisdiction. Therefore, to say that our actions can be caused is to put 
the whole concept of moral responsibility in jeopardy. In fact this means 
to put our whole social system in chaos as that essentially depends on the 
idea that men are free to act and therefore can be held responsible for their 
actions.
Some recent philosophers^ have tried to give a non-causal interpret­
ation of action. This attempt is very different from the reconciling
2 5attempts of philosophers like M. Schlick and A.J. Ayer who have tried to 
give a special meaning to the word 'free*. This reconciling attempt of 
Schlick and Ayer explains free action in terms of the absence of compulsion, 
not in terms of the absence of a cause. A free action is not a non-caused
1. A.I. Melden. Free Action. I96I. London 
R.S. Peters. Concept of Motivation. 1958
G.E.M. Ans combe. Intention. 1959
H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore'. Causation in the Law. 1959-
A. Kenny. Action, Emotion & Will. Ï965
W. Dray. Laws and Explanation in History. 1957
S. Hampshire. Thought & Action. 1959
2. M. Schlick. Problems of Ethics. 1939 p.143-156
3* A.J. Ayer. Philosophical Essays. Ch.12 p.278. 1954
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action, but a non-constrsd.ned or non-compelled action. They do not deny 
the possibility of a causal explanation of action as such and it is in this
way that they tiy to mediate between determinism and the notion of moral
responsibility.
Since then philosophers have started questioning the extensibility of 
the word * cause '. The thesis which A.I. Melden, R.S. Peters etc., have put 
forward is that human action cannot intelligibly be given a causal account. 
They have said that there is a categorial difference between mental concepts 
and physical events. Because of this, the notion of cause can be fruitfully 
applied to the latter but not to the former. When action is explained in 
terms of mental concepts like intention, desire etc., we do not get a causal 
explanation. Hence, any question of reconciliation of causal determinism 
with the notions of freedom and responsibility just does not arise.
II Forms of the causal explanation of action
There are two main forms in which the thesis that actions can have 
causes is usually expressed. One is the view of the various behaviourists 
who attempt to give a causal explanation of action in terms of stimulus and 
response, physical movements, or neurophysiology. This view usually tries 
to reduce action to movement and provides a physical or neurophysiological 
explanation for that.
Another variety of causal explanation can be found in the writings of 
traditional philosophers who instead of reducing action to movement, think 
that an explanation of action in terms of desire, want etc., is a causal 
explanation. According to them our actions are not caused by any external 
agency or force but by our own volitions. Because actions are so caused 
they can be differentiated from mere physical movements. The concept of 
volition is used by the traditionalists not only to explain action causally, 
but also as a criterion for distinguishing actions from movements or 
happenings.
Ill The opponents of the causal theory
The opponents of the causal theory of action have attacked both these 
two types of causal theory. They have rejected the very notion that an 
action can be causally explained. According to Melden "Yi/here we are con­
cerned with causal explanations,....we are not concerned with human actions 
at all but, at best, with bodily movements or happenings ; It has also 
been suggested that the causal question about human behaviour is appropriate
only when there is something extraordinary or unusual - a "deviation from
2
the purposive rule-following model" of behaviour.
This approach towards the explanation of human action is very much 
Wittgensteinian in character and is designed to show that to say that an 
action is caused by certain internal mental states like wants, desires etc., 
is to express a conceptual confusion. Philosophers like Melden and Peters
are not directly engaged in solving the problem of free-will and determinism 
but indirectly their theory is so fashioned as to save human action from 
causal determinism.
There are two aspects of this non-causal interpretation of action:
(i) The notion of a cause as it is defined in the physical 
sciences and by Hume, involves certain set patterns and 
rules in which no explanation of action in terms of 
intention, motive or desire can be accommodated.
(ii) Human action exhibits a clear and often self-imposed 
purposive tendency which cannot be explained in terms of 
blind, contingent, accidental happenings.
1. A.I. Melden. Free Action. Ch. XIII. pl84* I96I
2. R.S. Peters. Concept of Motivation. plO. 1958
The first aspect is concerned with showing the difference between a 
causal explanation and an explanation in terms of motives, wants, desires 
etc# The second one is concerned with showing more positively that a 
purpose or a set of purposes can be identified in human behaviour which 
will collapse if mechanical explanation of human behaviour succeeds.
Philosophers have variously expressed their disapproval of the claim 
that human actions can be causally explained. I shall narrate briefly their 
main criticisms against the possibility of a causal explanation of action in 
the following paragraphs. I shall return to their arguments again in detail, 
in due course.
17 A short introduction to the arguments produced by the 
opponents of the causal theory of action
(i) Reasons for actions and the episodic nature of a cause
Prof. G. Ryle in his Concept of Mind has tried to show the difference 
between a causal explanation and an explanation in terms of a reason. In 
the course of his elaborate discussion of the problem Ryle mentions a number 
of arguments against the causal theory of action. However, the one which 
Ryle emphasizes most is that mental things like desires, wants, motives etc., 
which people usually name as 'reasons' for their actions, are not 'episodes' 
or 'happenings' and therefore not causes of their actions.
Ryle says that there are two quite different senses in which an occur­
rence is said to be explained. One is the causal sense. "To ask why the 
glass broke is to ask what caused it to break, and v;e explain in this sense, 
the fracture of the glass when we report that a stone hit it. The 'because' 
clause in the explanation reports an event, namely the event which stood to 
the fracture of the glass as cause to effect".
1. G. Ryle. Concept of Lîind. Ch. 17. p88-89* 1949
2. Ibid p88 ~  ^
There is however another sense in which we can explain why the glass 
broke when struck and that is by saying that the glass broke because it was 
brittle. According to Ryle the because-clause in the latter case does not 
report a 'happening* or a * cause * # "People commonly say of explanations of 
this second kind that they give the 'reason 'for the glass breaking when 
struck"^ Ryle then applies this to the explanation of actions as issuing 
from specified motives, and says that explanations by motives are explan­
ations of the second type and not causal explanations. To explain an action 
in this second way is to give the 'reason' for the action and not the 'cause'.
It should be noted here that Ryle uses the term 'reason' in a wide 
sense in which it is applicable both to the animate as well as to the inan­
imate things. According to him when an action is explained in terms of a 
reason a dispositional account is given. For instance to say that Jones 
acted in a particular way because he was jealous is to explain Jones' 
activity in dispositional terms, just as to say that the reason why the 
glass broke was its brittleness, is to give a dispositional account of the 
glass breaking. In this sense the reason why something happened may consist 
of either personal or non-personal reasons.
The distinction made by Ryle between reason and cause is based on a
Humean supposition that a cause is an event or happening, whereas "motives
2
are not happenings and are not therefore of the right type to be causes."
Not only Ryle but other philosophers who hold that causal explanation of 
action is inappropriate also work on the basis of this fundamental presup­
position that a cause is an 'event'. Ryle does not pursue the distinction 
between reason and cause very far, but since then philosophers have tried to 
develop this conceptual difference between motives, desires, intentions 
etc., on the one hand, and causes as physical events on the other.
1. Ibid p89
2. Ibid pll3
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(ii) Indescribability of a desire or want independent of the action 
desired or wanted
An important and powerful distinction has been drawn by A.I. Melden 
1in his Free Action. Melden has emphasized the difference and incompatibility
between an explanation in terms of reason and an explanation in terms of
cause* Melden uses the term 'reason* ii^personal sense, i.e., in the sense
of 'his reason'. To quote Melden, "....stating a reason for what one is
doing is making it clear what it is that is wanted and what it is that one
2
wants to do with the thing wanted."
Melden's main argument is based on the presupposition that a cause, 
being an event, is logically distinguishable from the effect. According to
him the radical disparity between these two types of explanations, viz.
causal and rational, arises from the logical connection existing between 
intention, motive, desire, want, choice etc., and action. These mental
entities cannot be adequately described without a reference to the action
which is intended, motivated, desired, wanted or chosen. On the other hand 
a cause as an event is always describable without any reference to the
effect of which it is a cause. It should be noted that Melden does not
deny that human action as a series of movements is causally explicable; it 
is only as 'action' that it falls outside causal jurisdiction.
Melden thinks that to give a causal explanation of human action is to
view conduct as overt behaviour which is "an ambiguous term that effectively 
obscures the all-in^ortant distinction between bodily movements or happen­
ings and actions."^ He further says that as bodily movement^a piece of 
behaviour is a physiological occurrence which can very well be causally
1. A.I. Melden. Free Action. I96I
2. Ibid pl47 
3* Ibid p200
explained by another physiological occurrence. "In that case psychology 
reduces to physiology and the alleged explanations of human action have 
succeeded only in changing the subject, in substituting explanations of 
bodily movements for explanations of action."
Melden does not commit himself on the question of free-will as such.
He says that his argument "is designed to show the logical incoherence
involved in the supposition that actions, desires, intentions, etc., stand
in causal relations, either in the Humean sense or in any sense in which
2
the term 'causal* is employed in the natural sciences." But the rejection 
of the causal model of explanation for action does not imply indeterminism. 
Both determinism, and indeterminism and libertarianism are totally confused 
because they take the application of the causal model for granted. Thus for 
Melden the question of causal explanation of human action is conceptually 
inappropriate.
(iii) The purposive rule-following nature of action and the mechanical 
type of causal explanation
A similar distinction between a causal explanation and an explanation 
in terms of reason is made by R.S. Peters in his Concept of Motivation.
Peters says he does not want to deny that causal explanations are relevant 
to human action. They can state necessary conditions for human action to 
occur, but they cannot be sufficient explanations of human action.^ There 
is a slight difference between Peters' object of criticism and that of Ryle 
and Melden. V/hile Ryle and Melden make the traditional theory of volition 
the main target of criticism, Peters directs his criticisms at the mechaniceil 
interpretation of human action. By a causal explanation of action Peters 
means an explanation in terms of physical laws. His attack is in fact
1. Ibid p200-201
2. Ibid p201-202
3. R.S. Peters. Concept of Motivation. pl6
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directed against behaviourists like Hull or Hebb for trying to reduce 
psychological explanation to mechanical explanation. His main argument 
is that there are many different sorts of question which can be asked about 
human behaviour, which cannot be brought under an all embracing causal 
theory.
For Peters, an explanation of action involves concepts like intention, 
reason, purpose etc., whereas an explanation of bodily movement involves 
concepts like stimulus-response, nervous reactions, muscular contractions 
etc.He also says that because 'action* requires explanation in terms of 
reasons, causal explanation is inappropriate here. Human behaviour as 
* happenings' can be causally explained, but behaviour as 'actions* involves 
a purposive rule-following model and is to be explained in terms of concepts 
like want, desire, intention etc.^
Similar points have been made by P.F. Strawson in 'Determinism*. 
According to him, explanation of action involves concepts radically diff­
erent from those involved in the explanation of movement as such. These 
concepts involved in the explanation of actions "belong to a different kind 
of vocabulary and call for a place in a wholly different dimension of 
explanation. Peters^ and Strawson^ also emphasize the point that causal 
explanation involves giving an explanation of action in terms of bodily 
movements or physiological occurrences. As such an explanation of action 
will need complete correlation between action and physical movement, and as 
the concept of action cannot be reduced to that of bodily movement without 
a residue^ an overall causal explanation is not possible.
1. Ibid p3-l6
2. P.F. Strawson. De termini sml Freedom and the Will, ed. D.F. Pears. p64
3. R.S. Peters. Op cit. pl2 
4* P.F. Strawson. Op cit. p66
Prof. Eamlyn in his article ^ Behaviour ^ has expressed similar views to
Peters. His view however has changed considerably in his later article
2
'Causality and human behaviour' where he says that the reason why the con­
cept of action cannot be reduced to that of bodily movement is not merely 
that "....the bodily movements involved in the performance of a certain 
action are indefinitely various,"^; there is some underlying reason, which 
Hamlyn describes as "....the fact that in the cases of many actions at 
least, an intention is essential if the action is to be said to be performed 
at all (....). Hence, there is no possibility in these cases of formulating 
a principle to the effect that when certain bodily movements occur within a 
certain range then an action of a certain kind may be said to be performed."^ 
According to Eamlyn "....an understanding of the notion of intention is a
5
general prerequisite of an understanding of that of an action." He finally 
concludes that "....there is no unified conceptual scheme available, as 
there is in different ways between decision and action on the one hand and 
movement and physiological processes on the other.
(iv) General laws and reason-action explanations
The arguments mentioned above are reinforced by another strong argument
T 8present in the writings of Dray and Hart and Honore'. This is: reasons do
not presuppose any general law, which a cause does. This means that an
explanation in terms of reasons is not of the covering-law type, which a
causal explanation is. According to them a causal statement is supported by
a general principle derived from experience, but a reason-action statement
is a singular statement which does not refer to any general principle, fthen
1. D.W. Hamlyn.'Behaviour.' Philosophy 1953. pl32
2o D.W. Eamlyn. ^ Causality and human behaviour.^ PASS7 XXX7III 1964* pl25
3. Ibid pl30 
4* Ibidfpl30-131 
5* Ibid pl32
6. Ibid pl36
7* W. Dray. Laws and Explanation in history. 1957
8. H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore*. Causation in the Law.
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a person describes his action as issuing from certain reasons which he has 
for acting, he makes the statement immediately without the help of a general 
principle. But a person cannot make a causal statement without implying a 
general principle. Therefore Hart and Honore*, Bray and many other 
philosophers think that a statement which describes a reason-action relation 
cannot be a causal statement.
(v) Incorrigibility of reason-action statements
Opponents of the causal theory of action often cite another argument 
which is partially based on the above mentioned one. This is: a reason- 
action statement is incorrigible. Philosophers cite different reasons for 
this argument. Sometimes they say that a reason-action statement is in­
corrigible because of the privileged access one is thought to have to one's 
own reasons; sometimes they derive their support from Wittgenstein's comment 
on first person introspective reports, i.e., it does not make sense to say 
that one can be mistaken in identifying the reasons for one's action. Oil
the other hand a causal statement is always corrigible. This leads some 
philosophe; 
statement.
ophers^ to conclude that a reason-action statement cannot be a causal
The arguments of the opponents of the causal theory of action can be 
summed up now as follows: an explanation of action cannot be given in terms
of stimulus and response, or in terms of neuro-physiology, as the behaviour­
ists have tried to do, because that will obliterate the distinction between 
action and movement. Action being purposive behaviour involves mental 
concepts for its explanation. In other words, an explanation of action 
involves concepts like motive, intentions, desires etc. Now, an explanation 
in terms of desire, motive or intention cannot be a causal explanation because 
of certain logical difficulties. These are:
1. B.A.O. Williams. ^ Pleasure and Belief PASSV Vol.XXXIII. 1959 P57
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(i) motives, intentions, desires for actions and actions are not
adequately describable independently of one another which 
suggests that there may be a non-contingent relation between 
the two, whereas a contingent relation is essential for a 
causal connection;
(ii) motives, intentions, desires etc. are not events, whereas a
cause is regarded as an event in Humean philosophy;
(iii) the covering-law model which is so essential for a causal
explanation is absent in a reason-action situation;
(iv) and lastly, because of the supposed priviledged access to one's 
own reasons, one's reason-action statements are considered as 
incorrigible, but a causal statement is always corrigible by 
further experience.
I would like to add here that it would be a mistake to think that all 
of these arguments are equally shared by the opponents of the causal theory.
It would also be a mistake to think that the philosophers mentioned in 
connection with a particular argument are its only supporters.
7 The -pro.ject
So far I have been trying to describe the views and arguments of the 
opponents of the causal theory of action. Now I shall try to describe the 
aim of this thesis. The aim of the thesis is to defend the view that an 
explanation of action in terms of wants, desires etc., is a causal explanation.
It must be pointed out that to define the features of a causal explan­
ation is a notoriously difficult task. If there were one accepted form of 
causal explanation it would have been easier to decide whether an explanation
12.
of action in terms of reasons is a causal explanation. In the absence of 
such a defining criterion, I would like to proceed as follows :
Sometimes by 'causal explanation' philosophers mean a mechanical form 
of explanation and then try to show that a causal explanation of action in 
this sense is not possible. So first of all I would like to show that 
causal explanations are not limited to mechanical explanations. Mechanical 
explanation is only a type of causal explanation. Therefore, causal explan­
ations of actions need not be in mechanical terms. In this connection S.S. 
Peters' view will be discussed.
Secondly, I shall consider the traditional theory of volition as a 
causal theory of action and the adequacy of the concept of volition as a 
causal concept. I shall try to show that an act of will as it is conceived 
in the traditional theory fails to serve a logically coherent causal role 
for actions.
Thirdly, I shall argue that unless the reason-action relation is 
considered as a causal relation, the full implications of this relation 
cannot be brought out.
Lastly, I would consider the various arguments offered by the anti- 
causal theorists against the possibility of a causal explanation of action.
I would like to point out that the arguments of the anti-causal theorists 
are sometimes based on a misconception as to what is involved in a causal 
explanation - that certain features which are thought to be essential for a 
causal explanation (particularly in the context of the Humean definition of 
causation), are not really essential for it. I admit that some anti-causal 
theorists (e.g. Melden) have drawn our attention to the specific peculiarity 
of the reason-action relation, but I shall venture to show that reason-action 
explanations can be considered as causal in spite of this peculiarity.
13.
What I shall carefully leave aside is the question of freedom and 
responsibility, for I believe that this question should not be brought into 
the discussion of causal explanations of actions, though it is quite obvious 
that any decision about the causal explanation of action is bound to affect 
the notions of freedom and moral responsibility. This thesis however will 
be devoted only to describing and defending the view that explanations of 
actions in terms of reasons are in fact causal explanations*
14.
Chapter I
Explanation in terms of reason and the mechanieal form of causal 
explanation
In the introduction of this thesis I have mentioned that sometimes the 
opponents of the causal theory of action consider 'causal explanation as 
equivalent to mechanical explanation and think that to give a causal explan­
ation of action means to explain an action as a piece of physical movement in 
terms of physical laws. Quite often they talk about the sense in which 
'cause* is used in Humean philosophy and in physical sciences, implying that 
these two 'uses* are identical without clarifying at all why the concept of 
cause as described in Hume's philosophy should be restricted to physical 
changes only. Their use of the term 'physical' or 'mechanical' is also 
uncritical, A clear description of what they mean by mechanical or physical
explanation cannot be found in their writings. This unclarity can be found
iS
in R.S. Peters' Concept of Motivation and also.xtraceable in A.I. Melden*s 
Free Action. The belief that to give a causalexplanation is to give a 
mechanical explanation led philosophers like Peters and Strawson^ to argue 
that since such an explanation requires complete reducibility of the concept 
of action to that of movement, which cannot be done without a residue, 
actions cannot be given a causal explanation.
This seems to me a confused argument resulting from a mistaken idea 
as to what is involved in a causal explanation. In this chapter I shall 
consider this argument with specialjreference to R.S. Peters,
1, P.F. Strawson.^Determinism^ Freedom and the Will, ed. D.F. Pears. p66
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I Causal explanation and mechanical explanation
There is no doubt that the most perplexing concept in this issue is 
the concept of cause and philosophers are hardly unanimous as to what they 
really mean by 'causal explanation'. The term 'causal explanation' has 
often been used in various senses. For the purpose of this thesis, I shall 
however take it to mean the deduction of an event or of an object or of a 
state of affairsfrom a general law and initial conditions. This description 
of a causal explanation comes closer to Hume's definition of a causal relation 
in emphasizing the need of a general law in causal explanation. Neither 
Hume's definition of a causal relation, nor this description in any way 
suggest that causation is applicable to physical changes only or should be 
described in physical terms only. If the description stated above is a 
correct description of causal explanation, all that can be derived from such 
a description is that any explanation which satisfies the stated requirements 
can be called a causal explanation. It need not necessarily be an explan­
ation in terms of physical laws. The philosophers who consider 'causal 
explanation' as equivalent to 'physical or mechanical explanation' use the 
concept 'cause' in a very narrow sense. They start with certain precon­
ceptions as to the requirements for a causal explanation and after finding 
that those requirements can be satisfactorily met by the mechanical form of 
explanation, identify causal explanation with mechanical explanation and 
conclude that the use of the term 'cause' in mechanical theories is its sole 
use. They overlook the possibility that denotatively the concept of cause 
may be wider than the concept of mechanical change and that the causal 
theorists may not insist on a mechanical pattern of aetion-explanation.
Here the notion 'physical' or 'mechanical' needs some elaboration. I 
have already mentioned that Peters and philosophers holding similar views to 
Peters' have used the term 'mechanical* uncritically without clarifying what 
they actually meant by a mechanical explanation.
16.
By a mechanical explanation I shall understand an explanation given 
in terms of mechanical concepts, i.e., concepts involved in physical and 
chemical laws or in describing a mechanism. Such mechanical explanations 
we can find in the physical sciences where they are expressed in terms of 
matter, motion or energy, or in terms of chemical formulae. For instance, 
explanations of the formation of rust in terms of oxidation, of the formation 
of carbo-hydrate in terms of photo-synthesis, are mechanical explanations. 
They are also causal explanations as they satisfy the requirements for such 
an explanation. Attempts to give causal expleuiations of action in this 
mechanical sense can be found in the history of philosophy. Such a theory is 
often known as physical determinism, which views a human being as a complex 
machine, the function and structure of which are explicable in physico­
chemical terms. To identify causal explanation with this sort of mechanical 
explanation means to take it for granted that any sort of change in the 
universe, if it is to be given a causal explanation, must be reduced to only 
one fundamental kind of change viz., the change of material particles.
Whether such a reduction is logically possible is of course a different 
question. Even if the reductionist programme is possible, causation is still 
not limited to mechanical causation. There is nothing in the notion of 
causation which suggests such limitations.
I have already mentioned that it would be a mistake to think that all 
causal explanations are like mechanical exq)lanations. There are causal 
explanations where completely different laws and concepts are involved. For 
instance physiological or neuro-physiologieal explanation is also consid­
ered as causal explanation, but it is not 'mechanical* in the sense mentioned 
above. V/hen a neuro-physiological explanation of a situation is given, a 
causal explanation is given no doubt but not in terms of physico-chemical 
laws.^ When we explain certain animal behavioural disturbances in terms of
1. Physicalists would of course claim that here a reduction is possible. 
Sometimes within physical determinism, neuro-physiological explanations 
are included.
17.
neuro-physiology, e.g., by saying that they are caused by a conflict between 
cortical processes of excitation and inhibition which under normal condition 
are kept in balance, we are providing a causal explanation thought not in 
physico-chemical terms.
Again explanations such as that a chronic state of over-stimulation 
and insufficient motor discharge causes fatigue, tension, dizziness, insom­
nia etc., are causal explanations but not mechanical. As we pass from 
neuro-physiological explanations to psychological and psycho-analytic 
explanations^ we find less and less application of mechanical concepts; 
and more and more factors like socio-economic and cultural ones, heredity 
and environment, parental attitudes and childhood experiences, are taken 
into consideration. These factors are hardly mechanical and to deny their 
causal effectiveness because they are not mechanical is to fail to understand 
them properly.
What I want to emphasize here is this, that when we say a certain 
explanation is causal, what we refer to is its form. Thus both physiological 
£Uid psycho-analytic explanations exhibit the causal form, i.e., a general 
law and initial conditions, - without involving any reference to physico­
chemical laws.
II R.S. Peters and the causal explanation of action
In his Concept of Motivation, as we have seen before, Peters holds the 
view that an explanation of action cannot be a causal explanation because 
the latter involves mechanical laws and concepts. It is not at all clear 
what Peters means by a 'causal explanation' and what he wants it to oppose. 
Sometimes it seems that he wants to equate causal explanation with mechanical 
explanation in the narrow sense of the term 'mechanical' ; sometimes it seems 
that he equates causal explanation with mechanical explanation, using
1. Some physicalists will claim that even in the case of psycho logical, 
explanations reduction is possible®
18.
'mechanical* in an over-wide sense which includes not only physico-chemical 
and neuro-physiological. explanations, but also psycho-analytic explanations. 
This ambiguity becomes evident when Peters talks about "breakdowns in 
behaviour pattern." Within "breakdowns in behaviour pattern" he includes 
dissimilar cases like 'behaviour resulting from a brain-lesion', and 'making 
an advance to a choir-boy', and happily thinks that all of them can be 
provided with a mechanical type of causal explanation. But some of the 
explanations of the "breakdowns in behaviour pattern" could hardly be 
called explanations of movements. Nor do they involve mechanical concepts. 
Peters fails to see that the 'breakdowns' in behaviour pattern could be 
wider than what could be given a mechanical interpretation. I am not denying 
that all 'breakdowns' in behaviour pattern can be causally explained; what 
I am denying is that such causal explanations will always be of a mechanical 
type. The unclarity of the use of the term 'causal' also becomes evident
from Peters' use of such expressions as "....some kind of causal explan-
1 2 ation" or "....some sort of causal explanation" in the context of dreams,
forgetting a familiar name, or knocking something over in a familiar room,
without explaining what 'kind* or 'sort' of causal explanation they are.
Peters says "....a proper understanding of what is meant by a human
action has very important logical consequences. It shows,......that human
actions cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of causal concepts like 
'colourless movements'. Indeed to claim that we are confronted with an 
action is ipso facto to rule out such mechanical explanations*.' Here it 
seems that Peters equates causal explanations with mechanical explanations, 
but he overlooks the fact that psycho-analytic explanations are causal but 
they involve mental concepts.
1. R.S. Peters. Op. cit. p56
2. Ibid P54
3# Ibid|>p7-8. also see pl5
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It should he pointed out that in connection with his discussion of 
Freud's theory, Peters suggests that Freud was influenceihy mechanical 
principles in formulating his psycho-analytic theories. "He (Freud) never 
abandoned Hobbes' hoary hypothesis, developed in detail in the Project 
^Project for a Scientific Psychology/that psychical states were reflections 
of material elements subject to the laws of motion."^ In continuation of 
this suggestion Peters says "So, if a man is unintentionally rude to his 
employer, the explanation might be that the sight or thought of a man who 
was emotionally equivalent to the father initiated tension which must per­
sist until some kind of discharge is found. The discharge might take a 
hallucinatory form in dreams......or it might be discharged throu^ the motor
apparatus by his being rude or treading on his toe 'by mistake*. The
explanation is of a causal type; he is, as it were, pushed into being rude
2
by the wish or current seeking some form of discharge".
Peters' intention here is to show that Freud's psycho-analytic explan­
ations are mechanical in disguise. Here I think Peters overlooks the point 
that though Freud may be deeply influenced by the mechanical theories, his 
theory does not suggest that the psycho-analytic concepts like Id, Ego,
Super Ego, Repression, Hallucinatory wish-fulfilment. Dreams etcare 
reducible to physico-chemical concepts, or to physiological concepts.
Freud's use of a new set of concepts shows that for ' him the concepts used 
in mechanical sciences are inadequate for the purpose of explaining human 
behaviour. An explanation in terms of psycho-analytic concepts is causal 
not because the concepts involved in the explanation are reducible to 
mechanical concepts, but because the explanation itself fulfils the require­
ments of what we ordinarily understand by a causal explanation. An explan­
ation in psycho-analytic terms is nothing like an explanation in terms of 
'colourless movements'.
1. Ibid p65
2. Ibid p68
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Here perhaps Peters would like to argue that a causal explanation is 
mechanical, in the sense of being non-purposive. This point has its own 
difficulties. In the ordinary sense of being purposive i.e., goal directed, 
a physiological explanation can be called purposive for it often explains 
physiological changes in terms of functions, and functional explanations are 
goal-directed. Similarly p&ycho-analytic explanations being in terms of 
hidden subconscious motives, desires and wishes are also in a way purposive. 
Hence, it would not be wrong to say that certain causal explanations do 
contain purposive elements.
ÎEiis shows that a causal eaplanation need not be non-purposive as a 
mechanical explanation is. Therefore a causal explanation is equivalent to 
a mechanical explanation neither in the sense of involving mechanical con­
cepts, nor in the sense of being non-purposive.
There is however another sense of purpose in which Peters contrasts 
the mechanical type of causal explanation with e^lanation in terms of reason* 
The latter type of explanation is purposive in the authropocentric sense of 
'purpose* where 'purpose* means an end consciously desired or sought for©
Thus to provide an explanation of action in terms of reason is to say that 
it is intended, desired or willed. Peters is of course right in contrasting 
this sort of explanation with mechanical explanation which does not involve 
any intentional concepts. But he is mistaken in thinking that the adjectives 
'mechanical* and * causal * are interchangeable, and that therefore if an 
explanation in terms of reason rules out mechanical explanation, it also 
rules out causal explanation.
Peters* contention that an explanation of action in terms of physical 
movement cannot be provided without obliterating the meaning of the term 
'action* is a valid contention. But he is mistaken in thinking that this 
means that action as such cannot be given a causal explanation. As I have 
said before, the concept of cause is denotatively wider than the concept of 
physical movement.
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The belief that causal explanations are mechanical in nature led 
Peters to argue that there is no specifiable movement required for a particular 
action, while a causal explanation requires such specification. He says 
"To give a causal explanation of an event involved at least showing that 
other conditions being presumed unchanged a change in one variable is a 
sufficient condition for a change in another. In the mechanical conception 
of * cause* it is also demanded that there should be spatial and temporal 
contiguity between the movements involved. Now the trouble about giving 
this sort of explanation of human action is that we can never specify an 
action exhaustively in terms of movements of the body or within the body. 
(......) It is therefore impossible to state sufficient conditions in terms
of antecedent movements which may vary concomitantly with subsequent move­
ments.'*
This argument is based on the assumption that in order to be caussilly
explained an action should be correlated with bodily movements. Peters
2shares this view with D.W. Hamlyn, and he mentions the example of 'signing
a contract*. He says that here all that we can do is to specify certain 
general outlines of the required movement but *....it would be impossible 
to stipulate exhaustively what the movements must be."^
It should be noted here that although actions cannot be correlated 
with bodily movements, they are not always independent of bodily movements.
There is a strong point made by G.J. Wamock in this connection. He 
Says, “....even if the account of how matter moved thus does not entail any 
specific designation of what Smith did, there still are, surely, some des­
criptions of what he did with which it is incompatible.
1. Ibid pl2 . - '  ^^ '
2. H.W. Hamlyn.‘Behaviour.^ Philosophy 1953* pl32. Hamlyn gave up this 
argument later on. Vide. PASSY XXXYIII 1964^ pl29
3. R.S. Peters. Op. cit. pl$. The emphasis is/author's
4. G.J. Wamock. *^tion and Event I Freedom & the Will, ed. P.P. Pears. p77 
The emphasis is/author's
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Following the line of Wamock*s argument, one can say that when there 
is a particular movement, say the movement of the right leg, there is a 
limited range of possible actions which can be compatible with it. It rules 
out, as Wamock shows, the possibility of the happening of any other action 
which does not fall within the group of actions competible with the movement 
of the leg. This proves at least that in some cases the performances of 
actions are not so independent of the occurrence of movements as one mi^t 
think they are. But at the same time it is true that a neuro-physiological 
explanation of a movement, however complete it may be, will not be a des­
cription of action. It may be possible to give a neuro-physiological account 
of movement completely correlated with kicking but it will not say anything
about the action 'kicking*. This is simply because the notion of action
*
involves a notion of mentality.
I shall however deny the necessity of a one-to-one correlation between 
action and movement in a causal explanation of action. Such a necessity 
would arise only if causal explanations were taken as equivalent to mech­
anical explanations. Since I have denied such an equivalence I would like 
to point out that Peters is not only mistaken in demanding a complete 
correlation between action and movement but also mistaken in suggesting that 
such specification of exact movements is universally obtainable in the case 
of physical events. It is a mistake to think that whatever is causally 
explicable is neatly specifiable in terms of movement. This requirement is 
too strong even for physical events to satisfy. As G. lladell puts it,
”....if this requirement were necessary, then a great many occurrences, as 
opposed to actions, would also be removed from the domain of causal explan­
ation. For example falling off a cliff cannot be specified in this way: 
there is no set of movement which must take place if one is to be said to 
have fallen off a cliff...."^
* This point is discussed in Chapter III Sec. Ill
1. G. Madell: ^ Action and Causal Explanation.^ p56. Mind I967. Also see
B.W. Hamlyn. PASSY XXXYIII I964. pl29-120
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Peters has not denied that causal explanation is applicable to what 
'happens* to a man - when he * suffers* passively and does not do anything 
actively. This means according to Peters, what 'happens' to a man is 
specifiable in terms of movements. Now let us take the ill-fated example 
from Peters' list of what 'happens* to a man, viz. making an advance to a 
choir boy. This is no more specifiable in terms of movements than 'signing 
a contract'. There is no specific movement which constitutes precisely 
what is called 'making an advance to a choir boy* just as there is no 
specific movement which constitutes Peters* paradigm case of an action viz., 
signing a contract. Yet Peters believes that the former can be provided 
with a causal explanation, but not the latter.
Ill Hap-penings and doings
The distinction between what 'happens* to a man and what he 'does'
occupies an important position in Peters' treatment of the problem of causal
explanation of an action. Peterst continuously appeals to this distinction
to show that the causal explanation of action is not possible, and I would
like to show that this distinction does not in any way compel usjfco deny that
causal explanation of action is possible. Peters presents the argument, and
this he shares with J.O. ïïrmson^ , that there are many different sorts of
question which can be asked about human behaviour which cannot be brought
under an "all embracing causal theory. " He elucidates his point by saying
that 'why did Jones do that?* is capable of being answered in a variety of
different ways and the nature of the question "usually dictates the sort of
2
answer which is expected and which counts as an explanation."
One thing should be made clear here. It is true that the form of a 
question dictates the form of the explanation given in the sense that it 
tells us what form of explanation will satisfy the explanatory need of the
1. J.O. Urmson.^Motives and Causes.^  P179* PASSY Yol. XXYI. 1952
2. R.S. Peters. Op. cit. f>p3-4
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inquirer. When the class-teacher asks, *how did the window break', it will 
not be enough to say that 'it was struck by a stone', but that 'Jones broke 
it'. It is obvious that an explanation given in a particular situation does 
not, and is not meant to satisfy all explanatory needs which may possibly 
arise from the situation. Even in the case of physicsuL events, different 
sorts of questionscan be asked and answered in different ways, and the 
answer which will count as a relevant explanation depends on the nature of 
the question. In the case of a coal mine disaster, the explanation which 
will be relevant for the enquiring tribunal will not be relevant to the 
lecturer on mining engineering who is teaching how disasters happen inside 
a coal mine. But this, i.e. that the nature of the question dictates the 
sort of answer to be counted as an explanation, has got no connection with 
and does not rule out the possibility of a causal explanation - in the case 
of a physical event or in the case of an action.
It seems what Peters and Urmson want to mean is that in the case of a 
physical event we always ask about a 'happening*, but in the case of human 
behaviour questions asked can be categorised under two distinct categories. 
Some questions refer to a 'doing' and some questions refer to a 'happening'. 
It has been suggested that the form of the question asked indicates whether 
it concerns a 'happening' or a 'doing'. For instance, when we ask 'what 
made Jones do that?' we describe the situation as a 'happening' - something 
which happens to Jones. Conversely, when we ask why Jones did that the 
situation is described as an 'action* - a case of doing.
It is said that these two types of question cannot be brought under 
the same explanatory causal principle. Obviously they cannot be brought 
under one kind of causal principle, but it is not clear why they cannot be 
covered by a more general form of causal principle which will include both 
mechanical and non-mechanical causal principles. I have already pointed 
out that to consider causal explanation as equivalent to mechanical explan­
ation is to use it in a very narrow sense which excludes many explanations
usually called causal.
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Also it should be pointed out that in ordinary language, there is no 
systematic way to make the distinction between what a person 'does* and 
what ‘happens* to him, and the form of the question asked hardly throws 
light on the matter. In ordinary language, quite often .by what a person 
* does *^ one can refer to both actions and non-actions. For instance the 
question 'what did he do* can be answered by saying that *he fell asleep*, 
'he jerked his knee*, 'he sneezed*, 'he shivered* or 'he broke his leg*, 
though none of these examples can be called an action. It shows that the 
statement 'he did x* can be replaced by descriptions which are not necess­
arily descriptions of actions, and the question 'why did he do x* does not 
necessarily indicate that the situation concerned is a 'doing*, and not a 
'happening*•
Similar ambiguity can be found in the use of the description 'what 
happens to a person*, in our ordinary language. Within this description 
we include not only cases like 'he fell down from the cliff, or 'he had 
a brain lesion* but also cases like 'he was forced to open the safe', which 
could easily be the description of an action. Thus the form of the question 
'what made him do that* does not necessarily indicate in this case that the 
situation is a 'happening* and not a 'doing*. It seems to ne that Peters' 
suggestion is that the 'doings' are where explanations in terms of reasons 
are in place, whereas causal explanations are in place with happenings.
But he himself contradicts his point by his list of 'deviations' or 'break­
downs' from purposive rule-following behaviour.
This breakdown in behaviour pattern appears to be a pretty mixed bag 
for Peters. It includes, as I have already mentioned, different kinds of 
deviations from the 'purposive rule following model', e.g. refusal to take 
the quickest route to one's destination, failing to remember one's name, 
running to work while one is not late, crawling and sniffing while listening 
to an essay, as well as making an advance to a choir boy, or behaving in a
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particular way because of a brain lesion. In all these cases Peters is 
inclined to say that a man 'suffers* from something rather than that he 
•does' something. Causal questions are, for Peters, quite appropriate in 
all these cases. The answers one provides here are explanations which may 
involve certain physiological descriptions but never the mention of reasons 
in the form of intentions, desires, wants, motives, etc. This seems to me 
a very hasty conclusion, for except perhaps the cases of behaviour resulting 
from a brain lesion and failure of memory, I wonder how many of these 
deviations can properly be described as something 'happening* to a person. 
Some of these are border line cases which should better be described as 
cases of action than of happening. For instance, making an advance to a 
choir boy. In this case it can quite properly be asked 'what made him do 
that)^ and answered by naming a reason viz*, a strong desire or want. Peters 
appears to have confused the various senses in which the word 'breakdown* can 
be used. A breakdown in behaviour may mean unusual behaviour or defective 
behaviour or wrong behaviour. An advance to a choir boy is neither unusual 
nor defective but may be considered as 'wrong* in a particular social con­
text, whereas behaviour issuing from a brain lesion is a defective behaviour 
and crawling and sniffing while listening to an essay may be considered as 
unusual. Peters' treatment also suggests that causal explanations are rele­
vant in the case of human behaviour only when there is a 'breakdown*. But 
one can give a causal explanation of a perfectly normal situation which may 
not involve any breakdown at all like the causal explanation of how does the 
human mind works in a given situation. The confusion in Peters' treatment 
arises because of his over-emphasis on the form of the questions asked in 
connection with human behaviour.
The important point is that a piece of behaviour cannot be identified 
as 'action* or 'happening* unless the distinction between action and happ­
ening is made quite clear. But this cannot be done on the basis of how a 
question is phrased. Such a distinction cannot be promoted to a logical
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distinction. Vvhat I am denying here is not the distinction between a 
•happening* and a 'doing*, but that such a distinction can be drawn from the 
verbal form of the questions asked and answered in connection with human 
behaviour.
Therefore the distinction between a 'happening* and a 'doing* when 
drawn on such a verbal basis cannot successfully establish the inappropriate­
ness of the causal model of explanation in the case of human action. These 
questions presuppose the distinction and it is not the case that the dis­
tinction is drawn on their basis.
17 Are causal explanations appropriate only in the case of
deviations?
It is clear that Peters (and also Urmson, as Peters shares the view 
with Urmson) assumes from the very beginning that there is a distinction 
between a cause and a reason for an action and that the latter can never 
be treated as a cause. This is why Peters says that when we ask 'what made 
Jones do that* we rule out the possibility of a reason-explanation. To ask 
such a question is, on his view, to ask for a causal explanation and causal 
explanation and reason explanation are incompatible.
No wonder that such an assumption has led Peters to argue that causal 
explanation is appropriate only when something happens to a man in the sense 
that there is a deviation from the normal rule-following pattern of behaviour* 
To put it more precisely, we look for causal explanation only when something 
is unusual in human behaviour. This argument of Peters seems to me quite 
unsupported and unconvincing and obviously false. As B. Yfilliams puts it 
aptly, "....it rests on an idea of explanation which may serve the purposes 
of a jobbing electrician but is happily not shared by the natural scientists, 
or by children.We ask 'why' not only for unusualness but also for interest,
1. B.A.O. Williams.^Postscripts Freedom & the Will. pll7* ed. D.F. Pears
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For example, an apple falling from a tree is a perfectly normal situation, 
but it might arouse the interest of a scientist to ask 'why*. We very often 
ask for causes of actions even when they are perfect cases of action and not 
'breakdov/ns* in behaviour e.g. why did you take up philosophy?
It can be argued that even in the case of physical events we usually 
ask for a cause when something unusual happens i.e. the normal process gets 
disrupted e.g. a machine stops working. This does not mean that a causal 
explanation of the machine's normal function cannot be given, or that such 
an explanation is inappropriate. Similarly, it cannot be said that the 
fact that we ask for causes of actions when they are deviations from the 
rule-following model means that actions which are not deviations cannot be 
causally explained. To summarize, in the words of Hamlyn, "....our tendency 
to ask for the causes of behaviour which is abnormal rather than normal, 
irrational rather than rational, is a function of the circumstances in which 
we demand explanations in this sphere, rather than indicative of something 
about the concept of cause.
Conclusion
The arguments I have been discussing can now be summed up. I started 
with Peters' argument that to give a causal explanation of action is to 
treat action as movement and since no specification of action in terms of 
movement is possible, action cannot be given a causal explanation.
By characterizing action as involving a purposive rule-following model 
Peters means that there are reasons for doing it. When it is said that an 
action can be explained from the standpoint of a 'norm' all that is meant 
is that the action is performed for certain reasons. I raised ny hand 
because I wanted to signal; I turned the switch on because I wanted to have 
light. All these are explanations in terms of reasons and involve a
1® B.W. Hamlyn. ^ Causality and Human behaviour? PASS7 XXXVIII I964. P125
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purposive rule-following pattern* Peters did not ask the question whether 
these explanations could be causal, once he was satisfied that they excluded 
mechanical explanation.
I have tried to show that Peters was mistaken in taking causal explan­
ation as equivalent to mechanical explanation. Causal explanation includes 
but is not identical with mechanical explanation. Once this is understood 
it becomes clear that in order to give a causal explanation one is not 
required to give an account in terms of movement# Hence Peters' argument 
that action cannot be causally explained because it cannot be specified in 
terms of movement is not conclusive.
We are now left with the position that the causal explanation of 
action need not be in terms of movement. I have mentioned before that the 
opponents of the causal theory of action sometimes overlook the possibility 
that a causal theorist may not want to give a causal explanation of g^ ction 
in terms of movements; there may be some other factors which he will prefer 
to consider as causes of actions.
One such consideration we find in the traditional theory of volition
according to which an act of will is the cause of action. In the following
chapter I shall consider and analyse the volition theory as an attempt to
give a causal explanation of action. I shall try to show that the volition-
theorists are part^ïight and part^Srong. What is right is their realisation 
that the causal explanation of action should be given in intentional terms. 
What is wrong is their failure to see that an 'act of will' does not serve 
the purpose. I shall criticise the volition theory so far as the notion of 
an act of will is concerned, but I shall defend the claim of the theory so 
far as it tries to give the causal explanation of action in terms of mental 
entities.
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Chapter II
The theory of volition as a causal explanation of action
The theory of volition as a causal hypothesis has become subject to 
severe criticism within the last few years* The theory considers 'will' as 
a faculty of the human mind capable of producing action. This notion of will 
dominated the thoughts of philosophers from Hobbes to Prichard. Hobbes in 
Leviathan pointed out clearly two features of volition or will. First, that 
it is an act of will. "In deliberation, the last appetite,or aversion, 
immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we 
call the will;the act, not the faculty, of willing." Secondly, ".... a 
voluntary act is that, which proceedsth from the will and no o t h e r . I t  is 
on these two points that the volition theory is particularly ostracised by 
its opponents.
The notion of an act of will is deeply embeded in our thought and 
language, but philosophically we doubt its very existence. It is dubious 
whether there is any such thing as an act of will, and this is one of the
persisting questions that arise in the discussion of the notion of an act
of will.
There are two main tenets of the volition theory, viz., (i) all 
actions are preceded and caused by an act of will; (ii) an empirical 
identification of such an act of will is possible. The claim of the volition- 
theorists that an action is causally explicable in .terms of an act of will
depends much on the conclusiveness of these two tenets. If it can be shown
that actions are not universally preceded by an act of will, and that the 
empirical identiflability of an act of will is difficult to establish, then 
the claim that all actions are causally determined by an act of will cannot 
be maintained.
1. T. Hobbes. Leviathan, edt. M. Oakeshott. p38. 1957 
The emphasis is/auîhor's
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Part 1.
I Are all actions preceded by an act of will?
The volition-theorists have brought in the notion of an act of will 
to distinguish actions from movements* Human overt behaviour can be of 
various types ranging from the unconscious movement of a limb to the 
writing down of a logical argument* The notion of an act of will is used 
by the volition-theorists to differentiate one type of behaviour from another# 
According to them certain bodily movements are causally characterised by an 
act of will whereas the others are not* The former are called actions or 
voluntary actions* In the stock example of *I raise my hand' and 'my hand 
goes up' the physical movement is the same in both cases# If there were a 
physical difference between them, it would have been easier for one to 
distinguish them without feeling the need for the notion of an act of will. 
Since there is no such discoverable physical difference between 'I raise my 
hand' and 'my hand goes up', it is thou^t that only the presence or absence 
of an act of will can make such a distinction possible. In 'I raise my hand', 
the overt movement is caused by an act of will, the presence of which 
distinguishes it from ^my hand goes up*^ . The concept of volition is thus 
brought in to deimrcate actions from movements. The traditional volition 
theory holds that all actions, whatever their nature may be, are causally 
qualified, in contrast with movements, by the invariable presence of an act 
of will. Without this no physical movement can be called an action.
I shall consider this idea of an act of will in the light of the 
criticisms made by Prof. G. Eyle. A discussion of Eyle's view will be 
quite in place here as his view represents a common pattern of thought in 
recent philosophy.
II G. Eyle and the concept of volition
Eyle in his "Concept of Mind"^ remarks that the doctrine of volition 
is thought to be a causal hypothesis because it is wrongly supposed that 
the question 'what makes a bodily movement voluntary?' is a causal question.
1. G. Eyle* Concept of Mind p6? Ch.Ill 1949
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Eyle attacks the traditional theory of volition on two points viz. (i) 
whether all actions are preceded by an act of will and (ii) whether these 
actions are caused by an act of will.
Eyle's campaign against the notion of volition is in fact a part 
of his more general project of demolishing Cartegian mind-body dualism. It 
is therefore not surprising that he considers the "language of volition" as 
a "para-mechanical theory of the mind" and comments, "If a theorist speaks 
without qualms of 'volitions', or 'acts of will*, no further evidence is 
needed to show that he swallows whole the dogma that a mind is a secondary 
field of special causes"^.
Eyle presents several arguments to establish his contention that the 
whole idea of one's performing an 'act of will' is an absurd hypothesis. He 
says that ordinary men never report the occurrence of these acts. Nobody 
describes his own conduct in this idiom. Nobody can witness the volitions 
of another, nor can the agent himself know that an overt action of his 
follows from his volitions. Furthermore the notion that minds must exist 
to give causal explanations of intelligent behaviour contradicts the idea 
that the mind-body relation is mysterious and that mind has an existence 
outside the causal system of physical bodies. Lastly the theory that all 
actions are preceded by an act of will which itself is an act, involves an 
infinite regress.
(Die importance of Eyle's criticism lies in pointing out the 
untenability of the theory that all actions are preceded by an act of will, 
and in showing that such a theory involves an infinite regress, and I think 
Eyle is right in showing these two defects of the volition theory.
1. Ibid p64
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The thesis that all actions are preceded by an act of will is 
difficult to maintain for the following reasons. - First of all, as Eyle 
points outj it lacks empirical evidence. One must not forget that the 
volition-theorists conceive an'act of will* as a conscious mental performance. 
In this sense hardly anybody performs a mental act before performing an 
action. Eyle is right in saying that nobody ever reports the the occurance 
of these acts. When I raise my hand, I do not also perform a separate 
mental act which is called an act of will.* Besides, the thesis that all 
actions are preceded and caused by an act of will suffers from being all- 
inclusive. It is more easy to say what does not involve an act of will 
than to say what does. Quite obviously, movements like breathing, digesting, 
shivering, reflex movement, an epileptic fit do not involve any conscious 
act of will. But it would be a mistake to think that in contrast to this 
all actions (or any actions at all) are caused by specific actsof will. The 
volition-theorists overlook the point that within actions there are varieties 
of activities which cannot all be covered by the notion of 'being preceded 
by an act of will. *
In ordinary language as well as in philosophy the concept of action 
is used as a blanket term to cover heterogeneous activities. If an action 
is always preceded by an act of will these heterogeneous activities cannot 
all be Called action. This becomes evident if one considers the various 
cases of behaviour we include within the notion of action. Within action 
we include cases like making a noise while eating soup, moving one's leg 
while reading, actions done under duress, actions of the maniac etc. These 
instances can hardly be called cases of behaviour caused by specific acts 
of will. The variegated nature of the concept of action shows how 
difficult it is to maintain that all actions are equally preceded and 
caused by an act of will and to differentiate actions from movements in 
terms of an act of will.
* This point will be discussed in detail in the next part in connection 
with James, Vesey and Imlay.
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This becomes evident also from the way the adjectives 'voluntary* 
and 'involuntary* are used in ordinary language in connection with an 
action. Both voluntary and involuntary behaviour is called action, but 
involuntary behaviour like blowing up a nuclear power station by pressing 
the wrong button cannot be called a specifically willed action. If action 
is always caused by an 'act of will' which is a conscious mental performance, 
then involuntary actions fall out of 'action* and the notion of involuntary 
action becomes a contradiction.
It can be argued that although an act of will fails to distinguish 
properly actions from movements, it can at least serve as a distinguishing 
criterion for voluntary action in contrast with involuntary action. The 
difficulty of this argument is that if voluntary actions are willed actions 
and involuntary actions are not, then how should one differentiate between 
these two on the one hand and mere movement on the other. Certainly, there 
is a difference between my leaning on the door bell and ringing it unknowingly 
and the reflex movement of my knee. Besides ^ volition-theorists introduce 
the notion of an act of will to give a causal exqilanation of an action as 
such and not just voluntary actions. Even if for argument's sake we say that 
a voluntary action is. caused by an act of will, there will be no way to prove 
it, because, as Eyle points out, nobody is ever conscious of performing such 
an act of will. Thus, when used as a distinguishing characteristic of 
voluntary action in contrast with involuntary, an act of will fails to 
account for the difference between action and non-action, and when used as 
a characteristic of action in contrast with non-action or movement, it fails 
to account for the difference between voluntary and involuntary action.
Ill Acts of Will and an Infinite Eegress
The second defect of the volition-theory is that it involves an 
infinite regress. The theory conceives acts of will as 'actions* and all 
actions as being caused by acts of will. Therefore, the obvious conclusion 
is that acts of will being actions are caused by further acts of will and so 
on ad infinitum.
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Eyle has made this point in his own ingenious way. He raises the 
question whether volition is a voluntary or involuntary act of mind and 
shows that either answer leads to absurdity. If it is involuntary in 
the sense that I cannot help willing such and such, then it is absurd to 
say that the action to which such willing gives rise is voluntary. On 
the other hand if it is voluntary then it requires a prior act of volition 
and so on ad infinitum.
It has been suggested by some philosophers, including Eyle himself, 
that one possible answer to the above-mentioned argument might be that the 
case of volition is a case where the adjectives ‘voluntary* and 'involuntary* 
do not apply. If an action in order to be voluntary or involuntary pre­
supposes the notion of volition, then these predicates cannot be applied 
to volition; to do otherwise is to argue in a circle. To this however 
Eyle's answer is that in that case adjectives like 'good* or 'bad* 'vir­
tuous* or 'wicked' cannot be applied to an act of will. In Eyle's opinion 
if the volition theorists think that the distinction between 'voluntary' 
and 'involuntary* can be meaningfully and sensibly applied to all actions 
there is no reason why it should not be applicable to an act of will as 
well. From this perspective Eyle is obviously right in showing the absurd­
ity of either predicating or not predicating these notions of an act of 
will, though there is not any real necessity to bring in the notions of 
'voluntary* and 'involuntary* to establish the infinite regress. The 
infinite regress arises from the very description of volition as an 'act 
of will* and of action as being caused by an act of will. So long as 
volition is described as an 'act of will* there is no possibility of 
avoiding the fallacy of infinite regress.
Some philosophers have tried to reanalyse and redefine the notion 
of volition to avoid the infinite regress. For instance, A.C. Ewing, 
facing this difficulty of an infinite regress, proposes to reserve the
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term 'volition* to cover phenomena where the volitional element is more 
conspicuous like 'efforts of will*, 'choice*, 'decisions* etc, and to keep 
the word 'conation* to indicate a general and wider sense of "aiming at" - 
"casual or vigorous". He says, "we must however still not think of volitions 
as single acts hut rather as processes which may take up a long time."^ In 
this account Ewing tries to avoid an infinite regress by treating volitions 
as processes rather than as actions. If volition is not an action then no 
question of its being caused by an act of will arises.
There is a recent attempt by 33.M. Armstrong to solve the problem.
He says, "We must in the first place distinguish between acts of the will 
and mere operations or motions of the will. An act is something that we do 
as opposed to something that merely happens. An act springs from our will.
An act of the will is therefore something that is itself brought into 
existence ^  the will. An intention formed as a result of deliberation 
would be an example. It follows that not all our acts can spring from 
acts of will, but that we must in the end come to acts that spring from 
mere operations of the will. Operations of the will are mere happenings.
They have causes, no doubt, but these causes do not lie in the will.
How operations of the will are not purposive in the same sense that 
actions are. Actions are purposive in the sense that they are caused by 
the will. Operations of the will are purposive in the sense that they cause 
actions. Only acts of will are purposive in both senses. So there is no 
regress involved in saying that actions are caused by the operations of the 
will."^
1. A.C, Ewing.^Prof. Eyle's attack on dualism. PAS 1952-53. Vol LIII. p6y
2. 33.M. Armstrong. A materialistic theory of Mind. pl37* 1968.
The emphasis is'^author's
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I think this solution of Armstrong's gives rise to unnecessary comp­
lication. If operations of the will are causes of the acts of the will hut 
they are not further caused by will, and if some actions are caused by an 
act of will, when in the long run all actions are caused by 'operations' of 
the will, then why bring 'acts of the will* on to the scene at all? Besides, 
what exactly Armstrong means by an 'act of the will* or by an 'operation of 
the will* is not very clear. He describes operations or motions of the 
will as 'happenings' and considers them as the source of everything we do,
i.e., acts of the will and actions. But he does not sufficiently explain 
how operations of the will, which are mere happenings, could give rise to 
something like 'actions' or 'acts of the will* which obviously are not 
happenings but our performances. Here again, I think Eyle's criticism holds 
good. If operations of the will are things which happen to us and we cannot 
help having them, then it is absurd to suppose that the acts of the will, 
and actions, which such 'motions' or 'operations* produce, are voluntary 
performances. Thus Armstrong's attempt to avoid infinite regress by saying 
that actions are caused by the operations of the will whose cause lies 
elsewhere than in the will, only gives rise to further problems.
So far I have been criticising the traditional theory of volition 
from Eyle's point of view. The main target of Eyle's criticism is the 
notion of an act of will preceding every action, and I have agreed with Eyle 
that such a notion of an 'act of will* is difficult to maintain. The notion 
fails to serve the purpose for which it is postulated. As not all actions 
are preceded by an 'act of will', it fails to separate actions from move­
ments on that ground. Furthermore, the view that every action needs an 
act of will and thaV^ct of will itself is an action involves an infinite 
regress.
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These are, however, the difficulties connected with the notion of an 
act of will. In the next part of this chapter I shall deal with the other 
tenet of the volition-theory viz., that the empirical identiflability of 
an sact of will is possible. In this connection I shall discuss William 
James* experiment with an anaesthetized patient which philosophers often 
cite as a case where the performance of an act of will can be proved. In 
conjunction with this I shall also discuss two more answers to the problem 
which the experiment with the anaesthetized patient presents. These are 
answers given by G.N.A. Vesey and R.A. Imlay. The views of James, Vesey 
and Imlay will be discussed not because they advocate or oppose the idea 
of an act of will, but because their views have particular relevance to 
the question of the empirical identif lability of an act of will.
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Part 2.
I The empirical identifiability of an act of will
It has been sometimes said that in certain cases the presence of an 
act of will is likely to be recognizable. References are made to such 
items as 'efforts of will', 'resolving', 'deciding', 'choosing* etc. As 
Mary Wamock says, "There is a set of phenomena which, rou^ily speaking, 
involve the will. What they have in common is their relevance to situations 
of initiating and carrying on action and getting things done. To invest­
igate these would be to investigate the will."^
It is not however very clear when one investigates will or an act
of will through the investigations of 'efforts of will*, 'deciding*,
'resolving', 'choosing' etc., whether one is identifying an act of will by
the use of these mental terms. The volition-theorists think that the
presence of an act of will is a universal characteristic of action and in
that sense it is hard to see how it can be so established by referring to
an 'effort of will* or 'resolving*, or 'deciding*. As Eyle puts it, "....
most voluntary actions do not issue out of conditions of indecision and
2
are not therefore results of settlements of indecisions." Effort of will, 
deciding, choosing etc., are certainly very different from a supposed 
universal characteristic of action.
A similar point is made by C.A. Campbell. He says that 'effort of 
will* and 'activity of will' should not be confused. "....these are quite 
distinct phenomena. No doubt there is an activity of a sort involved in 
all willing or choosing; but to be conscious of that activity is not 
necessarily to be conscious of exerting effort of will."^
1. D.F. Pears. Freedom & the Will. Ch. 2. pl5 19&3
2. C. Eyle. Concept of Mind. p68
3. C.A. Campbell."The psychology of efforts of willPAS XL 1939-40 p49-50
40.
One thing is certain that effort of will is always a conscious 
mental phenomenon and we cannot speak of unconscious effort of will. In 
most cases of action we are not conscious of such an effort. Therefore if 
an act of will is conceived as something that accompanies all cases of 
action, then certainly it cannot he identified with or investigated through 
an effort of will.
II William James and the identification of an act of will
William James^ in his discussion of volition has asked the question 
how to account for the surprise of the anaesthetised patient who thought that 
he had raised his hand, hut without any effective physical result, and 
answered the question in terms of volition or willing. This experiment of 
James is often cited by philosophers to establish the performance of an 
act of will. The reason for this is, as it is often argued, that if the - 
patient had not done anything there would be no reason for him to feel 
surprised. And it should be noted that the surprise of the patient cannot 
be explained away by saying that he has 'tried* to raise his hand. For the 
general consciousness of 'trying* or making any 'effort* is absent here; the 
patient is not really aware of any 'trying*.
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Mary Wamock however denies that James* experiment can supply us 
with an empirical reason for postulating acts of will. She suggests that 
the explanation might be that the patient was "in a set to obey and was 
aware of this." She compares the case with the general preparedness and 
expectation of a typist who gets equally surprised if the right letter 
does not come out as expected, and comments, "....it would be abgurd to 
identify this preparedness or expectation or whatever we call it, with 
performing an act of will."^
1. William James. Principles of Psychology Vol.II Ch.XXVI* p486, l9Ql
2. D.F. Pears. Op. cit. p23 
5. Ibid
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Mary Wamock is right in saying that James* experiment does not 
supply us with any reason for postulating acts of will and this I shall 
discuss later. But I do not think that one can explain the patient's 
surprise any better by saying that it is like the general awareness or 
expectation of a typist. First of all Mary Wamock does not explain what 
it is to be "in a set to obey", and secondly there is a difference between 
the patient's case of surprise and the typist's case of surprise. It is 
not clear whether the typist gets surprised because she is in a particular 
* mental set* or because she has done something, i.e., pressed a key (in 
this case the wrong key) ® On the other hand, in James* experiment the 
patient has not done anything overt, though he feels that he has done
something, i.e., raised his hand. The typist's case is a straight forward
case of involuntary action, whereas the patient's case does not involve any 
action at all. The two cases are quite different, though it is quite 
natural to think that just as the typist has pressed the wrong key the
patient has done something. This is because, so far as the experiment is
concerned the patient actually thinks that he has done something and this 
'something* appears to him as if he has raised his hand. Obviously, this 
'doing* cannot be the raising of his hand. Nothing such has actually 
happened. We cannot say that the patient has moved his muscles. The 
reason for this is not that we cannot go behind our muscles and contract 
them; or that we have not enough knowledge of physiology and the nervous 
system to move the appropriate muscles; or that sometimes we move our 
muscles by raising our hands. But the reason is that such a movement would 
be an indirect movement and the question will remain equally pressing as to 
what we do when we move our muscles. It will not do, if we call the muscle 
movements and discharging electric currents the 'necessary intermediate 
steps* for raising one's hand. Even then the question will arise 'how do 
we do that?'
The answer which William James gives to the question is that we will 
that the movement should take place.
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It ou^t to be mentioned that James does not use the expression *an 
act of will*, instead he uses only 'will* or 'willing'. His treatment of 
'will* sometimes suggests that by it he means a mental occurrence, and 
sometimes a mental performance. Particularly in the example of 'willing 
to slide the distant table* he does postulate an act of will; whereas the 
first part of his analysis suggests that willing is nothing more than having 
an idea.
I would like to show that in neither of the senses of 'willing*, is
James successful in providing us with a clear account of what a person
really 'does' when he moves his hand and why the patient is surprised.
Let us first see what happens, on James* view, when the patient
'wills' to move his hand. James says the idea of movement in the mind is
a sufficient cue for the movement to follow. There need not be anything
else in the mind except this idea. This is because consciousness is by
nature impulsive and a movement immediately follows upon the idea of it.
"We think of the act and it is done and that is all that introspection tells
us of the matter."^ Where an idea does not result in action other ideas
simultaneously present inhibit it. An additional conscious element "in
the shape of a fiat, mandate, or express consent has to intervene and
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precede the movement" only in special cases. In ordinary cases, says 
James, "we do not have a sensation or a thought and then have to add some­
thing dynamic to it to get a movement."^
If this is what happens in the case of 'willing' to do something, 
this is what presumably has happened in the patient's case as well. This 
means he has an idea of the movement in his mind, he thinks about the move­
ment, attends to the idea, but the action does not follow. It is hard to
1. W. James. Principles of Psychology. Vol. II p522 
2.Ibid /the
3. Ibid p526. The emphasis is/author's
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see how this can constitute the patient's performing: an 'act of will*. 
Thinking about an idea or attending to that idea does not really clarify 
what the person 'does'. This description of willing, i.e., having an 
idea in the mind and attending to it does not differentiate willing as a 
special ability from desiring, wishing, imagining or thinking of a move­
ment. Mere recalling of the sensible qualities of a particular movement 
and attending to that idea is not enough to be called an 'act of will' or 
a 'doing' because such 'attending* is also involved in wishing or desiring, 
though we never talk of an 'act* of wish or desire. There is nothing 
special about this 'attending* to an idea which can make willing a part­
icular type of performance.
This description of voluntary action, i.e., having an idea and 
attending to it which is immediately followed by a movement also obliterates 
the distinction between 'voluntary* and 'involuntary*• The description 
fits 'involuntary movement* very well. For instance if we think hard about 
an object and attend to its sensory qualities, certain physical movements 
of our body automatically follow; if we think about delicious food we start 
salivating. Thus if in willing the mind only attends to the idea of the 
movement without involving any element of desire or want to perform it, and 
the movement follows immediately, then voluntary action becomes analogous 
to involuntary movement.
James' idea that willing consists only of having an idea of movement 
and attending to it leads him to conclude that we can 'will* to slide a 
distant table.
Let us first mention the inconsistency of this striking conclusion of 
James with what he says in connection with the origin of voluntary movement.
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James says that voluntary movements are secondary, not primary 
functions of our organism.^ The movements are first performed involuntarily 
and we learn our potentialities of action from experience. The starting 
point of volition is a kinaesthetic idea of movement left in the memory 
hy experience. For James, 'willing to slide a distant table' is as much 
a good case of willing as is 'willing to write' and he seems to have ignored 
completely the differences between these two cases. In the case of 'willing 
to write' one knows what 'writing' is, but not what actually 'sliding a 
distant table' is. One does not know what sort of idea one will have to 
'attend to' in this latter case. In one's memory there is an impression 
of past successful cases of one's 'willing to write', but in the case of 
'willing to slide a distant table ' one does not really know what that can 
possibly mean. This is because the kinaesthetic idea formed from past 
experience to which the mind in willing is to attend is not present here.
Our experience has never told us what 'sliding a distant table' is. Con­
sequently, if voluntary movements are secondary functions of the organism,
'willing to slide a distant table* cannot be a case of willing. James* 
demand here is inconsistent with his earlier assertion that in willing the 
mind attends to an idea which is obtained from reflex or accidental exper­
iences. The 'guiding sensation' as James calls it is absent here.
Furthermore there is a fundamental difference between this sort of 
willing and the ordinary cases of willing. In this sort of extraordinary 
willing, there is no element of human agency involved; it is more approp­
riate to say here that 'I am willing the distant table to slide' than 'I 
am willing to slide the distant table'. In this connection, D.F. Pears 
has quite appropriately observed that here "....we will that something
should happen,* not that, "we will to do something" and this something which
2we will to happen we cannot in fact do.
1. Ibid p487
2. D.F. Pesirs. Freedom & the Will. p35
45<
James says that while people say that they cannot will the tahle to
slide, the image of the stationary table inhibits volition. He says,
"Only by abstracting from the thought of the impossibility am I able to
imagine strongly the table sliding over the floor, to make the bodily
1
«effort* which I do, and to will it to come towards me."
This seems to be James* answer to the question what one does when
one wills to move the table without actually touching it, and if there is
no difference between an ordinary case of willing and «willing to slide a
distant table *, then this is also what one does in ordinary cases of
willing. Now from what James says above, the «doing* seems to consist of
«imagining* strongly, «making bodily effort*, «willing the table to come
forward* etc. But this doing does not seem very different from mere
imagining that one is sliding the table oneself. The whole idea of
« sliding a distant table* is derived from the ordinary case of actually
sliding a table oneself. V/ithout this derivation we do not even know what
* imagining strongly etc., in this case means. If this is what one does
in extraordinary cases of willing, then it does not help us to progress
much on the matter. Instead of explicating the general ordinary cases of
2
willing, as J.F. Thomson has pointed out, this extraordinary case of 
willing is constructed on the analogy of the ordinary cases of willing and 
action. Besides, it does not throw any light on the case of the anaesth­
etized patient. The patient attends to the idea of raising his hand no 
doubt, but it cannot be said that he is aware of performing any «bodily 
effort* or of «imagining strongly* that his hand rises.
1. W. James. Op. cit. p560. foot note
2. D.F. Pears. Freedom and the will. p^6
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It can be argued against James that if willing to write and willing 
to slide a distant table are equally good examples of volition, then why 
does the case of «willing to write* when not followed by appropriate move­
ment, cause su3^ )rise, but the case of «willing to slide a distant table * 
does not? V/hen we will to write and writing does not follow we tend to 
think that something has gone wrong, but when we «will to slide the distant 
table* and the table does not move, we do not think that something has gone 
wrong* This shows the lack of resemblance between the two cases which 
James fails to notice.
James* description of willing also fails to explain the surprise of 
the patient. According to James the patient is surprised because his 
willing the movement to occur, i.e., his attending to the idea of the move­
ment, is not followed by the expected result. But he contradicts this 
explanation of the patient*s surprise by his example of 'willing to slide 
a distant table* where the failure of the expected result to occur does not 
cause any surprise.
We are now in a position to sum up James* view. We started with the 
question how to establish that in raising one's hand one performs an act of 
will. For this purpose we cited James* experiment with the anaesthetized 
patient. We assumed for the sake of argument that it is quite plausible 
that he has done something, otherwise the patient would not be surprised.
We found that one possible answer to what he has done, is what James says
i.e., he has performed an act of will. But unfortunately James* account 
of what happens when a person wills does not really show that there is a 
performance which can be described as an act of will. Besides in the 
context of his various examples of willing, willing fails to explain the 
surprise of the patient.
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The belief that the patient must have done something, otherwise he 
would not be surprised, is so strong that an attempt has been made to int­
roduce a sort of «mental doing* instead of a «real* doing to solve the 
problem. This is where the explanation given by G.N.A. Vesey comes in.
Ill G.N.A. Vesey and Mental-bodily movement
In his article «volition* and book the Embodied Mind, G.N.A. Vesey^ 
has tried to give an answer to the question what a man really «does* in 
a case like William James* experiment with the anaesthetized patient. The 
answer is: so far as the mental side of the patient is concerned he moves 
his hand.
This answer as it develops from Vesey*s criticism of James* ideo-
motor theory, is designed to avoid the difficulties of the causal approach.
The causal approach as made by William James and others, assumes that one's
moving one's hand is not direct but indirect through doing something else.
As such it postulates something in between us and our movement, while Vesey
wants an account which will not put anything between us and our movement.
His approach aims to be non-causal. It holds that when we move our hand
we just move it, we do not do anything else to move our hand. As
Wittgenstein says, "When I raise my arm «voluntarily* I do not use any
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instrument to bring the movement about'.* Such an approach puts one in a 
difficulty when one faces situations like William James* anaesthetized 
patient. Vesey says that in such situations we do not do nothing at all, 
nor do we move our hand physically, yet so far as our mental aspect as an 
agent is concerned we move our hand* Vesey calls this mental bodily move­
ment. It is essentially subjective. "Just as bodily sensation (a sens­
ation in part of the body) seems to be both something of which I am aware,
1. G.N.A. Vesey. (i)  ^volition;^Philosophy p$52 Vol. XXXVI, I96I
(ii) Embodied Mind. Ch. Ill & Ch. V. I965
2. L. Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. 1.6l4.l60e
Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. 1959 Oxford
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and yet not an object of awareness, so a mental bodily movement seems to 
be both something I do, and yet not an action."^
In order to clarify the situation, Vesey compares this mental bodily
movement with a parallel situation in perception. He says, "It may be
pointed out that what colour a carpet looks to someone depends on the state
of his nervous system. If he took certain drugs, it might look quite
different to him. His awareness of the carpet is thus subject to certain
conditions - there being light, his having eyes, an optic nerve, etc. Here
just as in the case of voluntary action, a causal account can be given of a
person's perception of a carpet as being, say, blue. And in the light of
this causal account, we may be invited to talk of what the person is immed- 
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iately aware of." V/hat he is immediately aware of, is truth-functionally 
independent of what the carpet is. But at the same time what he is 
immediately aware of is not something other than what he is aware of, when 
he is aware of the carpet, and to say that he is immediately aware of how 
the carpet looks to him is also to say that he is aware of the carpet.
"In saying ‘He is immediately aware of how the carpet looks to him* we are 
not debarred from saying, concurrently, that he is aware of the carpet. We 
are not debarred from saying this because ‘how it looks to him* is not another 
thing; and so it does not 'come between* the observer and the carpet. He
5
is aware of the carpet and he is immediately aware of how it looks to him."
In a similar way, says Vesey, the mental bodily movement does not come 
between the agent and his bodily movement. It is something which the agent 
does and yet not an action.
1. G.N.A. Vesey. Embodied &Ünd. plO?. Emphasis is the author's.
2. Vesey.Volition.'Philosophy I96I. p$62
5# Ibid. Emphasis is/author‘s.
the
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In a recently published defence^ of his theory Vesey tries to
clarify his position more explicitly. He says "....our language as it
stands does not provide the means of answering this question , and I
proposed an innovation: the patient raises his arm, but only so far as
the mental side of him as an agent is concerned. I proposed this as a way
of talking whereby we were relieved of the embarrassment of having to say
that the patient had no reason in what he had done, for being surprised to
find that his arm had not moved. It was intended to be a therapeutic 
2
linguistic move".
A critical analysis of Vesey's theory
Vesey distinguishes the mental bodily movement from the 'willing*
of past philosophers. This mental bodily movement is not causally
related to movement, as 'willing* is thought to be; nor is it characteriz-
able independently of the movement willed. The mental bodily movement
is parasitic on the idea of 'bodily movement*. It is merely the mental
side of bodily movement. Vesey says that this concept we have only if
"we understand something by the question 'how do you know, your hand is
moving?* asked when a person is directly moving his hand, but can neither
?
see it, nor feel it, moving.
The purpose of introducing such a concept of mental bodily movement 
is clear enough. On the one hand, Vesey wants to avoid the instrumental 
explanation of simple actions. When I raise my hand I raise my hand 
directly. I do not do anything else to raise my hand. Thus he tries to 
avoid inserting the notion of an act of will between us and our actions and 
to save action from being an indirect performance. On the other hand, he
1. Vesey. Do I ever directly raise /by arm? Philosophy I967. pl48
* Why James' patient is surprised to find that his arm has not moved. 
2e Ibid pl48
3. Vesey. Embodied M n d  pl08
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wants to provide us with a means to explain the surprise of the anaesth­
etised patient without obliterating the notion of a 'direct action'.
The logic of the situation thus demands that a mental bodily move­
ment cannot be a real action for in that case it will be equivalent to an 
'act of will* which Vesey does not want it to be; nor it can be a completely 
pseudo action, for in that case the surprise of the patient will remain 
unexplained. Yet, I think Vesey*s concept of a 'mental bodily movement* 
turns out to be what it should not be, i.e., either the equivalent of an 
act of will or a therapeutic linguistic d e viceand thus fails to serve
the purpose which it is meant to serve. Vesey says a mental bodily move-
2 3
ment seems to be both something we ^  and yet not an action. In his reply 
to Imlay's criticism of his theory, he holds that the patient's surprise must 
be explained in terms of something he has done, thou^ in his article 
'volition* and in Embodied Lüind he insists that the mental bodily movement 
is not a real doing. It is hard to attach any meaning to this. Either
mental bodily movement is a proper 'doing* or not. If it is a proper doing 
then the surprise of the patient is explained but *I raise my hand' becomes 
an indirect action. Moreover this explanation that the patient moves his 
hand mentally is more or less like the explanation given in terms of an act 
of will and consequently faces the same logical difficulties. On the other 
hand if it is not a proper doing but just a linguistic device, then the 
surprise of James* patient remains unexplained in return for the action of 
raising his hand being direct. If the patient has not really done anything, 
there is no need for him to be surprised. After all, he does not know any­
thing about Vesey*s therapeutic linguistic move!
1© Vesey of course prefers 'therapeutic linguistic device* 
2© Ibid. Embodied A'hnd plO?
3. Ibid. Philosophy I967. pl49
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In spite of Vesey*s repeated insistence that a mental bodily move­
ment is not something other than the bodily movement, but is just the mental 
side of it, it is quite evident that they can not be so intimately related 
as they are thou^t to be. Vesey says that it can be said truthfully of 
a person that so far as his mental aspect is concerned he moved his hand, 
even when physically his hand was at rest.^ It is quite evident from this
that a mental bodily movement is not the same thing as a bodily movement.
The former is clearly independent of the latter. But it is a one-way 
independence. If the mental side does not occur, *I moved my hand* cannot 
be true, and it cannot be distinguished from *my hand moved*. But the 
mental side can occur without *I moved my hand* being true. Thus the 
statements, *so far as my mental side is concerned I moved my hand* and *I 
moved my hand* are different. They describe different situations. The 
former can be true without the actual movement taking place, whereas the 
latter depends on the former as well as on the actual movement taking place. 
In short, *he moved his hand mentally* does not imply anything about whether 
he has moved his hand or not. Thus the mental bodily movement is made 
independent of, and contingently connected with physical movement. But 
this is just what Vesey wants to avoid. Also, the analogy with perception
does not throw light on the concept of a mental bodily movement. Vesey
here mistakenly takes the relation between *so far as my mental aspect is 
concerned, I moved my hand* and *I moved my hand* as the same as that which 
exists between an 'immediate awareness of the carpet* and 'awsireness of the 
carpet*. These two relations are far from being the same. Being 'Imm­
ediately aware of the carpet* and 'being aware of the carpet* are not two
2
different kinds of awarenesses. There is no difference between * immediate 
awareness* and 'awareness* of the carpet. From this perspective a mental 
bodily movement and a bodily movement are two different kinds of movements.
1. G.N.A. Vesey. ^ VolitionJ Philosophy p365. I96I
2. See R.A. Imlay on this point. Philosophy I967. pl24
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Performing a mental bodily movement does not mean performing a bodily 
movement, whereas in the case of perception if one is 'immediately aware* 
of something, one is also * aware* of the same thing.
It is really hard to see how Vesey* s account differs from an indirect
causal account of action in terms of an act of will and how it succeeds in
showing that the mental bodily movement is not something other than the bodily 
movement. Vesey carefully refrains from committing himself to saying that 
we move our hands by moving our hands mentally. But if there is no such 
connection there is no reason why the patient should be surprised when the 
bodily movement does not occur. Besides, if we are allowed to postulate 
the notion of a mental bodily movement between the patient and his moving 
his hand, in order to explain his suiprise (which Vesey of course does not 
allow) then there is no reason why one should not extend such a notion even 
to cases where the patient succeeds in moving his hand.
IV R.A. Imlav and a special sense of 'trying*
In a recent criticism of Vesey*s notion of a mental bodily movement,
Imlay^ has made a good point. He says "Vesey has mistakenly taken the
identity in terms of kind of awareness underlying the expression * immediate
awareness* and 'awareness* when no reference is made to the object of
awareness to indicate the same identity in the two kinds of actions 
2
mentioned". Imlay's view is that, whereas awareness and immediate aware­
ness are one and the same thing and distinguished only by their objects, 
there is no such common element of 'doing* in raising one's hand and men­
tally raising it (in the way the patient does).
With this argument of Imlay I agree, but the answer he gives to the 
question why the anaesthetized patient was surprised seems to me quite 
dubious.
1. R.A. Imlay.^Do I ever directly raise my arm? Philosophy 196?. pll9
2. Ibid pl24
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Imlay's answer to the question about the patient's surprise is that
he has 'tried*. He says that in the patient's case there is no 'doing*;
the only 'doing* occurs when we actually (i.e. physically) raise the hand.
In the patient's case there is only a 'trying* and this sense of trying
does not consist of any doing, unlike the other sense of 'trying* which
involves doing, viz., trying to start the car by turning the ignition key.
Imlay says that Vesey *s argument^ would be conclusive only if to try means
to exert an effort of will. The patient cannot be said to have tried in
that sense for he is not conscious of exerting any effort of will. But
there is another sense of trying "where saying that some one has tried is
just a more positive way of saying that he has not succeeded in doing what he
set out to do*....on this model, the application of the term 'trying* can
be seen as an ad hoc device for bridging the gap between what the person
2thinks he is doing and the fact that he is doing nothing."
To a certain extent Imlay* s comment reveals the crux of the whole 
issue i.e., that the patient's surprise is not to be explained in terms of 
any doing. But how far the patient's case should be described as 'trying* 
seems to be disputable.
Imlay says that * trying* not only means exerting an effort of will 
in the face of obstacles, but is also a positive way of saying that someone 
has not succeeded in doing what he * sets out to do*. I think Imlay fails 
to give us enough analysis of the phrase 'set out to do*. We often say 
*he tried to get through the exam* or *he tried to save the child from 
drowning*, meaning that the person concerned here has failed to do what he 
set out to do. But by this, do we really mean that he has done nothing?
On the contrary, in each of these cases, there is a range of different
lo G.N.A. Vesey. Philosophy I96I. p355* also see Philosophy I967. pl49 
2o H.A. Imlay. Philosophy I967. pl25
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activities which the person concerned has done and which constitute his 
'trying*. Otherwise we would not say that he 'has tried*. When we say 
that a person has tried to get through the examination, what we mean is 
that he concentrated in his studies and did not waste his time in doing 
other things. Similarly, when we say that a person has tried to save the 
child from drowning we mean that he ju%ed into the water, searched for 
the child etc. Hence, it is not true that to say that somebody 'has 
tried* is only a positive way of saying that *he has failed....*. It 
means more than that. It also means that the person concerned has per­
formed certain necessary activities which constitute his 'trying*. In 
this sense, the patient definitely cannot be said to have tried^for he has 
done nothing, nor he is conscious of doing anything (except of course 
raising his hand) which can be considered as his 'trying* or 'setting* 
out to move his hand# I doubt very much whether James* patient would ever 
describe himself as "having tried to raise his arm once he had discovered 
that he did not succeed in what he was intent upon d o i n g . T h e  patient's 
experience does not really enable him to say that he was trying to raise 
his hand. Imlay's point can be proved only if there is a sense of trying 
where it can be said that he has tried, though his 'trying* clearly will not 
involve any 'doing* whatsoever. But there any such sense of trying where 
trying does not consist of any doing at all?
2
Let us take the example of a runner who can run only five miles per 
hour, and is running at the rate of five miles per hour# As he cannot run
more than five miles per hour, he is already doing whatever he can do, in
running five miles per hour# Under such circumstances if he wants to try 
to run six miles per hour and says that now he is trying to fun six miles 
per hour, probably his 'trying* will not consist of any doing, as he cannot 
do anything more than what he is already doing.
1. Imlay. Op. cit. pl25. Imlay emphasises the word 'discovered*
2* I owe this example to Dr. A.R. Lacey
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However, this example does not really show that the runner's 'trying' 
does not consist of any doing. True, that his trying to run 6 miles per 
hour does not consist of anything extra i.e., more than what he is already 
doing. But it consists of what he is already doing viz. running 5 miles 
per hour. Of course he could he doing this without trying to run faster; 
hut there is no reason why in this case what he is doing will not have two 
different descriptions viz., running 5 miles per hour and trying to run 6 
miles per hour. What is really extra here is his desire to run 6 miles per 
hour. This case does not appear to me any different from a case where the 
agent exerts his efforts of will in the presence of obstacles.
Imlay's application of the term 'trying' is a very special application 
and perhaps it may be seen as an ad hoc device to bridge the gap between 
what a person thinks he is doing and the fact that he is doing nothing, or 
nothing extra. One can of course extend this notion of 'trying' to cover 
cases like James* patient's but that cannot be done without sacrificing 
what we ordinarily understand by 'trying*.
However it seems that James' patient cannot be said to have tried in 
any of the senses of 'trying* we have discussed so far. First of all, he 
has not tried in the sense of exerting an effort of will in the face of an 
obstacle. He has not been conscious of any such effort. Secondly, he has 
not tried in the sense where 'he has tried* means *he has failed to do what 
he set out to do* and his trying consists of at least some form of doing. 
James' patient has not done anything at all. Lastly, he cannot be said to 
have tried in the sense the runner has tried. , The difference between 
James' patient and the runner is that James* patient does not think that he 
is trying to do something. On the contrary he thinks that he is doing 
something i.e., raising his hand. He will never describe the situation as 
'trying* to do something. The term * trying * in any of these senses does 
not really explain James* patient's surprise.
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V V/hy is the patient surprised?
In the rest of my discussion I shall try to give an answer to the 
question 'why is the patient surprised'. But before doing this some 
recapitulation is necessary.
In my opinion both Vesey and James are wrong in assuming that the 
patient's surprise should be explained in terms of a 'doing' ; though I 
must admit that I would be mistaken if I ascribed this view to them without 
adding any further qualification. Let us take James first. V/e have seen 
that though he holds that what the patient does is willing the movement to 
take place, his use of the concept 'willing* does not differ much from 
'wishing*. It lacks the active element of causal agency. It fails to 
provide sufficient reason for the patient to be surprised. James also 
confuses his point when he describes the 'willing to slide the distant 
table* as a proper case of willing. James is however right in recognizing 
that the cause of the patient's surprise must be sought in volitional states. 
If 'willing* in James* analysis could be taken as a positive 'act of will', 
then the patient's surprise perhaps would be explained, but that together 
with the idea that all actions are caused by an act of will would involve a 
regress. However, James* account does not show that any such act is per­
formed by the patient when he 'wills' to move his hand.
So far as Vesey is concerned, he is right in recognizing that the 
patient's surprise cannot be explained in terms of any 'trying* for there is 
no awareness of 'trying' in any ordinary sense of 'trying*, and he is also 
right in recognizing that what happens when the patient proceeds to move his 
hand cannot be described as a 'real* doing. Any description in terms of a 
real 'doing* will lead to an infinite regress as happens in the case of an 
act of will. But the solution which Vesey offers, i.e., his theory about 
the patient's performing a mental bodily movement, does not really solve the
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problem satisfactorily. Vesey*s insistence that the patient's surprise
must be explained in terms of a 'doing* together with his refusal to accept 
it as a real doing confus es his point.
In this respect I think Imlay is right in showing that the surprise 
of the patient is not to be explained in terms of a 'doing', for there is 
really no 'doing* in the patient's case. But Imlay's special sense of 
* trying* is also difficult to understand. As there is no evidence that 
such a special 'trying* has taken place, there is no reason why the patient's 
surprise should be explained by this special sense of ' trying*. To suppose 
this is to indulge in unintelligibility just as Vesey has done in using the 
phrase 'mental bodily movement *.
We are still left with the problem of why the patient gets surprised. 
There is no doubt that the case is an extraordinary case and any final explanr- 
ation is difficult to find. It has however emerged from our discussion 
that the philosophers we have considered seem to think that the surprise of 
the patient cannot be explained unless it is assumed that he has done some­
thing. This 'doing* is sometimes described as an act of will, sometimes as 
a mental bodily movement - sometimes as a real action, sometimes as an action 
which is at the same time not an action. But one cannot proceed further 
than this. ,1b further elaboration of such a 'doing' can be provided. Be­
sides there is no emprical evidence that the patient has performed an act of 
will or a mental bodily movement, though the surprise of the patient shows 
that there is a reason for his getting surprised.
Here I suppose one can refer to what Imlay says about the 'positive 
1
attitude* of the patient towards the experiment. I do agree with Imlay
1. Ibid pl26
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that the positive attitude of the patient, i.e., his willingness to co-op­
erate with the experiment, distinguishes his case from the case of a person 
who remains indifferent towards the experiment. But Imlay does not give 
any further elaboration of this 'positive attitude* or 'willingness to 
co-operate*. It seems to me that the phrase 'willingness to co-operate* 
is rather vague; one may be willing to co-operate in various situations, 
but not all 'willingnesses to co-operate* can be called antecedents of 
actions. Here I think Vesey is right in pointing out in his reply to Imlay 
that unless this positive attitude of the patient is further explained the 
problem remains unresolved.
In ny opinion the patient's positive attitude consists of his wanting 
to raise his hand which the unco-operative one does not want to do. The 
patient's case can thus be differentiated from the other person's case on 
the ground of his desire or want to raise his hand. Imlay omits any mention 
of the term 'desire or want* to explain the positive attitude of the patient,
though I do not know what that positive attitude can be, except that the
patient wants to raise his hand.
The solution, that the patient was surprised because he wanted to 
raise his hand but his want misfired because of the peculiarity of the cir­
cumstances which he was not aware of, has its own advantage. First of all, 
it avoids the logical difficulties involved in the notion of an act of will, 
because here want is not conceived as a performance. Secondly, as the 
solution does not consider wants or desires as necessarily conscious perfor­
mances like an act of will, it leaves room for unconscious desires or wants 
to act as causes. Thirdly, the solution does not consider wants or desires
of the patient as a passive occurrence of an idea to do something so that
the case like 'sliding a distant table without touching it* can be described 
as a case of willing. The want or desire of the patient is not just a 
passive wish to do something. 7/hen the patient wants to raise his hand.
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his want is ready to play its causal role. Under normal circumstances his 
want is sufficient to move his hand. But the patient's case is not a 
normal situation, and he is completely unaware of the situation. So he 
mistakenly thinks that he has raised his hand. Lastly, the explanation of 
the patient's surprise in terms of his desire or want has one more advantage 
which is: it does not introduce unfamiliar ideas like mental-hodily move­
ment or 'trying* which does not consist of any doing.
I admit that the presence of the deceptive feelings makes the 
patient's case very peculiar. There might he a neuro-physiological 
explanation for the occurrence of such a deceptive feeling or thought, hut 
that would not be the patient's reason for becoming surprised. He became 
surprised because what he thought happened was not compatible with what 
actually happened. The answer to the question why he thought that he 
raised his hand however lies with the fact that he wanted to raise his hand. 
The other person did not want to raise his hand and he did not have any 
deceptive experience. ■ Thus the real cause of the surprise lies with the 
patient's desire or want to raise his hand.
James has not informed us whether the patient still feels as if he 
moves his hand when he wants to move it, once he comes to know that his hand 
is anaesthetized. It is unlikely that the deception will ever happen once 
the patient knows that he is under anaesthetic.
We are now in a position to see the relevance of the patient's case 
for the purpose of this chapter in general.
I started with the question of the empirical identifiability of an 
act of will. The phrase 'act of will* is used in the same sense in which 
the traditionalists have used it, i.e. as a performance. I evaluated the 
attempt to establish the empirical identifiability of an act of will through
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the cases of will or volition which misfire. In this connection William 
James* experiment with the anaesthetized patient was introduced and various 
answers given to explain the surprise of the patient - particularly the 
answer given in terms of a performance - were considered.
I have tried to show that the whole question as to what the patient 
*does* in such a case is wrongly posed. For, there is no 'doing* or action 
involved in the patient's case. The patient's case does not help to 
establish that an action i.e. an act of will is performed. His deceptive 
feeling viz. as if he has 'raised his hand*, cannot be the act of will. If 
there is an act of will he must have performed it before he feels as if he 
raises his hand. But he has no consciousness of performing any such act. 
All that happens before he feels that he raises his hand is his desire or 
want to raise his hand.
Therefore the attempt to explain the patient's surprise in terms of 
an act of will and thereby to establish the performance of such an act does 
not prove anything. Hence, the traditional claim of the empirical iden­
tifiability of an act of will cannot really be established from this case of 
volition which misfires.
Conclusion
We can now sum up the arguments of this chapter. I started with the 
traditional theory of volition as a causal theory of action. I considered 
the two tenets of the theory viz., that an action is always preceded by an 
act of will and that the empirical identifiability of an act of will can be 
established. I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that the success 
of the traditional theory as a causal theory of action depends very much on 
the conclusiveness of these two tenets. In part 1 of this chapter, I tried 
to show the various inconsistencies involved in the idea of an action being 
always preceded by an act of will. In part 2 of this chapter, I tried to
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show that the empirical identifiability of an act of will cannot be estab­
lished. First of all such acts cannot be identified through efforts of 
will, resolving decisions etc. The agent has no consciousness of performing 
such an act before performing an action. Secondly, cases of volition which 
misfire, do not show that an act of will is performed. Thus the two tenets 
of the traditional theory are far from being conclusive and this makes the 
theory itself an unsatisfactory causal theory of action.
However James* experiment with the anaesthetized patient has thrown 
light on the possibility that a causal explanation of action can be provided 
in terms of something which is mental and not a physical phenomenon. I said 
before that the patient felt surprised because he wanted to raise his hand and 
mistakenly thought that he had raised his hand. Under ordinary circumstances 
such a want or desire is enough to produce the action and from this perspec­
tive the traditional theory and James' ideo-motor theory have relevance so 
far as they maintain that the explanation of the patient's surprise should 
be sought in volitional states. If 'volition* or 'willing* can be used as 
a blanket term to cover the different stages of wish, desire, want, intention , 
etc., then it can be said that what the patient did was that he 'willed* to 
raise his hand. But to use the locution 'what he did', is not to suggest 
that he performed an action. Here lies the difference between the tradit­
ional theory and the theory that desire or want is a cause of action.
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Chapter III
Are Explanations of Actions in terms of reasons causal explanations?
In the introduction I remarked that I would try to show that full 
justice to the relation between the concept of action and the concept of 
reason can be done only by viewing it as causal. In this chapter I shall 
try to justify the thesis that explanations of actions in terms of reasons
are in fact causal explanations.
Before proceeding further some recapitulation is necessary. In
chapter I, in connection with R.S. Peters* treatment of the issue of the 
causal explanation of action, I tried to show that the opponents of the
causal theory of action were mistaken in thinking that causal explanation
is always mechanical explanation and that action cannot be causally explained 
unless it is reduced to movement. I put forward the idea that causal 
explanations include mechanical explanations but are not synonymous with them. 
To give a causal explanation of action one does not have to give an explan­
ation in terms of physico-chemical or mechanical concepts, or to reduce 
actions to a series of movements.
Once this misconception about what sort of concepts and laws are in­
volved in a causal explanation is removed, it is easy to see that the causal 
explanation of an action can be given in terms of concepts and laws other 
than mechanical ones.
In this respect the traditional theory of volition is an attempt to 
provide a causal explanation of action in terms of something other than 
mechanical concepts i.e., in terms of an act of will. In chapter II,I 
tried to show the insufficiencies of the traditional theory as a causal
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theory of action which are as follows: first of all, a human action cannot
be said to be preceded by an act of will; secondly, the empirical identif­
iability of an act of will is hard to establish; and thirdly the idea that 
a^l actions are caused by acts of will and acts of will are also actions, 
involves an infinite regress. I also mentioned that though confused and 
mistaken in their analysis of an act of will, the traditionalists are right 
to think that the explanation of action involves the concept of mentalitjr.
The thesis which I intend to support is however not very different
from the traditional theory of volition. It maintains that an explanation 
of action in terms of wants, desires etc., is a causal explanation. It 
resembles the traditional theory in the following respects. Like the trad­
itional theory it considers that action needs an explanation in terms of 
mental concepts. Like the traditional theory it holds that explanations of 
actions given in terms of desires, wants etc., are in fact causal explanations. 
The point in which the thesis differs from the traditional theory is that it 
does not advocate the idea that actions are caused by acts of will or that 
desires or wants to perform an action are themselves performances.
I Desires or wants to perform actions are not themselves performances
In chapter II, I tried to show that the misconception on which the
traditional theory rests is that that which causes the action is also an
action. I want to maintain that though the causal explanation of an action 
is to be sought among the desires, wants etc.,^ for the actions, these are not 
themselves performances.
In connection with the traditional theory of volition we have noted 
the logical and empirical difficulties connected with the idea of an act of 
will. The same sort of difficulties will arise if one tries to view 
desires, wants etc., as performances. But before going in to the detail
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of these difficulties it is necessary to mention the difference which exists 
between the traditional notion of an act of will or volition and the concepts 
of desire, want etc. The traditional notion of an act of will suffers from 
being completely non-empirical. Its non-empiricality is two-fold. Firstly, 
we cannot empirically identify volition as a mental state or occurrence and 
secondly, we cannot offer empirical evidence for performing an act of will.
In contrast with this, desires, wants etc., are common psychological exper­
iences. No one will doubt the empirical nature of these psychological 
experiences. The doubt arises only when they are viewed as performances.
The primary defect of the contention that desires, wants etc., are 
performances,is its non-empirical character. There is no empirical evidence 
that when a person desires or wants to do something he is performing an 
action. There is nothing like an act of desiring or an act of wanting.
When we desire to do x we just 'desire* and nothing else. If there is an 
act of desiring then one will obviously find that in performing an action 
one performs another action - an internal action. But there is no empir­
ical evidence for the performing of this internal act of desiring. Just 
like an act of will, nobody has ever reported performing an act of desire or 
want.
The second defect of such a contention is that it involves an infinite 
regress. In connection with an act of will we have seen the difficulty of 
maintaining the contention that all actions are caused by an act of will 
which itself is an act. The infinite regress is involved because such an 
act needs another act of will and so on ad infinitum. A similar regress 
will arise if desires or wants are treated as performances and if performances 
or actions in general are explained in terms of desires and wantb. If my 
behaviour is an action because it is desired or wanted by me, and if all
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actions are so desired, and my desire or want in its turn is an action, then 
it will need another desire as its cause and so on ad infinitum. I am not 
denying however that there can he mental acts like forming an intention, but 
such acts are not the direct cause of actions. It is the intention which 
is so formed that is claimed to be the cause of an action.
II Are actions movements caused by our desires?
Before proceeding further it is necessary to dissociate ourselves from 
the traditional theory that actions are movements caused by acts of will.
The traditionalists* main concern is to show that the notion of an act of will 
is required to distinguish an action from a movement. The point which I 
want to make in this connection is that actions involve movements in most 
cases no doubt, but they are not just physical movements caused by our 
desires and wants.
If actions were movements caused by our desires etc., it would have 
been more natural to talk about desires to move certain par^tsof our bodies 
than desires to do certain actions. When an agent desires or wants to do 
something, the primary object of his desire or want is not to perform a par­
ticular set of specific movements; the object of his desire or want is an 
action. The performance of the movement is only secondary in the process 
of performing an action. For instance, in the desire to sign a contract,
* signing a contract* is more important to the agent than the physical move­
ments of his hand muscles involved in such an action. This however does not 
mean that a physical movement can never be the object of a person's desire.
In certain situations flexing one's biceps can very well be the object of 
one's desire or want. But such physical movements become objects of 
desires or wants only when the action itself is nothing more than performing 
such movements. In other words, the aim in the action is just to perform
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that physical movement. But ordinarily when we want to do something like 
signalling, signing a contract, keeping an appointment, interviewing people 
etc., the movements involved in such actions are not objects of our desires. 
We never think about the movement aspects of the actions we do. If actions 
were movements caused by our desires, it would have been commonplace to talk 
about desires to move our muscles in such and such^way so that the movement 
thus caused can be an action described as signing a contract or interviewing 
an undergraduate.
Secondly, by holding the view that actions are movements caused by an
act of will, the traditional theory also suggests that all actions have a
specific movement aspect - and this is far from being the case. Simple 
actions like winking, kicking or raising one's hand have got a specific 
movement aspect but not all actions are like them. Sophisticated actions 
like organizing a meeting^ conducting aæminar, judging a case, or even 
playing football are not limited to a particular type of movement, though 
they involve some sort of movements., Here the situation is not that a 
particular set of specific movements caused by a desire or want fulfils an 
action-description, but that a particular action caused by the agent's 
desire makes a set of specific movements relevant for the purpose.
Besides there is a whole range of mental performances which do not
involve any physical movement, e.g., doing a sum mentally, solving a logical 
problem in one's head, or thinking about a line and deciding what it is going 
to be. These mental performances are not mere successions of mental happ­
enings. On the contrary, just like physical action, the process starts with
the desire, want or intention to do something mentally and ends up with the 
achievement of some results. This happens when one tries to rhyme a word 
in one's head. It starts with one's intending to do it and the intention
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sustains the action until the result intended is achieved. Hence it would 
be a mistake to think that all actions have an overt movement-aspect.*
In the light of this discussion we see that an action is not a move­
ment caused by a desire or want and when we say reasons are causes of actions 
we are not using the term 'action' 'proleptically'meaning that what is 
really caused is a piece of physical movement. In this connection, Yolton's 
comment is worth quoting: "We must keep in mind that what is done in cases of 
action is not the body moved but a debt repaid, a truth told, an attitude 
honoured. Because in most if not all actions the body moves, we are in­
clined to locate the mental cause between some mental event or the person and
2
those bodily movements."
Naturally the question will arise that if actions are not movements, 
then what are they? It will be naive to think that this question which is 
one of the difficult questions in philosophy, can be answered in a simple, 
straightforward, unambiguous way. Perhaps action can best be described as 
a change - mental or physical, causally produced by the desire or want of 
an agent - which almost always involves movement but is neither identical 
with movement nor is it movement caused in a special way.
* Even if it is argued that the movements involved in mental performances 
are movements in the brain, it still cannot be claimed that a mental 
performance is equal to a brain process plus a desire to act mentally, 
because of the same reasons as mentioned in the case of a physical 
performance.
1# D.F. Pears. 'Desires as Causes of Actions'. Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Lectures Vol. 1. I966-7. p92
2. J.W. Yolton. hand goes out to you'. Philosophy I966. pl51
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III Actions involve a reference to the agent's desires, wants etc.
It is important to note that in actions, in contrast with movements, 
there is always a causal reference, direct or indirect, to the agent's 
desires or wants. Sheer physical movements like a jerk, a spasm, are not 
referable to the desire or v/ant of the agent. It is noticeable that where 
there is no reference to the agent's wants or desires we withhold the des­
cription of action altogether, as happens in the case of an epileptic fit 
or a spasm. On the other hand wherever there is the possibility of the 
agent's desire or want being involved there is the possibility of an action- 
description. In this sense full-blown actions involve a direct aeference to 
the agent's desire or want. If in certain circumstances a physical move­
ment is caused by the agent's desire or want, then it ceases to be a pure 
physical movement. For instance, if one can lower one's blood pressure at 
will, then that is a case of action and not merely of a movement.
Quite obviously the question will arise that if actions always in­
volve a reference to the agent's desire or want, then how can one consider 
involuntary actions as actions? Involuntary actions like knocking down 
the flower vase while taking one's coat off, or blowing up the nuclear power 
station by pressing the wrong button, do not presuppose any desire or want 
of the agent.
The notion of an 'involuntary action' itself is an undefined notion 
and the concept of action is applicable to it only in a wider sense. In­
voluntary actions are not full blown actions and it is not so obvious that 
the agent's desires or wants are involved in them in the same sense as they 
are involved in a full-blown action.
69
However, though it is true that when someone knocks over the flower vase 
in the process of doing something else, he does not really mean to knock 
it over, still indirectly such involuntary actions are referable to what 
an agent wants to do. The description that he knocked over the flower 
vase in a sense seems to be another description of what he did viz., 'took 
off his coat'. Hence, the involuntary action of knocking over the flower 
vase is also describable by some other description i.e. 'taking his coat 
off under which it is desired or intended. This is partly the reason why 
involuntary actions are regarded as actions though they involve only an 
indirect causal reference to the agent's desires or wants.
The contention that involuntary actions are referable to the agent's 
desires or wants because they are describable by some other descriptions 
under which they can be said to be desired or intended, however presents a 
problem.
The problem is: if causality is extensions!, then if A is the cause 
of B, then it will remain the cause of B under any description of B. But, 
to quote Bichman in this connection, "A given action has a number of diff­
erent possible descriptions. Yyhat constitutes someone's reason for per­
forming the action described in one way clearly need not constitute a reason
for performing it when it is described in another way." .....".... if the
causal relation is extensions! and if the primary reason* for an action is
its cause, then the primary reason for the action must remain the reason
1
for the action under any description'.'
* According to Davidson "The primary reason for an action is its cause." 
D. Davidson.'Actions, Reasons and Causes'. Free Will and Determinism, 
ed. B. Berofsky. I966. p222
l.R.J. Richman. 'Reasons and Causes: Some Puzzles'. Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy. 1969» p44
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This argument is sometimes considered as strong evidence for the 
thesis that reasons are not causes. If reasons are causes and causes are 
extensional, then reasons should be extensionalo Therefore, if a man's 
reason for taking his coat off is that he desires to do so and in the 
process of doing so he knocks down the flower vase, and if his knocking 
down the flower vase is another description of what he is doing, then one 
should be able to say that his reason for knocking down the flower vase is 
his desire to take the coat off. But this seems absurd. Naturally the 
question arises that if reasons are causes of actions, then how can a want 
or desire be a reason for action under one description and not a reason for 
doing it under another? Consequently it is suggested that reasons cannot 
be causes of actions. To quote Richman "....it is this feature of the 
description of events, namely, that the causal relation's holding is indep­
endent of the mode of description of its relata, while the relation of being 
a reason for (an action) is not similarly description-independent, that 
renders plausible the differentiation of causes and reasons".^
Richman's argument assumes that if reasons are causes then they must 
be synonymous. If they are synonymous, then a reason-action relation should 
be extensional like a causal relation. But to say that reasons are causes 
is not to say that reasons and causes are synonymous. If the concept of 
reason is not synonymous with the concept of cause, the former does not have 
to be extensional like the latter.
According to Davidson, towards whomRichman's criticism is mainly
directed, rationalisation is a species of ordinary causal explanation. He
2
does not think that reasons are synonymous with causes. In a similar way,
1* Ibid. p47* The emphasis is the author's.
2. Davidson, as a matter of fact, recognizes the difference between 
rationalisations and other forms of causal explanations, "....our 
first condition for primary reasons (Cl)* is designed to help set 
rationalizations apart from other sorts of explanation. If rational­
ization is, as I want to argue, a species of causal explanation, then 
justification, in the sense given by Cl, is at least one differentiating 
property." D. Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons and Causes'. Free Will and 
Determinism, ed. B. Berofsky. p228 
* Cl - Ibid. p223
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in this thesis, reasons are considered as a kind of cause, and it is also 
admitted that causal explanation, being wider than any of its sub-classes, 
can include both mechanical as well as reason-action explanation. The 
concept of cause is a genus in relation to reason, and therefore it is not 
illogical to say that as a sub-class of causal relations, a reason-action 
relation can have its specific difference, i.e., it can be non-extensional 
without being non-causal.
Besides, in view of the different types of reasons, it can be said 
that though someone's reason for performing the action described in one way 
may not be 'his reason' for performing the action when described in another 
way, it can still remain 'the reason' for his performing the action when 
described in this other way. Thus a person's desire to take his coat off 
may not be 'his reason' for knocking down the flower vase, but it can still 
be 'the reason* for his knocking down the flower vase. Hence, when an 
action is given alternative descriptions, the desire concerned does not 
necessarily lose its causal efficacy or its role as the reason for the 
action.
IV In what sense of the term are reasons causes of actions?
I have already mentioned that the concept of reason can be used and 
is used by philosophers in different senses. It is therefore necessary to 
explain in what sense of the term reasons are causes of actions.
Ordinarily when people cite reasons for their actions, they do not 
necessarily mention their wants, desires, intentions etc. They usually 
cite a fact, a situation, a circumstance, ends and ideals, or even beliefs 
and faiths. For instance, I took the coat off because it was too hot; I 
left Paris because I was broke, I voted labour because of its policy. None
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of these re as on-expl anations actually mention the wants, desires or inten­
tions of the agent though they are implicit in these reason-explanations.
Thus when I say I voted Labour because of its policy, the policy of the 
Labour Party did not cause my act of voting. desire or want to vote
Labour caused my act of voting. Similarly my action of leaving Paris 
does not directly follow from the fact that I was broke, but from my desire 
or want to leave Paris. Statements of such reasons imply my belief in and 
what I think about certain things and consequently the desires or wants I 
have to perform certain actions.
Hence when I say reasons are causes of actions, by reason I do not 
mean whatever is mentioned by an agent as a reason for his action, I mean 
the desire or want or intention of the agent because of which the action is 
done. To say this is not to deny that facts, situations, circumstances, 
or other factors cited as reasons have a causal role to play in the explan­
ation of action. They certainly influence the desires and wants of the 
agent to some extent and thus play the role of a distant factor in the causal 
chain. But the causal explanation of action is to be sought not in the 
situations or circumstances in which the agent happened to be placed, but 
in his desires or wants to perform the action.
A further point in this issue is that one should distinguish between 
the justificatory sense of 'reason* and its explanatory sense. Sometimes 
reasons are what we appeal to in supporting or justifying our actions. In 
a sense a reason for an action always justifies the action - at least from 
the agent's point of view. As Davidson puts it "....from the agent's point 
of view there was, when he acted, something to be said for the action."^
From the observer's point of view however the reason given by the agent for
1. Ibid. p228
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his action may or may not justify his action, depending on the circumstan­
ces. There are two senses in which a reason can justify an action - the 
subjective sense and the objective sense. The same reason may be a just­
ifying reason for the agent and not so for the others. Such a justifying 
reason is subjective. For instance, a person may cite his political or 
religious conviction as his reason for planting a bomb in a public place. 
Here the reason stated i.e., 'his reason', justifies the action from the 
person's subjective point of view. It may or may not justify the action 
from the perspective of others. There is another sense in which a reason 
can subjectively justify an action, though in that sense it need not be 'his 
reason'. For instance, an agent may perform an action because of some sub­
conscious motives or desires though he may be completely unaware of their 
existence and sincerely believe that some other desire or motive is the 
cause of his action.
A justifying reason need not always be subjective. It may be objec­
tive. For instance, a person may cite the possibility of having cancer as 
the reason for his giving up smoking, but it need not necessarily be 'his 
reason' for giving up smoking. He may give it up to please his girl­
friend. One can cite all sorts of justifying reasons for doing an action 
though they may not be one's reason for doing it. In such cases the reason 
cited justifies the action objectively but not subjectively.
However a reason in the justificatory sense - subjective or objective, 
need not necessarily be a real reason. A real reason is that which is 
operative in bringing forth the action and motivates the agent consciously 
or unconsciously to perform the action. It is also in this sense of 'real' 
that a reason can claim to be causal. So long as the reason offered is not
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one of the real ones,it may or may not justify an action but it does not 
explain the action. It fails to connect the action with the reason. For 
instance, in some cases the reason sincerely cited by the agent as 'his 
reason* may not be the real reason for his action; the real reason may be 
a subconscious desire. In such cases 'his reason' may justify the action, 
but will fail to explain it causally. Similarly when one mentions just­
ifying reasons for one's actions which are not one's reason for acting, the 
reasons mentioned may justify the action but do not explain it.
I do not mean that a justificatory reason can never be an explanatory 
one. Sometimes people cite a real reason to justify their actions. The 
reason why a person gave up smoking may be his fear of cancer, and that may 
be a 'real reason' for his giving up smoking. Such a reason not only 
justifies the action but also explains it. V/hat a mere justificatory reason 
which is not a real reason fails to do, is to imply that the action it 
justifies is performed because of the reason. Hence however convincing 
a mere justificatory reason may be it does not imply that the action actually 
follows from the reason mentioned. Such a reason fails to explain the 
action causally.
Considering the various uses of the term 'reason' it is important to 
ascertain the candidates for being a real reason. I have already mentioned 
in the introduction the senses in which Ryle and Melden have used the term 
'reason'. Ryle has used the term 'reason' in the sense of 'the reason'.
In this sense 'the reason' is impersonal and is applicable to both human 
actions and physical changes. For Ryle, it is a disposition as opposed to 
an occurrent. When applied to human actions in this dispositional sense, 
the term 'reason' includes both 'the reason' and 'his reason'. But Melden
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and philosophers having similar views, have used the term 'reason' in the 
narrower sense of 'his reason' and denied that in this sense reason can he 
a cause of action. In the Meldenian treatment of the issue reason means 
the reason one has for doing something. I have mentioned above that only 
a real reason can be the cause of an action. When we speak of a 'real 
reason' it is necessary to make clear whether we mean 'the reason' or 'his 
reason' or both.
The concept of 'the reason' includes various things. Sometimes 
'the reason' may be a physical event e.g., the reason why he leapt forward 
was that he was pushed, though it is quite clear that once such an explan­
ation is given the piece of behaviour involved can no more be considered as 
an action. The reason offered here is a physical event and the explanation 
given can easily count as a causal explanation. 'The reason' in this sense 
is a real reason or a cause.
However this type of 'the reason' explanation is not our concern.
Our main concern is with those reason-explanations which mention 'the reason'
for an action. In this list of 'the reasons' are included reasons which
are 'his reasons' for an action and reasons which are not 'his reasons' for 
an action. The latter type of 'the reasons' are the sub-conscious motives, 
desires, etc., which are often cited as the sources of one's actions, e.g., 
the reason why he avoided her was his sub-conscious fear of a mother-figure. 
Most psycho-analytic explanations belong to this group. Here 'the reason' 
for an action is a real reason in the sense that it is operative in bringing 
forth the action, though the agent in most of the cases is unaware of its 
existence.
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The causal character of such explanations is often doubted by phil­
osophers - mainly on the grounds that they are not sufficiently predictive, 
and that they are purposive and not the mechanical type of causal explan­
ations.^
It may be pointed out that the purposive nature of psycho-analytic 
explanations would be a weakness only if causal explanations are synonymous 
with mechanical explanations. I have already discarded such synonymity.
So far as the lack of predictability is concerned the question of causation 
and the question of predictability are not the same thing. An event can be 
caused without being predictable.*
Williams who brought these charges against psycho-analytic explan­
ations admitted that these weaknesses had compensations as well; "....the 
theories do actually apply to complex forms of human conduct, and explan­
ations of human conduct are actually produced, instead of being (....) hopes 
for the future of science." He also pointed out that "psycho-analytical
explanations of certain sorts of aberrant behaviour carry conviction and
2
modify the tendency to ascribe responsibility and blame" . The questions 
whether all behaviour is psycho-analytically explicable - whether all our 
reasons for doing an action are rationalizations - whether such psycho­
analytic explanations will destroy the citadel of our 'moral reasponsibility 
and blame' are unimportant here. The important thing is that where psycho­
analytic explanations are relevant, they are relevant because they causally 
explain the behaviour.
1. B.A.O. Williams.^Postscript.’ Freedom & the Will. Ed. D.F. Pears. pll5
* See Chapter 6 . P | 3?o
2. Ibid. pll5-6
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However, the real difficulty lies with the type where 'the reason' 
for an action coincides with 'his reason'. 'His reason' is the reason 
which an agent sincerely gives for his action and believes that his action 
follows from that particular reason, e.g., the reason why he did not employ 
the man was that he did not want to employ negroes; the reason why he left 
the room was his dislike for the upper class snobbery. Such reasons may 
not only be 'his reasons' they may also be 'the reasons', i.e., the real 
reasons for his action. It should be remembered that 'his reason' does not 
necessarily mean 'the reason' or a 'real' reason. In some cases 'his 
reason' may be a rationalisation. It is only when 'his reason' is also 
'the reason' for an action that it can explain an action.
The discussion so far shows that a reason can claim to be causal only 
in the sense that it is a real reason, i.e. it is operative and not a mere 
justificatory one. It is not just a possible reason from which an action 
may follow but one because of which the action is performed. In this sense 
of 'real', reasons mentioned in psycho-analytic explanations and some reasons 
mentioned in 'his reason' explanations can both claim to be causal. We 
have seen before that the causal character of psycho-analytic explanations 
carries conviction and where such explanations are given they are considered 
as causal explanations. Our main concern will therefore be to show that 
'his reason' explanations where his reason is also 'the reason' can count 
as causal explanations.
The discussion of this point will be two-fold. On the one hand, I 
shall try to show that an adequate explanation of action is not obtainable 
until the relation between desire, intention etc., and action is considered 
as causal and that without this consideration one fails to explicate the 
role a desire or want plays in the explanation of an action. On the other
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hand, I shall try to refute the arguments which are designed to show that 
a reason-explanation cannot be a causal explanation or a reason cannot be a 
cause. This will be considered in the following chapters. In the remainder 
of this chapter, I shall limit myself to the discussion of the first point 
only.
V Reasons are Causes of Actions
We have seen before that actions are referable to the agent's wants, 
intentions, desires etc. When an action is performed the situation is not 
simply that the agent has a want or desire and the action follows. On the 
contrary the agent has a want or desire which brings forth the action. To 
have a desire or want is not enough to produce an action. The desire or 
want must be operative.
David Pears comments "....it is not sufficient that the idea of the 
project should occur to you; you must also have a favourable attitude to­
wards it."^ But to have a favourable attitude towards the project is not 
enough, just as it is not enough to want or desire to act. ' The desire or 
want must be operative. An action can be said to be performed only when 
the desire or want concerned is causally operative.
To elucidate this point it is better to start with a comment made by
C. Taylor in his Explanation of Behaviour. Taylor comments that proper
action is not only intended, but intention plays a specific role there.
"....the distinction between action and non-action hangs not just on the
presence or absence of the corresponding intention or purpose but on this
intention or purpose having or not having a role in bringing about the 
2
behaviour."
1. D.F. Pears. 'Desires as Causes of Actions'. Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Lectures. Vol. 1. 1966/7* p85
2. 0. Taylor. Explanations of Behaviour. p35
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Though Taylor himself is an opponent of the causal theory of action, 
his comment brings out the crux of the whole issue* If the causal role of 
intention is rejected what sort of meaning can be attached to the phrase *a 
role in bringing about the behaviour'? When an action is performed some­
thing more is involved in the situation than merely having an intention or 
desire to perform it. This is an important point, because this 'something 
more' explains the difference between two otherwise exactly similar situations, 
namely a piece of behaviour intended and performed by an agent, and a piece 
of behaviour which just happened to follow the agent's intention. For 
instance, it is the causal role of intention which distinguishes the case 
of my intending to move my hand and moving it, and ny intending to move my 
hand and my hand's moving.
When I say that I moved my hand because I wanted to, I mean something 
more than that I happened to have a certain desire and my behaviour happened
to follow my desire. I mean that I moved my hand because I wanted to,
and this because is a 'causal because'. It should be pointed out that ref­
erence to what follows cannot differentiate the two cases. T/hat follows in 
the physical world is more or less the same, i.e. my hand moved. Again a 
reference to the mere presence of a preceding intention or desire or a fav­
ourable attitude will not help, because in both the cases I have the intention 
to move my hand. It is only when my intention causes the movement of my 
hand in one case, and in another it does not, that the distinction betv/een 
the two cases is possible. This is what I meant when I said before that in
order to cause an action, an intention must be operative.
It might be argued that the distinction between 'I intended to move 
my hand and moved my hand', and 'I intended to move my hand and my hand 
moved' can be drawn on the basis of a physical cause. It might be said that
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in the latter case a physical cause is in operation, say a sudden push or 
an electric shock, whereas in the former case it is notjsoin order to make 
a distinction between the two above-mentioned cases one does not have to 
take recourse to the causal efficacy of an intention or want.
This argument can be answered by saying that such a distinction cer­
tainly can be drawn on the basis of observation and experiment by referring
I
to a physical cause. But the difficulty is that not all actions are as simple
{
as *I moved my hand because I intended to'. Actions are often highly com­
plex like conducting a seminar, making aq)eech etc., and it is not easy to 
comprehend in such cases of complex action what the phrase 'absence of a 
physical cause ' will mean. In such cases reference to a physical cause will
not be very helpful. How could the reference to a physical cause distin­
guish between a case where the solution of a riddle occurs to me and a case 
where I deliberately try to solve a riddle? Lastly one must not ignore . 
the fact that long before an observational distinction with reference to a 
physical cause is made, the agent knows that in one case his intention was 
operative and in the other it was not. He makes this distinction on the 
basis of the operation of his own intention. By this I do not claim that in 
all cases of action the agent is conscious of the causal operation of his 
intention or desire, or that one cannot be mistaken about the causal effic­
acy of one's intention. All that I want to maintain is that in the case of 
full-blown actions the agent is conscious of the causal efficacy of his 
intention and usually is not mistaken about it.
So far I have been discussing cases where actions are obviously 
preceded by desires, intentions etc. It can be argued that in such cases 
where there is a clear-cut antecedent desire or want, one can talk about
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desires causing actions. But in many cases of actions, the presence of 
the antecedent desires or intentions are not so obvious. Actions are 
sometimes merely done intentionally without any prior well-formed intention. 
For instance, I swerved the car to save the child. Here it seems I did not 
form an intention first and then swerve; I swerved intentionally. Sim­
ilarly there are cases where I do things without even thinking about them - 
like moving my hands while talking, or swinging my legs while eating. In
this case there is no deliberation whether to move one's hand or not; 
there is no conscious reasoning preceding one's swinging one's leg; there 
is no well-formed antecedent desire or want, no period of decision or indec­
ision. Sometimes one is not even fully aware of the fact that one is 
moving one's hand. In such cases it seems odd to talk about a desire or 
want causing the performance.
One thing should be pointed out here, that our every-day normal 
behaviour-pattern is so systematic and follows, as Peters has said 'a 
purposive rule-following model', that it does not require to be stated ex­
plicitly that every action we perform is specifically willed or intended.
V/e normally refer to intention or make an enquiry as to whether an action is 
deliberate, if there is some sort of interruption or unusualness about it. 
Thus if a person eats his breakfast every morning at eight regularly for 
twenty years no one will ask whether he intends to do it. But if he does 
not do it one morning and there is a break in his behaviour-pat tern, the 
question whether he intends to have his breakfast arises. But this, i.e. 
we normally raise the question whether a piece of behaviour is deliberate 
when there is something unusual, does not rule out the possibility that 
where we do not raise such a question, the action can still be deliberate and 
specifically willed. To say this however, is not to deny that there is a 
difference betvæen actions which are specifically intended and actions which 
are done intentionally or, to be more precise, voluntarily.
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This difference certainly has some relevance to the thesis that 
actions are always caused by our desires, wants etc. If lesires, wants 
etc. are considered as something of which the agent is always aware, then 
it will be difficult to maintain that all actions causally proceed from such 
conscious desires and wants. But we have seen in the course of our dis­
cussion that not all desires are necessarily conscious desires. A desire 
or want can be at work v/ithout the agent's being conscious of it. This 
happens in the case of sub-conscious motives and desires.
However, explanations in terms of subconscious motives and desires 
cover only a limited range of human behaviour. So far as our ordinary beh­
aviour is concerned the question still remains, how we can causally explain 
actions which are done voluntarily without being preceded by a specific 
desire or intention. This question brings us back to the examples like 
swerving a car intentionally, moving hands while talking etc. One thing 
should be mentioned, that a desire, in order to cause an action, need not be 
a definite occurrent.^ It may be a long term sustaining state or process 
from which the action emerges. Swerving a car intentionally can be causally 
explained in terms of a long-term sustaining desire e.g., a desire not to 
run over people. However it seems to me that in the case of swerving the 
car one cannot really rule out the possibility of making a quick split- 
second decision to swerve the car. Such split-second decision can cause 
the act of swerving the car.
Sometimes though there may not be a specific deliberation prior to 
each individual activity performed in connection with an action^ the action 
as a whole may involve a desire or intention as its cause. For instance.
1# This will be discussed in Chapter V
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if one wants to eat one uses knife and fork without reflecting about using 
them, or forming a definite desire to use one's knife and fork, or deliber­
ating each time before one moves one's knife and fork. The desire or the 
intention to eat, which causes one's act of eating can be said to be the 
cause of everything one performs in this connection. The same thing 
applies to swinging one's leg while eating or moving one's hand while 
talking.
Similarly, the cause of habitual actions can be traced back to 
desires or v/ants. Habitual actions are actions performed regularly, and 
because of that one does not have to think about their execution. They do 
not need any specific deliberation. But to say that an action is habitual 
is not to say that it is unintentional or involuntary. The regular prec­
ision with which a man eats his breakfast at eight every morning for twenty 
years, does not mean that his action is unintentional or that he has no 
want or desire to eat his breakfast. At some stage of his mental life in 
the past he definitely had formed an intention to eat his breakfast at 
eight.
One thing is certain that if we want to differentiate these actions 
from mere movements we have to invoke the notion of desire or want as their 
cause. Without this causal reference they cannot be separated from mere 
movements. They may not be specifically intended actions, but they can 
still be caused by the agent's desires or wants.
Conclusion
We can now sum up the arguments of this chapter. I started with the 
contentions that desires or wants to perform actions are not themselves 
performances and that actions are not movements caused by desires or wants.
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I maintained that actions in general involve a reference to the agent's 
desires or wants and such a reference is a causal reference. I tried to 
differentiate among the various senses in which the term 'reason' is used 
and to determine in what sense of the term reasons can he causes of actions. 
Lastly, I tried to show that unless the relation between reasons and actions 
are considered as causal,an adequate explanation of actions cannot be given.
In the remaining chapters I shall try to refute the various arguments 
designed to show that reasons cannot be causes.
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Chapter IV
The indescriba'bilit.Y of volition without a reference to action
In this chapter I am going to consider one of the arguments mentioned 
in the introduction to this thesis - the arguments which philosophers often 
cite to support the contention that a causal explanation of action in 
terms of reasons is not possible.
The argument is: our desires, wants, intentions etc., cannot be
described without involving a reference to the action desired, wanted or 
intended; whereas a cause can be described without involving any reference 
to its effect. Therefore, an explanation in terms of reasons cannot be a 
causal explanation. This argument is the strongest of all the arguments put 
forward by the opponents of the causal theory of action. As this argument 
is based on Hume's definition of cause, it will not be completely out of
context to discuss that a little first.
I David Hume and volition as a cause
Hume has recognized the difficulty of forming a just definition of
cause. He admits that it is not possible to find out 'that circumstance'
in the cause which makes the cause a cause. From his definitions^ and from
2
the rules by which to judge cause and effect, a cause appears to be as 
follows:
A cause is contiguous and precedent to its effect; the effect regularly 
follows the cause; and this regularity can be subsumed under a law-like 
generalisation, i.e., events of the cause-sort are followed by events of the
J_ ____ ______________
lo David Hume. Treatise Bk 1 gill. Section XIV. pl?2 & Enquiry Sec. VII 
Part II. P76-77. ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge 
2. David. Hume. Treatise. Bk 1. ^111. Sec.XV. pl75
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effect-sort; so far as experience goes, if the cause had not been, the 
effect had never existed. These characteristics show that psycho-genetic- 
ally the cause-idea is formed from the experience of contiguity, resemblance 
and regularity. But philosophically causation does not imply anything more 
than mere regular sequence. The effect can never be deduced apriori from 
the cause, or in other words that a particular cause has a particular effect 
is purely a contingent matter. The cause-effect relation is not a relation 
of logical necessity. Cause and effect are two separate events, connected 
in our minds by means of association.
It is a point of interest to note that for Hume, the problem of will 
and its influence on physical bodies is only one aspect of the more general 
problem of causal necessity. His aim is to show that the so-called necess­
ary connection which will enable one to infer apriori the effect from the 
cause cannot be established from a consideration of the relation between 
will and action, though it is commonly thought that such an idea is derived 
from the operations of will on physical bodies. "....the will being here 
consider'd as a cause, has no more discoverable connection with its effects, 
than any material cause has with its proper effect."^
Hume however fails to mention the differences existing between an 
ordinary physical cause and an act of volition or will. He also fails to 
realise that his theory of causation, which implies that the cause and the 
effect are two distinct events and that the effect cannot be inferred from 
the cause, does not so obviously apply to an act of volition and its alleged 
consequence. But to say this is not in any vray to suggest that volition 
cannot be a cause. It is only to recognise the difficulties that lie on 
the way to describing volition as a cause. Hume's contention of the non- 
inf errability of the effect from the cause has further implications. It
1. D. Hume. Treatise. Appendix p6$2. ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge
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implies that cause and effect are not logically connected. It is on this 
implication of Hume's theory of causation that Melden bases his argument 
that volition, being describable only in terms of an action, has a logical 
relation with action and therefore cannot be the cause of action#
II Melden and the indescribability of volition without a reference 
to action
A.I. Melden in his Free Action^ has tried to find the nature of the 
relation between an act of will and its alleged effect. He intends to show 
that this is not a causal relation by an appeal to Hume. He has admitted 
that there might be different senses of 'cause* other than the Humean in 
which volition could be a cause, but his treatment is mainly confined to the 
question whether volition can be a cause in the sense in which the word 
'cause' is used in the physical sciences and in Hume's philosophy.
Melden's argument is as follows: according to the Humean definition
of cause, a cause is an event describable independently of its effect. But 
volition is not describable independently of its effect. An act of volit­
ion or will is describable only in terms of the action willed. Therefore 
volition cannot be a cause. Melden starts with a distinction between a 
mere happening and an action. According to the traditional theory the 
latter is performed by means of an act of will; the agent performs an act 
of will which results in an action. The difficulty arises, as Melden 
points out, with the description of an act of will. How can one describe 
one act of will as distinguished from another, act cf will? What character­
ization has one in mind in order to recognize an act of will? Melden then 
proceeds to show that the only way to describe an act of will is to do so 
in terms of the action willed; "....nothing can be an act of volition that 
is not logically connected with that which is willed - the act of willing
2
is intelligible only as the act of willing whatever it is that is willed."
1. A.I. Melden. Free Action. 19^3
2. Ibid. p53
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This argument of Melden is not only directed to acts of will, hut also 
to desires, wants,motives etc. He holds that an explanation in terms of 
desires, wants or motives cannot he a causal explanation because we cannot 
describe a desire, vrant or motive without linking it with action. This 
argument is traceable in different variations among other philosophers, 
representing the same pattern of thought. In this chapter I shall try to 
evaluate this argument in the context of Melden*s analysis of the problem.
Melden argues that for a genuine Humean causal relation we need two 
distinct events logically independent of one another; but in the case of 
volition, want, desire etc., such logical independence is lacking. This 
is because they cannot be described without reference to their alleged con­
sequences. As Melden puts it, "If in thinking of 7^ (some particifLar act 
of volition) we are of necessity to think of it as the willing of (some 
particular muscle movement), then cannot be afly occurrence, mental or 
physiological, which is causally related to since the very notion of a 
causal sequence logically implies that cause and effect are intelligible 
without any logically internal relation of the one to the other."
The assumption behind Melden's argument is that if the description 
of one event involves the idea of another, they cannot be logically indep­
endent. The argument that volition cannot be described without reference 
to the action willed appears to be so forceful because of what Melden takes 
it to mean. For Melden it means that the relation between volition and 
action is non-contingent, whereas according to the Humean theory a cause 
and an effect are only contingently related.
q. A.I. Melden. Free Action. p52
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The contingent nature of the causal relation suggests many things.
It suggests, obviously enough, that the relation between cause and effect 
is not a necessary logical relation; it suggests that cause and effect are 
distinct and separately identifiable and can be described independently of 
one another. To quote Melden, "....in general if A causes B, a description 
of A other than that it has the causal property of producing B must be forth­
coming, otherwise 'A causes B* degenerates into 'the thing that produces B, 
produces B.'
It is necessary to make clear how the Meldenian claim should be in­
terpreted. Melden does not say simply that when a cause or an effect is 
described in terms of the other, the relation between them turns out to be 
non-contingent, but that the relation becomes a non-contingent one when the 
description 'A is the cause of B' is the sole description of A. The further 
implication of Melden's argument is that, the description of a volition* in 
terms of an action being its only description, a volition can be identified 
only as the volition to perform an action. The same is true of other items 
of reasons like, desires, wants, motives etc. Thus in the cases of volit­
ions, desires, wants, motives etc., the question of independent describab­
ility seems to be also a question of independent identifiability. But before 
we answer the questions, whether items of reasons are independently iden­
tifiable and whether the relation between them and their alleged consequences 
is a non-contingent relation, it will be worthwhile to discuss some of the 
attempts made by different philosophers to answer the Meldenian argument.
1. Ibid. p46
* I have used the term 'volition' in this chapter, because Melden has used 
it. I have discarded the concept of volition in the sense of an act of 
will, in chapter II
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III Some Answers to Melden's argiment
(i) D. Davidson in his article 'Actions, Reasons and Causes' has tried
to offer an independent description of a want without involving a reference 
to the action wanted. He says that a reason-statement can he expressed 
without involving any terms used in the description of an action-statement. 
According to Davidson it is not a mistake to take "'Lÿ reason for flipping 
the switch was that I wanted to turn on the light' as entailing, in part,
'I flipped the switch and this action is further describable as having been 
caused by my wanting to turn on the light. ' " Then he comments that "The 
example serves also to refute the claim that we cannot describe the action 
without using words that link it to the alleged cause. Here the action is 
to be explained under the description; 'my flipping the switch', and the 
alleged cause is 'my wanting to turn on the light'. \7hat possible logical 
relation is supposed to hold between these phrases?"^
It seems that what Davidson suggests is tliat 'I wanted to turn on the 
light' and 'I turned on the light' may seem to be logically connected, but 
'I wanted to turn on the light' and 'I flipped the switch' do not seem to be 
logically connected. So far as this particular point is concerned 
Davidson's answer to the Meldenian argument does not seem to me very effec­
tive. This is simply because one cannot so easily replace 'I turned on the 
light' with 'I flipped the switch'; 'I turned on the light' and 'I flipped 
the switch* do not necessarily describe one and the same action. Flipping 
the switch does not necessarily mean turning the light on. Besides if the 
action-description 'I turned on the light * can be replaced by another action- 
description viz., 'I flipped the switch', there is no reason why the want- 
description 'I wanted to turn on the light' cannot be replaced by another 
want-description viz., 'I wanted to flip the switch*, in which case the want- 
description again becomes dependent on the action-description.
lo D. Davihon. 'Actions, Reasons and Causes'. Free Will and Determinism. 
ed. B. Berofsky. p253
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It may be argued here that the two want-statements are not related 
exactly in the same way as the two action-statements seem to be. Want
being in tens ional, wanting to turn the light on cannot be replaced by wanting 
'to flip the switch. For instance, to say that *I v;ant to shoot by mother- 
in-law ' is not to say that *I want to shoot the Education Minister'. I 
may not ha,ve any idea that my mother-in-law is also the Education Minister. 
Hence, though the action-description 'I turned on the light' may be replaced 
by 'I flipped the switch', the want-description 'I wanted to turn on the 
light' cannot be replaced by 'I wanted to flip the switch'.
It can be pointed out against this argument that the want-description
viz., 'I wanted to turn on the light' in some sense involves 'I wanted to 
flip the switch'. The want or desire to turn on the light may be the cause 
of the want or desire to flip the switch, or the second desire may be a part
of the former. So 'I wanted to turn on the light* does involve in some
sense *I wanted to flip the switch*• Hence it cannot really be claimed that 
in the want-action relation 'I wanted to turn on the light and I flipped the 
switch', the want-description is independent of the action-description.
It seems to me that mere replacement of a reason-action statement by 
another will not solve the problem of description-dependency. Davidson
however has mentioned another important point to show that desires and 
actions are not conceptually related. To this point I shall return in due 
course.
(ii) Sometimes the following argument is put forward in support of mental 
items as causes, viz., that if two concepts are conceptually connected, that 
does not mean that the things falling under them are also internally connec­
ted. D.W. Hamlyn has used this argument to criticise Melden* s position.
He says, "To say that no independent description of the intention can be
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given is to say that there is an internal connexion between the concepts 
of intention and related action. But it by no means follows that where two 
concepts are internally related the things to which the two concepts may be 
applied cannot be contingently related. Thus, although the intention to 
write a letter can be described only as that intention, whatever goes on in 
the mind when the person has that intention might, for that matter, be rep­
resented as the cause of writing the letter - provided, of course, that 
anything does go on in the mind." Hamlyn has tried to prove this conten­
tion with the help of the particular instance of 'Intention to write a 
letter* and 'writing a letter'. His argument is that what goes on in the 
mind of a person, if anything does in forming an intention, may be describ­
able in terms independent of the object of the intention, and hence can be
2
its cause, although intention as intention is not so describable. Accord­
ing to Hamlyn, what goes on in the mind of a person in forming an intention 
can be interpreted as something like an inner uttersnce 'I will write a 
letter'
Hamlyn is not at all clear as to what he means by 'forming an inten­
tion'. He also uses expressions like "....what goes on in the mind in 
having or forming an intention...."^, as if 'having an intention' and 'form­
ing an intention' are interchangeable. It seems to me that 'forming an 
intention' and 'having an intention' are different. 'Forming an intention' 
is definitely not an intention whereas 'having an intention' and intention 
are not so different. It seems that Hamlyn has talcen the occurrence of an
inner utterance viz., 'I will v/rite a letter* as equivalent to 'what goes
5
on in the mind in forming the intention*. V/hatever it may be, it can be
lo D.V/. Hamlyn. * Causality and Human Behaviour*. ppl33-134* PASSV 1964* 
Emphasis is the author's. This point is also made by K. Baier. K. Baier 
'Pains'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1962. p20
2. Ibid. pl34
3. Ibid
4. Ibid. pl35
5. Ibid. pl34
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pointed out that this does not help in proving that an intention is the 
cause of writing a letter. 'vfhat goes on in the mind in forming an inten­
tion* can be completely different from an intention itself. An intention 
can be the result of 'what goes on in the mind in forming an intention*.
To say 'what goes on in the mind in forming an intention* is the cause of 
the action of 'writing a letter* .is not to say that the intention is the 
cause of 'writing a letter*. For the intention to write a letter and 
'what goes on in the mind in forming the intention to write a letter* may 
not be one and the same thing.
It appears that Hamlyn wants to apply the concept of intention to 
'what goes on etc.* and thus to show that while the concept of intention and 
the concept of action are internally connected, the things to which these 
concepts apply, i.e. in this case 'v/hat goes on etc.' (viz., an utterance 
'I v/ill write a letter') and the action of writing a letter may be causally 
connected. I am not denying that they may be causally connected, but I 
do not see how the concept of intention can be applied to 'what goes on in 
the mind (if anything does) in forming an intention'.
However, 'having an intention' is a completely different case from 
'forming an intention'. If 'intention' is not used in an abstract sense, 
it cannot exist independently of 'having an intention* or of someone's 
having it. As an abstract concept it describes a state of mind and there­
fore can be shared by many. In that sense it cannot be a cause. It can 
be a cause only in a personalized sense, i.e., someone's having it. So 
'having an intention* and intention in/personalised sense are not really two 
different things. From this perspective, one can of course say, after 
Hamlyn, that though intention and action are conceptually related, what goes 
on in the mind in having an intention, if anythin^g does (like an utterance 
* I will write a letter*) and action of writing a letter may be causally 
connected.
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(iii) D.F. Pears seems to offer us a solution of the problem we are dis­
cussing, in his article 'Desires as Causes of Actions'^, though one must 
admit that his analysis is opaque and it is difficult to understand what his 
own view on the matter is. However, from what he suggests in the form of 
various possibilities, it seems that the notion of an anticipatory feeling 
is the basis from which he starts.
Pears says that someone can claim against the objection /that A cannot
cause B unless A can be specified in some way that does not mention the fact
that it causes b/ that it is not true that we have only "....one line
attaching practical desires to public phenomenon", ...."....we have two
2
different lines on to practical desires," though these two lines are not
completely independent of one another. One of these lines is the usual way
of identifying a desire or want in terms of its object, and the other is an
anticipatory feeling*"....to have a desire is to have an anticipatory
feeling which is very like the feeling of satisfaction when the goal is
achieved. People could use this similarity in order to establish the
3existence of practical desires instead of using the sequel".
Pears however goes on criticising the above-mentioned position. V/hat 
seems to be his own view on the matter is a slight modification of the claim 
mentioned above. According to him what helps us to identify our desires 
in advance is a degree of feeling which is like the feeling of satisfaction 
when the goal is achieved. To quote Pears, "....there is a degree of
1. D.F. Pears. 'Desires as Causes of Actions'. The Human Agent. Royal
Institute of Philosophy Lectures vol. I 1966/70”p83. Pears 
has offered another solution in his recent article 'Are 
Reasons for Actions Causes?' in Epistemolopy. ed. A.Stroll.
1967. p219-220
2. Ibid. p89
5. Ibid. By 'Sequel' Pears means the set of alternatives one of which 
follows a practical desire.
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feeling about a project which is causally connected with the sequel and 
which is identified in advance*"^
Pears* answer to the Meldenian criticism has several disadvantages* 
Firstly, I am not sure how far Pears' description applies to all cases of 
desires, wants, intentions etc* IVhat he says may be true in some cases - 
particularly in cases of desires, but it vfould be wrong to say that whenever 
we intend, want or will to do something we have this anticipatory feeling of 
satisfaction which we get when the action is performed* In many cases of
desire we do not know what the feeling of satisfaction will be* We cannot
even anticipate the feeling of satisfaction* For instance when a person 
desires to die, he cannot have an anticipatory feeling of satisfaction. He 
cannot even know what will count as fulfilment of his desire.
There are many things we desire or want to do, about which we feel
absolutely no feelings. I want to put the book back, to push the chair, 
to stir my tea. I do recognize my desire or want in all these cases in 
terms of the action I desire or want to do, but not as a certain degree of 
feeling which is like the feeling of satisfaction which is obtained v/hen 
the action is performed. In most of the cases I do not even have a visual 
image, e.g. the image of my getting up or stirring tea.
Secondly, even if we grant that sometimes we identify in our mind
the anticipatory feelings of satisfaction which we get before we perform 
certain actions, will it be reasonable to identify such feelings with the
desires to do such and such actions? For instance, if I am angr^ '’, I may
have an intense feeling which I may recognize as the anticipatory feeling 
of satisfaction which I will get if I start throwing things, but can it be 
called the desire to throw things? I agree that sometimes our desires are
lo Ibido p95
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closely related to such feelings. But a desire cannot be identified with 
such a feeling. It may be the result of such a feeling. I may desire to 
throw things if I am angry, because I may realize that the anticipatory 
feeling of satisfaction can be actualised only in that way. Again, some­
times even if I have such anticipatory feelings, I may not desire to act 
accordingly. Thirdly, Pears' contention is: I have a desire which I
identify in terms of an anticipatory feeling which is very much like the 
feeling I will get if the desire is fulfilled. But this criterion with 
which I identify a desire viz., the feeling which resembles the feeling I 
will get if the desire is fulfilled, itself presupposes that I should have 
the desire and it must be fulfilled, otherwise I would not know vfhat the 
feeling is. Hence, my desire cannot be identified in advance in terms of 
an anticipatory feeling which itself depends on the fulfilment of the desire.
Pears also mentions another possibility in this connection. He says 
that though the reference to action is the only available criterion at 
present that does not mean the possibilities are exhausted and there cannot 
be another criterion in future. Pears suggests that "....some independent 
identification of practical desires may become available later, perhaps 
through neurology." The point here, however, is not whether a second 
criterion in terms of neuro-physiology is theoretically possible for the 
specification of desires, wants etc., the point is that such a specification, 
being in neuro-physiological terms, will not say anything about a desire 
or a want as such, just as a description of action in neuro-physiological 
terms would not say anything about an action as such.
1. Ibid. p91. Pears goes on, however, to raise an objection to this as a 
solution.
Also see D.P. Pears. 'Are Reasons for Actions Causes?' 
Epistemology. Ud. A. Stroll. p215. 196?
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However, I think Pears is right in emphasizing the fact that we really 
do identify our desires in advance, but I would like to say that identific­
ation is not in terms of certain 'feelings', for we can intend, will or want 
without any anticipatory feelings.
So long I have been discussing the various answers given to the 
Meldenian criticism that items of reason are description-dependent on actions 
and that the description of a reason in terms of an action is its sole 
identifying criterion. Let us consider once again what are the apparent 
shortcomings of the reason-action relation as a causal relation.
The force of Mel den's argument consists in attempting to show that
the contention 'willing to act produces action' is vacuous because, this
that
amounts to saying/the cause of action is what causes action. Therefore any 
statement expressing a causal relation between desires, wants, motives etc., 
and an action is empty.
Another stronghold of the Meldenian argument is that wants, desires, 
intentions, motives etc., are, as Pears puts it, in a peculiar way trans­
parent. They are transparent in the sense that not only are they indes­
cribable without referring to their effects, but this reference shows prior 
to experience what effect is going to follow. This is in direct conflict 
with Hume's notion of causation where what effect a cause will produce can­
not be inferred from the notion of the cause itself; it can be known only 
through repeated experience of the situation, whereas to have a desire to 
perform an action already tells prior to experience what sort of action is 
going to follow. As Broad puts it, 'It is perfectly plain that, in the 
case of volition and voluntary'’ movement, there is a connection between the
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cause and the effect which is not present in other cases of causation, and 
which does make it plausible to hold that in this one case the nature of 
the effect can be foreseen by merely reflecting on the nature of the cause.
One thing should be pointed out here, that the Humean notion of a
causal relation - that it can be kno?/n only through repeated experience of
2
the situation - can be accepted only with qualification. It is not nec­
essarily true that we cannot know a cause directly - without going through a 
process of repeated observations. For instance, I can know immediately with­
out any research that my headache is causing my distraction. But still one 
would not call the relation between my headache and my distraction non-con­
tingent. However, there is one big difference between the case of the head­
ache and distraction and the case of volition and an action. In the former 
case I can describe my headache as the cause of my distraction only after 
experiencing the effect happening. But in the latter case it seems that 
the cause actually tells us what effect is going to follow.* This differ­
ence suggests that the argument that the relation between volition and 
action is non-contingent has some weight.
17 An attempt to answer Melden
I have already mentioned that in this particular issue of desires, 
wants etc., the question of independent jndescribability seems to be also a 
question of independent identifiability.^ These two questions are not 
necessarily the same question. To describe a cause in terms of its effect 
is not necessarily to identify it in terms of its effect. But in the case 
of a desire and an action it seems that there is no other way of identifying
1. C.B* Broad. The I/Iind and its place in Nature. pl02. 1925. London
2. This point will be developed and discussed in Chapter 71
* V/e shall see later on that this is not exactly the case
3. See p89
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a desire than in terms of its object. Therefore, the Meldenian philosophers 
conclude that the relation between a desire and an action cannot be contin­
gent and causal.
I shall now try to show that although the description of a desire or
want may involve the description of an action, yet the relation between them
is not a logical relation.. Besides a desire or want can be identified in
the
a way which does not make / relation necessaig'’.
In Pears' analysis we have seen an attempt to identify a desire in­
dependent of its object. According to him one can identify the desire in 
advance in terms of a feeling without referring to the sequel. Although I 
do not agree with Pears in his claim to identify a desire in terms of an 
anticipatory feeling, I think Pears is right in pointing out that there is 
a way to specify a desire other than the way which involves reference to its 
objects; though these two ways are not completely independent of one anotherc
The opponent of the causal theory often overlooks the point that 
normally an agent can specify his intentions, desires, wants etc., independ­
ently of the actual occurrence of the action. To others the knowledge of 
his want or desire is circumstantial and requires external evidence; but 
to him the knowledge of his wants or desires is direct. If a person wants 
to do something, normally he knows that he wants to do something in advance 
of the actual happening of what he wants to do. Thus if I intend to go to 
the British Museum tomorrow morning I come to know my intention to do so 
long before the action actually takes place, if it ever does. This shows 
that the way the agent identifies his desires, wants, intentions etc., is 
independent of reference to the actual action. The reference such a desire 
involves is to a possibility of action which may or may not happen. It takes 
place and is identifiable in advance irrespective of whether the action
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occurs or not. This shows that although some descriptions of desire in­
volve the description of an action, desire as such is quite intelligible 
irrespective of whether the action occurs or not.
This point is more important than it appears to be. Therefore,it
needs further clarification. The critics may argue that the identification 
of one's own intention may be independent of the reference to the actual 
action but that it is not independent of the reference to the notion of 
action as such. One still identifies one's intentions, desires etc., under 
a description which involves a reference to the action intended. But to say 
I recognize my desire, intention etc. under a description that involves a 
reference to a possible action is not the same thing as to say that I rec­
ognise my intention under a description that involves a reference to an 
actual action.
It should be pointed out that it is not always true that a desire or
intention can never be described in terms other than those which involve
reference to its object. For instance one can alwa^’-s describe a desire by
reference to the time when it is formed without mentioning its object. Thus
instead of saying that 'Cinderella left the palace because she wanted to 
leave', one can always say that 'she left the palace because of the want
she had at five to twelve'. The only thing is that such a description will
be empty, devoid of all content and therefore of very little explanatory 
value. But it is not impossible to describe desires, wants etc., in such
a way. Hence, the Meldenian argument really means, in a more qualified
way, that when a desire is described by mentioning its object, the descrip­
tion of the desire refers to the description of its object. Even this 
qualified' statement of the argument cannot be accepted without further 
qualification.
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It is true that the description of a desire to perform an action 
involves reference to its content but the description of the content hardly 
says anything definite about what sort of action is going to be performed.
Consider the statement 'I want to insult her* or *1 want to be polite••
V/hat sort of particular actions do these statements imply? They do imply
some sort of actions no doubt, but they do it in an indefinite way. I
admit that they eliminate the possibility of some sort of actions happening 
but they do not indicate definitely what sort of action is going to follow. 
Thus if I want to insult her, I may ignore her, or shout at her, or not 
answer her letter; similarly if I want to be polite, I may open the door 
for her, or pay her bill or shalce hands and so on. Hence, we can say that 
in ordinary want-action statements the reference involved in the description 
of a want to its content is an indefinite generic reference. It does not 
say anything about what particular specific action is going to follow. If 
this is the case then what action is going to take place cannot be deduced 
from the description of the desire, whereas if A is logically related to B, 
then B can be deduced from the description of A, as happens for instance in 
Geometry. Melden*s argument that a desire cannot be described in indep­
endent terms is designed to show that there is a logical relation between a 
desire and an action. But, as we have seen before, from the descriptions 
of desires, wants etc., one cannot really deduce the specific actions which 
are going to take place. Hence, the relation between desires and their 
alleged consequences cannot be a full-b].ooded logical relation.
I think the critics here would like to argue that the reference in­
volved in the description of a desire is not always indefinite. Sometimes 
a desire-description definitely indicates what sort of action is going to 
follow. For instance, a desire-description like *I wanted to be polite* 
can be further analysed and specified as *1 wanted to open the door for her', 
The agent here believes that opening the door is an instance of politeness.
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It seems that in such cases, the description of a want like 'I want to open 
the door for her' refers to a definite action viz., opening the door for her. 
But here also the definiteness of the action-description is only apparent.
For the description that 'I want to open the door for her' does not guarantee 
that I will in fact open the door for her. One cannot deduce definitely 
from the description of the want whether or not the alleged action will 
follow.
Melden is of the opinion that one identifies one's desires in terms 
of actions. I think Davidson has an answer to Melden. To quote Davidson, 
"....the event whose occurrence malces 'I turned on the light' true cannot he 
called the object, however intensional, of 'I wanted to turn on the light'.
If I turned on the light, then I must have done it at à precise moment, in 
a particular way - every detail is fixed. But it makes no sense to demand 
that my want be directed at an action performed at any one moment or done in 
some unique manner. Any one of an indefinitely large number of actions 
would satisfy the want, and can be considered as equally eligible as its 
object."^
It seems to me that Davidson is right in his criticism of Melden.
The agent identifies his desire or want only in terms of enaction whose 
details are not fixed, whereas the action which follows from such a desire 
is definite and determined. These two actions cannot be one and the same 
thing though they may not be completely different. Therefore, the descrip­
tion of an action which is definite and determined cannot be logically 
deduced from the description of an action whose details are not fixed and 
which is the object of a desire. Quite often this point is proved by ord­
inary expressions such as 'I had completely different ideas about doing it 
before I actually did it'. This shows that the relation between an action 
and the desire of which it is an object cannot be a logical relation.
1. D. Davidson. 'Actions, Reasons and Causes *. Free will and Determinism, 
ed. B. Berofsky. p224
103
Could a person be said to intend X if he did not do X in the
absence of countervailing factors?
• A common argument, which the anti-causal theorists often put forward 
in support of the necessary connection between intention and action, is that 
one cannot speak of intending something unless either it results in an 
action or a countervailing factor is detected*^ Given the opportunity, if 
a person does not do what he apparently intends to do, he does not really 
intend to do that. This applies to other items of reason as well. If a 
person desires to do something, and does not do it when there is nothing to 
prevent him, he does not really desire or want to do it.
This argument obviously needs qualifications. Let us first consider 
the phrase * countervailing factor' which is so much emphasized in this argu­
ment. The phrase is an ambiguous expression in this issue. Â^hat should 
be counted as a countervailing factor? Should we consider both physical and 
mental factors? The argument overlooks the possibility that a person may 
really intend to do something and change his mind later on, but at the time 
of forming the intention may not foresee the possibility of changes. Even 
if he does foresee the possibility of changing his mind, he still may be said 
to be intending. Besides many things can happen after a person intends to 
do something. Not only may he encounter external obstacles to performing 
the action, he may also forget his intention, he may just stop intending 
before the time for action, or, he may form a new intention replacing the 
old one.
Again time plays an important role in assessing whether a person 
really intends to do something or not. It should be pointed out that when
1. C. Taylor for instance remarks "I could not be said to intend X if even 
with no obstacle or other countervailing factors I still did not do it" 
G. Taylor. Explanation of Behaviour. p33. I968
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a person intends to do something in the future, or has intended to so some­
thing in the past, it malces quite good sense to say that he intends (or 
intended) to do an action even if no action followed afterwards. Thus if 
I said at 3 p.m. that I would have tea at 4 p.m., and if at 4 p.m. the event 
did not talce place, it could still remain true that at 3 p.m. I intended to 
take tea at 4 p.m. Perhaps I changed my mind, or stopped intending to have 
a cup of tea or simply forgot it. Similarly, if a person really intends 
to do something in future then it will be true to say that he intends to do 
something though the action has not happened yet. He has an intention, 
though there is no action visible in the proximity.
The difficulty arises only with the immediate present. V/hen a 
person intends to do something right now and the action does not follow, it 
is odd to talk about him as really intending to do something. Me cannot 
explain such a situation in terms of countervailing factors because when one 
intends to do sometiling right now there is little time to change one's mind 
or to forget or to get frustrated by a counter-desire or want. Hence here 
the question seems to be: could one intend to act now but not act now with­
out any interfering factors occurring?
This is a difficult question to answer. It is hard to see what it 
means if I say that I intend to do X now and I don't do it. It is not only 
difficult for an observer, but also for the agent, to comprehend such a 
situation without presupposing certain countervailing factors. It seems to
me that one should tr^ r to understand the question in the context of physical 
causation. In the first place the case of intention hardly differs from an 
ordinary case of physical causation where a thing cannot be called a cause 
unless it produces its alleged effect in the absence of countervailing 
factors. Could a physical event or object be described as a cause when it
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failed to produce the effect without any of the interfering factors occur­
ring? . The ansY/er is negative and so it seems in the case of intention.
However there is an important difference between a physical event 
or object and an intention. If a physical object fails to produce a cer­
tain effect it still remains itself to a certain extent in virtue of its 
other properties besides the causal one, whereas an intention has only the 
causal property viz., that it is an intention to do something. When this 
causal property is taken away the concept does not survive. Because so 
far as intentions are concerned, this causal property is also the identifying 
criterion. Of course an intention can be identified by reference to the 
time when it is formed. But as we have seen before such a description will 
be empty and of little explanatory value. Hence, if in the absence of 
interfering factors an intention does not produce the action intended, it 
does not remain an intention or anything at all. In such cases we say that 
the agent does not have any real intention. If a person intends to do X 
but occasionally does not do it, we shall refer to an interfering factor to 
explain the situation. But if it happens frequently we will have to say 
that the concept of intention is not applicable to such cases.
No doubt the difficulty one faces here arises from the so-called 
description-dependency of the intention-concept on the action-concept. How­
ever, the important question here is: does such dependency of the inten­
tion-concept on the action-concept show conclusively that the relation 
between these two concepts is one of logical entailment and not causal? I 
think it does not. Because, as I have already mentioned, the agent can 
identify his intention without waiting for the performance of the action, 
and from the description of the intention one cannot deduce with certainty
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what sort of action (or which particular action) will follow. Lastly, if 
not the others, at least the agent can identify his intentions, desires etc., 
by reference to the time of their inception. It is not uncommon that some­
times one remembers one's intention to do something but forgets what it is 
that one intended to do. From this perspective, intentions, desires or 
wants are distinct enough to have a contingent, causal relation with the 
actions intended, desired or wanted, though their descriptions may involve 
some sort of generic descriptions of the actions concerned.
Conclusion
We are now in a position to sum up the arguments. In this chapter I 
have been concerned with the argument that items of reason are indescribable 
apart from their alleged effects, with a special reference to Melden's view. 
Melden's argument aims to show that there is a logical connection between 
volition and action which arises from the indescribability of the former 
vfithout the latter. He also tries to show that since the description of 
volition in terms of action is its only identifying criterion, the statement 
that volition causes action is vacuous.
I have tried to show that this description-dependency of volitional 
concepts does not really prove that the relation between them and action is 
a logical relation. The agent identifies his desires, intentions etc., in 
advance without waiting to see whether the action is going to follow. Be­
sides it is difficult to deduce from the notion of desire or intention 
exactly what sort of action is going to follow. The action-reference which 
the notion of desire or intention involves is only a generic reference and 
not a specific one. Thus, although the description of volitional concepts 
involves the description of action, it does not refer to action in the same 
sense in which the description of a triangle involves a reference to a 
figure having three angles. Hence the relation between action and volition 
cannot be such a non-contingent relation as to stand in the way of volition 
being a cause of an action.
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Chapter 7
Causes as Events
In the introduction I have already had occasion to say that some 
philosophers have denied the possibility of causal explanation of action in 
terms of reasons on the ground that such an explanation of action involves 
a conceptual mistake. Desires, intentions, wants etc., are not of the 
right logical type to be causes. The fundamenteil proposition on which 
these philosophers have built their defence is that a cause is an event. 
Reasons, being attitudes and dispositions, are not events and therefore 
cannot be causes. This is a general objection against a reason's being 
a cause and obviously is derived from the Humean notion of cause and rein­
forced by Ryle, Melden and others.
In this chapter I shall examine the Humean doctrine that a cause is 
an event and shall also consider the possibility of things other than events 
being causes, which will include the discussion of reasons as well.
I The argument
In the Humean philosophy a cause is an event or happening and a 
causal explanation takes the form of relating one event to another event or 
set of events according to some covering law. The word 'event' or 'happen­
ing' is used in a sense suitable to include cases like the impact of a 
billiard ball on another. The principle that every event has one or more 
events as its cause excludes things or entities other than events from the 
causal sphere. Ryle, Melden, etc., have emphasized this point and claimed 
that desires, wants, intentions, not being events, are not causes.
In general the thesis that the cause of an event must be an event 
seems untenable and I shall put forward the thesis that a cause need not 
always be an event*
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II Is cause always an event?
I shall begin with the thesis that the description of a cause as an 
event leaves out not only mental states, dispositions, beliefs and attitudes, 
but also many physical states and conditions usually considered as causes# 
Therefore the description of a cause as an event is a limited description 
and does not do full justice to the denotation of the term 'cause*#
The Humean conception of a cause as an event suggests strongly its 
duration in time# If events are occurrences in time what will be the 
necessary period of duration for such an occurrence? Do we count all sorts 
of changes as events? Do beginnings and endings count as events? Do we 
consider changes of any length of duration as events? Or, are only 
iÿaolable instantaneous happenings events? The atomistic empirical app­
roach of the Humean philosophers towards the issue suggests that events, 
even if not instantaneous, are happenings of limited duration which are 
isolable from their context and can be treated as sufficient conditions for 
the occurrence of the effect# In this sense, however, there are very few
'events' which can be the cause of another event# Actual happenings in the
physical world, sometimes even in experimental cases,* are often continuous 
processes and a cause-event is only relatively isolable from this continuity
with reference to the context. A drop of acid turning blue litmus paper red
may be an isolable happening in the required Humean sense, but not all causal 
cases are simple like that# Sometimes happenings are gradual changes in 
situations# We often find causes which are persistent physical states like 
continuous sunshine darkening the skin, or which are the absence of a phy­
sical event, like the failure of the monsoon causing famine. Thus, to quote
B. Blanshard, "....not only changes but the lack of change, not only the fall 
of the water over the cataract's edge, but the persistence of ice in the 
frozen r i v e r # . a r e  considered as happenings in ordinary language.
* e.g. the effect of smoke on rats
1. B. Blanshard. 'The case for determinism'. Determinism and Freedom in the
age of Modern Science, ed. S. Hook. p3. 1958
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Properly speaking it is erroneous to say that an event causes an­
other event. This is because events never repeat. They are in a sense 
unique. Aiy insistence on the ligid description of an event as an event 
will fail to fulfil the regularity criterion of causal explanation. Thus 
in causal generalisation we usually use the phrase 'similar events' and 
not 'the same event'. Pointing to this feature of causation Susan 
St ebbing has said, "....We can speak of the same cause on different occasions 
only because the causal connection is primarily between the characters, and 
is derivatively between the events to which these characters belong."^
We often give causal explanations in terms of states, characters, 
etc., instead of in terms of a specific event. For instance the gravit­
ation of the earth explains several facts, but the earth's gravitation is 
not an event. If the falling of an object is explained in terms of the 
earth's gravitation, we state what is the cause of the falling of an object.
But this statement is not in terms of an event but in terms of the charac­
teristic of a material body. This is a point to which Hume has not paid 
much attention in his philosophy. States and processes, like events, can
be regarded as causes. For instance 'heating causes water to vaporise' is
a good example of a causal relation, though the subject and the predicate 
in the example do not stand for events. They describe certain processes 
of material bodies. In a similar way, Hume has ignored completely countless 
other things which can be counted as causes and effects; changes, processes, 
permanent states, objects, failures, non-occurrence, absence - can all be 
considered as causes or effects. For instance we can causally explain the 
respiratory process and the digestive process which are effects but not 
events. In pointing this out Davidson has observed "....states, dispos­
itions, and conditions are frequently named as the causes of events: the
1. L.S. Stebbing. A modem Introduction to Logic. p284* 1933. London
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bridge collapsed because of a structural defect; the plane crashed on
take off because the air temperature was abnormally high; the plate broke
1
because it had a crack." These cases whatever they are, are not events 
in the Humean sense, yet they can be considered as causes.
Ill Ryle and Melden on the notion of a cause as an event
I have already pointed out that the Rylean line of thinking has al­
ways presumed that a cause is an event, whereas explanations given in
dispositional language being covertly hypothetical cannot be "construed as
2
expressing categorical narratives of episodes". In the introduction, I 
have mentioned that according to Eyle^ there are two senses in which we can 
ask why did the glass of the window break? One is the causal sense, where 
the answer will be - 'it broke because it was struck by a stone'. The 
second is the sense where we give a reason, that 'it broke because it was 
brittle'. Ryle says that the be cause-clause in the latter answer does not 
report a happening or event and therefore is not a causal 'because'. Sim­
ilarly, says Ryle, "When we ask 'Y*hy did someone act in a certain way?' this 
question might, so far sis its language goes, either be an inquiry into the 
cause of his acting in that way, or be an inquiry into the character of the
4
agent which accounts for his having acted in that way on that occasion".
1. D. Davidson. 'Action, Reasons & Causes'. Free-Will and Determinism
ed. B. Berofsky. p231. Davidson admits that "this 
reply does not, however, meet a closely related point. 
Mention of a causal condition for an event gives a 
cause only on the assumption that there was also a 
preceding event." To this question of 'a preceding 
event' I shall return later.
2. G. Ryle. Concept of Mind. p83. 1949 
5. Ibid. p88'
4. Ibid. p89
Ill
According to Ryle explanations by motives are explanations of the second 
type. Thus if we explain an action by saying 'because he was vain' then, 
Ryle thinks, that is not a causal 'because', and therefore the explanation 
cannot be a causal explanation. It is a statement of disposition and 
"Dispositional statements are neither reports of observed or observable 
states of affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or unobservable states of 
affairs. They narrate no incidents. But their jobs are intimately conn­
ected with narratives of incidents, for, if they are true, they are 
satisfied by narrated incidents."^
Melden also appears to hold similar views to Ryle's. He suggests
that if a motive is to be the cause of an action then it must be an
'interior mental event', but referring to the case of the signalling driver
he asks "when the driver raised his arm what mental occurrence did in fact 
2
take place?" Melden says that even if we suppose that something went on
in the mind of the signalling driver - an event, which is the motive and
the cause of the driver's raising his hand - the supposition that the motive
is the cause of the driver's raising his hand is logically incoherent.
Because "As the alleged cause of the action, it cannot serve further to
characterize the action. As motive it must - for it tells us what in fact
5the person was doing." Melden's point here is that a motive redescribes 
an action, but a cause does not. A cause only explains how the action came 
to be. If motive redescribes the action, there should be a logical conn­
ection between the motive and the action. But "This is impossible if the 
sequence motive^action is a causal relation. It is equally impossible if 
the motive is some interior mental event distinct from that event that is the 
action of raising the arm."^
1. Ibid. pl25
2. A.I. Melden. Free Action. p86
3. Ibid. p88
4. Ibid. p89
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I have already discussed Melden*s argument, that there is a 
logical relation between motive and action, in the previous chapter. To 
the argument that motive re describes action and therefore cannot have a 
causal relation with action, I shall return at the end of this chapter.
For the present I shall try to show with reference to Ryle that mental 
entities like desires, wants etc., which are usually named as reasons for 
actions can be occurrents as well as dispositions.
In reply to Ryle's criticism that the items of reasons are dispos­
itional and not episodic, I shall argue that there is a difference between 
dispositions as such and the items of reason^ and that in some cases 
dispositional verbs can have a non-dispositional use. And furthermore 
even as dispositions mental items like jealousy etc., can be causes of 
actions that follow.
IV Are items of reasons dispositions?
For Ryle, explanations in terms of motive, want, desire etc. are all 
explanations in terms of dispositions - in terms of possible and actual 
behaviour. They are law-like hypotheticals expressible in 'whenever* - 
sentences, i.e. people having those dispositions are prone to behave in a 
particular way whenever they get a.change, just as glass is liable to break 
because it is brittle. Admittedly, when we give reasons for action in 
terms of dispositions we usually do not report a happening. But this may 
not always be the case, just as there is no need to think that since the 
reports of reasons sometimes are not reports of happenings they are not 
reports of causes either. The paradigm case of a disposition is 'knowing*, 
which is not an 'act', and I do agree with this. But it would be a mis­
take to think that every mental act or item can more or less be analysed 
like this particular item.
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Ryle says that the traditionalist's mistake was to take it for 
granted that a dispositional verb is also episodic. It seems to me that 
Ryle has committed the opposite mistake. He gives reasons for thinking 
that a dispositional verb can never be episodic. However, certain words 
in our language can be used in a dispositional as well as in a non-dispos- 
itional way. For instance, the word 'enjoy' in 'he enjoys the tribal 
dance' is used in a dispositional way; whereas if he is found watching a 
tribal dance quite engrossed, it will be true to say that at this partic­
ular moment he is enjoying a tribal dance, without implying the truth of the 
first proposition. The second case describes a temporary state in his 
mind which has caused him to stop and watch.
Let us take again the case of another mental item, e.g., remembering. 
Ryle has agreed that the verb 'to remember* can be used in two ways; one is 
more like the verb 'to know' ; 'in this sense one can say that 'he remembers 
the multiplication-table '. This means he is capable of using it whenever 
and wherever it is necessary. But there is another way of using the verb 
to remember^ in which sense it is more like narrating an occurrence or 
mental event* V/hen, asked 'why are you going back', I answer, 'because I 
suddenly remember that I have left my key at home', it is not a report of a 
disposition or learning that I give, nor even of a physical happening, but 
the report of a mental occurrence which accounts for my going back.
It is true that terms like 'desire', 'want' etc. are sometimes dis­
positional, but they can also be used to narrate present mental states and 
occurrences. Thus to say that 'he has got a strong desire to return to 
his native country' may mean that he expresses his desire in forms
of behaviour including speech-acts. Similarly, my 'want for ghost 
stories' means that I am prone to read such stories wherever and whenever 
I get a chance. On the other hand it is equally true that often these
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terms are used to narrate mental happenings which are not translatable 
into a series of actual and possible pieces of behaviour or into any sort 
of 'proneness*. For example, 'why are you staring like that?' can be 
answered and explained by 'because I want to draw his attention. ' Again, 
'why did you touch her elbow?' can be explained by 'because I felt a sudden 
desire to touch her elbow'. In none of these cases will it be true to say 
that the person is prone to stare at people to draw their attention, or that 
whenever he wants to draw attention he stares, or that whenever he sees a 
woman he feels like touching her elbow. This might very well be the first 
time in his life and does not imply at all that in future he will ever act 
in the same way. Not all desires and wants are descriptions of tendencies 
and modes of behaviour. A good many cases or desires and wants report 
occurrences. A very common experience of everyday life is to desire or
want something as soon as one sees it, I sa;w a pretty object in the shop
window, I wanted to buy it and bought it; whether this is a strai^tforward 
causal relation I am not going to discuss now. Quite obviously it will 
involve questions like whether it refers to any generalisation or regular 
sequence, to which I shall return in due course. For the time being it 
will be enou^ to say that any analysis of such a 'want' in terms of a
steady pattern of behaviour seems to be absurd. From such a first person
singular want-statement we do not get either a law-like description of a 
person's behaviour, or an 'inference-ticket' which will enable us to predict 
a person's future behaviour.
I have mentioned before that the items of reasons and dispositions 
are not exactly alike. There is a difficulty in describing wants, desires 
etc., in purely dispositional terms. Such a description will clash with 
the way an agent comes to know the relation of his wants to his actions.
In cases of pure dispositions, discriptions of a thing as such and such
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(e.go glass is brittle, salW is soluble etc.) depends on repeated obser­
vation, whereas in the case of wants etc., one does not have to wait and 
observe a number of cases to know that one buys a thing because one wants 
to buy it. Conversely, from the observer's point of view, that a thing 
is soluble or brittle can be proved through a single experiment, but that 
an action follows from a particular desire, cannot be established from 
one single case.
Wants, desires etc., also differ from the mental dispositions like 
vanity etc. So far as the mental dispositions like vanity, jealousy or 
suspicion are concerned, it takes an agent a long time, as well as repeated 
observations and personal research to reatlize that his actions come from 
his jealous, vain or suspicious nature. Sometimes he fails to realize 
that he is vain or jealous; whereas in the case of a want or desire, the 
agent does not normally have to do personal research to leam that his action 
follows from his desire to act.
It has often been sug^sted that a desire can be an event only if 
it is identified with a bodily feeling, pleasant or unpleasant. But this 
is misleading, for we can have a desire without having any sort of bodily 
feelings, pleasant or unpleasant. . For instance, I can have a strong 
desire to go to the Sorbonne to study French. V/hat sort of bodily feel­
ings could possibly be there? We often tend to confine our attention to 
a particular type of desire which gives rise to a strong urge connected 
with bodily feelings. But we can have all sorts of desires where such 
bodily feelings are either practically nil or do not exist. For instance, 
the desire to learn a language, to become an astronaut etc. It will be 
an over-simplification of the nature of desire if we connect it with bodily 
feelings so that we can describe a desire as an event. But this does not 
imply that desires cannot be episodic.
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The difficulty with the notions of desire, want etc., is that they 
can sometimes he described as dispositions, and sometimes can be more 
appropriately described as occurrences. On the one hand I may have a 
strong desire for alcohol, and this desire can be a dispositional quality 
of my character. the other hand I may start desiring to have a pint
of beer for the first time in my life, as soon as I see it. In the latter 
case it would not be wrong to describe the desire as an occurrence. Again 
situations like coming to a decision, beginning to want, can better be 
described as occurrences rather than as dispositions.
We have already suggested that in the physical world we often find 
that states and dispositions are named as causes. If 'to cause' means to 
bring forth, to produce, to make something happen, then definitely in 
certain cases states and dispositions are contributory causes. I agree 
that ordinarily to explain an event in dispositional terms is to redescribe 
the situation e.g. the glass broke because it was brittle. Here the causal 
conditional is a redescription of the situation. Yet in certain situations
brittleness of a thing being unexpected or unusual can causally explain 
what happens. Similarly, dispositions of certain individuals in certain 
situations operate as causes. I agree that a man who is jealous by nature 
quite often behaves jealously. But to say this is not to imply that he is 
always in a state of jealousy. ^  may feel a sudden upsurge of jealousy 
if he finds his wife with another person and behave outrageously. In such
1. Urmson provides an example for this "....it is a mere superstition 
to think that only an event may be properly named as a cause. It 
would indeed be absurd in ordinary circumstances to give the fact 
that a piece of glass has the (ordinary) brittleness of glass as the 
cause of its breaking, but in ordinary circumstances it would be very 
proper to mention the (unusual) brittleness of an aircraft's wing as 
the cause of the wing falling off, and quite ridiculous to mention 
the fact that the wind was pressing against the wing in quite a normal 
way, if investigating the cause of an accident."
J.O. Urmson. 'Motives and Causes'. PASSV 
Vol. XXVI 1952. pl92
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a situation it would be quite normal to say that he behaved like that 
because he suddenly felt jealous. We will not hesitate to consider the 
sudden upsurge of jealousy experienced by a man who has never been jealous 
in his life, as the cause of his behaviour (like committing a murder).
If this is so, then I do not see why the behaviour of a person who has a 
jealoug disposition, cannot be explained in terms of his jealousy. A 
person with a jealous disposition experiences jealousy more often than a 
person with a non-jealous disposition. If in the latter case a piece of 
behaviour could be causally explained in terms of jealousy, there is no 
reason why that could not be done in the former case as well.
One important necessary criterion of the cause is that without it, 
the effect would not have taken place. This criterion the Rylean phil­
osophers often tend to overlook. We cannot apply the concept of cause to 
a certain entity without its fulfilling this criterion. Dispositions and 
states quite comfortably satisfy this criterion of causation. So far as 
states are concerned, a good example can be obtained from the cases of 
medical idiosyncrasy. Some people cannot take penicillin. Their physical 
constitution is such that penicillin makes them ill. It would be wrong to 
say that in situations like this the giving of penicillin is the actual 
cause of the particular illness. On the contrary, it is the physical 
state of the person which when he is given penicillin produces the illness. 
But such a state can hardly be described as an 'event'.
This seems to be the crux of the whole problem. A cause in the 
Humean philosophy has been regarded as an 'event*, yet often we ascribe 
causal efficacy to things which are not 'events'. With Hume we can say 
that we still do not know what it is that makes a cause a cause. Constant
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conjunction, repetition, a custom-bred expectation - nothing provides us 
with that magic wand which will help us to find a cause in every situation. 
The way the cause of an event is determined in a given situation may not 
be arbitrary, but is very much contextual and relative. That is why in 
some cases, the presence of oxygen is just a necessary condition for fire, 
whereas in another case, say inside a spaceship, it is the cause of fire.
In every field, not only in the case of human conduct, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether, in the Humean sense, something is the cause of something 
else. Sometimes we ask counterfactual questions to select a cause - like 
whether A would have happened without B. Sometimes the condition by which 
we think we can control the occurrence of the effect is selected as the 
cause. ” Sometimes, which causal condition should be considered as the 
cause depends entirely upon the interest of the investigator. Thus a road 
accident may be causally accounted for in terms of bad weather, of the 
unusual bend of the road, of the drunken state of the driver, or of the 
negligence of the Ministry of Works to improve the road-condition. States
and dispositions can pass any of these tests quite comfortably.
I have raised this well known difficulty of the selection of a cause 
because, I think, bearing in mind the contextual and relative nature of any 
particular cause, it will be a too narrow definition of cause, if we rest­
rict it to events only.
In this connection Hart and Honore quite correctly have drawn our 
attention to a ‘shift* in the form of inquiry in Mill's account of
causation. Mill's treatment of causation "....leaves open the possibility
that the common notion of causation may have features which vary from 
context to context, that there may be different types of causal inquiry, 
and that there may not be a single concept of causation but rather a cluster 
of related concepts."^
1. H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honor/. Causation in the Law, pi?. 1959* London
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Mil has also pointed out that the reason why we associate "••••the
idea of causation with the proximate antecedent event rather than with any
of the antecedent states or permanent facts, which may happen also to be
conditions of the phenomenon," is that "....the event not only exists, but
begins to exist immediately previous ; while the other conditions may have
pre-existed for an indefinite time."^ These other conditions are not
instantaneous changes or a succession of such changes but long-lasting
states. In no uncertain terms. Mil concludes, "....though we may think
proper to give the name of cause to that one condition, the fulfilment of
which completes the tale, and brings about the effect without further delay;
this condition has really no closer relation to the effect than any of the
other conditions has. All the conditions were equally indispensable to the
production of the consequent; and the statement of the cause is incomplete,
2
unless in some shape or other we introduce them all."
Mill's analysis shows that the philosophical way of referring to a
preceding event as a cause is extremely vague and unclear. As a preceding
event a cause is often a temporal section arbitrarily cut out from the total
'causal happenings' antecedent to the effect. But in this sense hardly
any preceding event can properly be called a cause, i.e. if we take a cause
'3to be a sufficient condition. As Mill and also Hart and Honore have
lo J.S. Mil. System of Logic. Vol. I. Bk.III. Ch.V. Sec*3. p382. 1872 
Emphasis is the author's.
2o Ibid. p 379
3o H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore. Causation in the Law. pl5-l6. 1959* Oxford 
"We often speak of a single event as the cause of an occurrence, yet we 
never find that whenever a single event of one kind occurs it is ' invar­
iably' followed by some occurrence of another kind. ....Our causal 
generalisation informs us only that an occurrence of a given kind 
regularly follows when a complex set of conditions is satisfied. So 
when we identify single events as causes it appears that we choose one 
element from such a set, although each of the members of the set is 
equally required for the production of the effect."
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pointed out, it is quite unfair to call such a temporal section singled 
out from the total causal situation a cause# A preceding event in this 
sense is not enough to produce the effect# Besides it is always possible 
to find out for the sake of argument a 'preceding event* in the situation 
where an action is happening, as Davidson has attempted to show in the case 
of a signalling driver#^ But if the meaning of 'preceding event' is not 
to be so trivial it is difficult to see what should count as a preceding 
event# Not only is it that a 'preceding event' mentioned as a cause (like 
a lighted match causing a bush fire) is often insufficient to produce the 
effect on its own, but also that things often happen without a clear-cut 
event or without any relevant preceding event at all# For instance 'the 
garment got torn because it was worn out.' Is gradual 'wearing out' a 
preceding event? Have we got any specific time as to when the garment 
starts wearing out? Again 'the wet road has caused an accident#' The 
condition of the road may be something preceding the accident, but is this 
an 'event'? If a cause is always an event this sort of explanation cannot 
be a causal explanation. Yet when an accident is explained in terms of the 
wet condition of the road, the explanation is taken to be causal# This 
shows that even in the physical world a cause need not necessarily be an 
event# Thus the Humean claim that the word 'cause' means an 'event' cannot 
be accepted without qualifications. Hence Ryle's and Melden's arguments 
which rely on this Humean dictum cannot be taken as conclusive#
V Are explanations of actions in terms of reasons redescrintions?
Closely connected with the contention that a cause is an event, and 
desires, intentions etc#, are not events is another allied contention which 
is often put forward by the anti-causal theorists# This is; to give the
1. D# Davidson# 'Actions, Reasons & Causes'# Free V/ill & Determinism 
ed. B. Berofsky# p252# "But of course there is a mental event; at 
some moment the driver notices (or thought he noticed) his turn coming 
up, and that is the moment he signaled."
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reason for an action is to redescribe it and thus to place it in a pattern 
and in this way the action is explained, hut the redescription of an action 
does not introduce a separate event which can he a cause#
This means when an action is explained in terms of the agent's wants,
desires etc#, the explanation does not state the cause of the action but
states more explicitly what sort of action it is# Therefore in a reason- 
action explanation we do not get two separate entities related aa cause and 
effect, but the same entity described in two different ways# To quote 
Melden "A causal explanation, in other words, does not give us a further 
characterization of the event thereby explained rather, it offers
us an account of how it is that an event, whose characteristics are already 
known is brought to pass#" Yftiereas, "....citing the motive was giving a 
fuller characterization of the action; it was indeed providing a better 
understanding of what the driver was doing.
One thing should be made clear, that there is a trivial sense in
which an explanation of something in terms of something else is always a
redescription. In this sense the causal explanation is also a redescription
because it further characterises the effect by mentioning the cause. Melden
2
himself recognises this point# But if the meaning of redescription is not 
taken in this trivial sense I do not see how an explanation in terms of a 
reason can be called a redescription.
Let us consider some ordinary cases of redescriptions: the author
of Ulysses is James Joyce; the aboriginal's physical movement is a ritual 
dance; the driver's raising his hand is signalling. These are cases of 
redescription and in none of these cases does the redescription mention a
1# A.I. Melden# Free Action. p88 
2# Ibid
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separate factor which can he regarded as a cause. These redescriptions, 
obviously enough, are not causal explanations* They are only further 
characterisations of the event concerned. Thus performing a ritual dance 
is not the cause of certain physical movements; signalling is not the 
cause of raising one's hand; just as James Joyce is not the cause of 'the 
author of Ulysses'. On the contrary, performing a ritual dance is doing 
certain physical movements; signalling is raising one's hand and James 
Joyce i£ the author of Ulysses.
Are all re as on-explanations exactly like these cases of redescrip­
tions? Let us consider the case of the signalling driver. Here we are 
quite inclined to think that 'signalling' is a redescription of the driver's 
raising his hand and it is a redescription. But to redescribe the 
driver's raising his hand as 'signalling' is only to characterize a piece 
of movement as a particular type of action. Even then, one cannot con­
clusively characterise it as an action because someone might have forced 
the driver's hand in a signalling gesture when the turn came. It is only 
when the notion of want is introduced in the redescription that the piece 
of behaviour can conclusively be called an action. Thus to redescribe the 
driver's raising his hand as signalling is not to give the whole story.
It does say what sort of thing the agent is doing, but does not say why the 
driver is signalling or raising his hand. If one stops here, Melden's 
claim that reason-explanations do not say how the action came to be as 
other causal explanations do, appears to be quite justifiable. But this 
is not what the causal-theorists have in mind when they say that a reason- 
explanation is a causal explanation. The redescription of the driver's 
raising his hand as signalling is not even a full-blooded reason-explanation, 
Once one mentions the want or the desire which explains why the driver is 
signalling or raising his hand, the difference between a reason-explanation
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and a redescription becomes apparent. The driver raises his hand because 
he wants to signal and he wants to signal because he wants to make the 
others aware of the fact that he is about to turn. But what he wants to 
do, and his signalling or raising his hand are not one and the same thing.
To say one wants to signal is not to say that one signals or one raises 
one'8 hand.
When the causal theorists say that reasons are causes of action they 
do not mean to say that a situation described as 'he signals' causes a 
situation described as 'he raises his hand'. On the contrary they maintain 
that the want or desire to signal can be the cause of the driver's raising 
his hand. There is a difference between what the causal theorists are 
taken to mean and what they actually mean. In the case of signalling and 
raising one's hand there is no extra factor which can be treated as a cause. 
In the case of one's want to signal and signalling there are two required 
factors which can stand in a cause-effect relation, viz. one's want to 
signal and one's actual signalling which consists of raising one's hand.
Thus when raising one's hand is described as 'signalling' it is a redes­
cription and tells us what sort of action is done. But when raising one's 
hand is described in terms of one's want or desire to signal, not only is it 
said what sort of action is done but also why the action is done and how it 
came to be. Hence, Melden's claim that a reason-explanation does not say 
how the action came to be is not justifiable. It cannot really be main­
tained that explanations of actions in terms of reasons are only redes­
criptions of actions.
Conclusion
We are now in a position to sum up the arguments in this chapter. I 
have tried to show that the description of a cause as an event does not do
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full justice to the denotation of the notion of cause. The description 
excludes things - both mental and physical - which are usually considered 
as causes. From this perspective Hume's definition of a cause as an event 
seems to be rather limited. Once it is shown that a cause need not be an 
event, the argument that reasons cannot be causes because they are not 
events seems to be untenable.
Closely associated with this argument is the argument that reason- 
explanations are redescriptions of actions and do not mention a separate 
event other than the action itself, which can be a cause. I have tried 
to show the untenability of this argument by pointing out the difference 
between a mere redescription and a reason-explanation given in terms of an 
agent's wants, desires etc. The latter type of explanation states an extra 
factor which can serve as a cause.
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Chapter VI
Generalisation and Reason-Action Statements
The argument of the previous chapter was mainly concerned with the 
examination of the question whether a cause must he an event. We reached 
a negative conclusion, and found that it is not really necessary that a 
cause must he an event. This is true of the physical as well as of the 
mental world.
In this chapter I shall he discussing the question how far an 
explanation in terms of reasons can he called a causal explanation in view 
of another criterion of causal explanation. This is the generality model 
involved in causal explanation.
An argument is quite often put forward that explanations in terms of 
reasons do not involve a generalisation of a covering-law type which is an 
essential feature of a causal explanation. This argument enables its advoc . 
ates to draw one more distinction between reasons and causes. It is based 
on the assumption that whenever we give a causal explanation our explan­
ation is guaranteed by a general principle derived from experience. All 
causal statements are either covertly general or imply a general proposition. 
There cannot be anything like a singular causal statement on its own. It 
is always supported by a general proposition.
Philosophers who are opponents of causal explanation of human action 
often find the application of this generality-model to human action not only 
impossible but also dangerous. According to them the theory, which assumes 
that human behaviour can be generalised, brought under law and predictable, 
leads to determinism and eradicates freedom and moral responsibility. Quite 
a number of philosophers have criticised the application of this generality 
model to human action. In connection with explanation in histoiy - a
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large field of human action - W. Dray^ has commented "....whether or not 
it has a use in other fields, it is a dangerous model for the philosophy 
of history. For it commonly leads its advocates into talking about 
explanation in history in ways which are either radically incorrect or mis­
leading in important respects."
Certain things which have been mentioned by Dray and other philos­
ophers in connection with historical events are claimed to be true in the 
case of human action in general by the opponents of the causal theory of 
action. These are the peculiar nature of the subject concerned - its 
particularity and uniqueness. They say that to such a field the notions 
of cause and generalisation have got no application at all.
There appear to be two reasons for this attitude. Firstly, these 
philosophers maintain that due to the extreme complexity and the fluid 
nature of our motives, intentions, desires etc., formulation of any precise 
general law seems to be simply impossible. It is difficult to ascertain 
which particular motive or intention will cause which particular action in 
what context. Secondly, they say that there is a direct, immediate sense 
in which we know that our action results from an intention or motive. We 
do not know this in the same way in which we know that fire causes burning, 
i.e. through induction. To know that my catching the bus at a particular 
moment is explained by my intention to catch the bus at that particular mom­
ent is not to invoke any generalisation. It seems that in the case of 
mental items, we can say that our intention, desire etc., account for our 
action without having recourse to generalisation. But in ordinary causal 
situations we can say that one event explains another only after repeated 
observations.
1* Wy Dray. Laws and Explanation in History, pi. 1957* Oxford
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What R«G. Collingwood has said in connection with historical events 
clarifies this argument very well. He has said that "For history, the 
object to be discovered is not the mere event, but the thought expressed 
in it. To discover that thought is already to understand it."^
There are however, two ways of facing the question of the generality- 
model in the case of human action.
(i) Firstly, by pointing out that laws connecting reasons and actions 
can be formed;
(ii) secondly, by showing that a general law is not essential for a 
causal explanation; in other words that a valid singular causal 
statement can be formed without requiring the support of a general 
law.
In this chapter my concern will be the discussion of these two points. 
I shall try to show that generalisations concerning reasons and actions can 
be formed and that there is no logical difficulty in forming such general­
isations. I will however reject the second point, that a singular causal 
statement can be formed without assuming any sort of generalisation. I 
shall maintain that generalisation is necessary for a causal explanation.
But at the same time I shall try to show that such a necessity does not 
exclude the reason-action relation from the causal sphere.
I Can laws connecting reasons and actions be formed?
I have mentioned before that philosophers often cite the highly com­
plex nature of human wants, intentions, desires etc., and actions as an 
obstacle to the formulation of a general law which is thought to be essen­
tial for a causal relation. This difficulty of formulating laws in the 
case of reason and action can be either logical or empirical.
1. E.G. Collingwood. The Idea of History. p214* 1946. Oxford
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(i) The logical difficulties can arise from the nature of the relation 
between reasons and actions. One such difficulty may arise from the in- 
describability of a reason without involving the notion of its alleged 
effect. This feature of reason-action relations, as Melden has argued^ 
may mean that the relation is non-contingent. If it is non-contingent, 
then the generalisation of such a relation will not be a causal generalis­
ation. However, in chapter IV we have seen that though the descriptions 
of reasons involve descriptions of actions that does not really imply that 
the relation is non-contingent and therefore cannot be causal.
Another logical difficulty may arise from the suggestion that the 
apparent incorrigible and immediate nature of first person singular reason- 
action statements makes generalisation superfluous ; here one does not have 
to appeal to general laws to find out that one's action follows from one's 
reason to perform such an action; nor does the falsification of the general 
law mean the falsification of the singular reason-action statement. To 
this point I shall return later. The question as to whether such state­
ments are really incorrigible will be discussed in the last chapter. For 
the time being I shall concentrate first on the question of empirical diff­
iculties, and then on whether generalisations are necessary for causal 
explanations. In connection with the latter I shall discuss the view of 
Hart and Honore'.
(ii) So far as the empirical difficulties are concerned it should be 
noted that the existence of empirical difficulties does not in any way 
suggest that generalisation is impossible. Nor does it suggest that one 
should explain human action without referring to generalisation. It is 
arguable that the empirical difficulties may be great enough to make 
generalisation impracticable. Hut such empirical impracticability of 
forming a generalisation sometimes exists even in the case of physical 
causes, particularly when we deal with unique systems especially in the 
field of astronomy or cosmology. For instance, generalisations are not 
possible in the case of the Universe.
1. See Chapter IV
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It is not true that we do not generalise about human b ehaviour and 
reasons for such behaviour. Quite often we infer from psychological laws; 
we assume generalisations of behaviour in order to predict or account for 
others' behaviour. Our everyday conduct is always based on rough laws 
and generalisations about others' behaviour. V/e often calculate and plan 
our own action on the basis of the knowledge of how others have acted under 
similar circumstances. Surprisingly enough we generalise more about human 
behaviour than we think we do. Such generalisations can be found in 
abundance in any field of human interactions and relations. In the field 
of psychology and the social sciences we find remarkable success in explain­
ing any predicting human behaviour. Political prophecies and economic 
planning would have been impossible had we not accepted the general law 
that men are liable to act in a particular way in a particular situation.
No question of manipulation, influencing and changing human behaviour could 
have arisen then. We can think of manipulating human behaviour because we 
know that certain antecedents produce certain kinds of behaviour on our part 
in certain circumstances. Different activities existing in human society 
like propaganda, indoctrination, social conditioning or techniques of 
advertisement, are based on the idea that human behaviour can be generalised 
and is predictable and changeable by the introduction or removal of ante­
cedent factors.
Predication and reason-action explanation
Philosophers often try to deprive wants, desires etc., of causal 
efficacy on the ground of uncertainty of prediction. Their argument runs 
as follows: if anything is causally determined, it is predictable; action
is not predictable; therefore action cannot be causally determined. They 
claim that the laws connecting reason and action are not accurate and precise 
enough for successful predictions to be made on the basis of them.
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The major premise of this argument is wrongly conceived. For 
causal determination and predictability are not the same thing. They are 
not interchangeable and lack of predictability does not mean absence of 
causal determination. An event can be unpredictable because of empirical 
difficulties or it can be 'in principle' unpredictable. So far as the 
empirical difficulties are concerned, sometimes events are unpredictable 
because of lack of empirical evidence. Predicting an event means saying 
beforehand, with the help of some general laws, what is going to happen 
from the conditions which already exist. Sometimes there may be practical 
difficulties in understending or collecting the initial conditions or in 
formulating a general law which will enable one to predict. A particular 
system may be so complex that it may be difficult to collect evidence for 
correct predictions. One can predict an event if its cause is known, but 
the cause of an event cannot always be known beforehand. As prediction 
is not guessing and follows a logical method, such scientific methods may 
be unavailable in particular cases or the use of a particular method or 
technique may interfere with the prediction. The most common example 
comes from the findings of quantum physics, that^to attempt to specify the 
position and the velocity of an electron simultaneously is impossible be­
cause the conditions under which such an attempt is carried on affect either 
the position or the velocity. However, the presence of such difficulties 
does not refute the existence of a causal relation though the example I 
cited above is often used in favour of Indeterminism.
There is silso no need to think that a causal event cannot be 'in 
principle' unpredictable. As Dr. A.R. Lacey puts it, "....there is no 
reason why events which are determined should be even in principle predic­
table, because there might be no method by which the law governing the 
event in question could be known before its first instance. Some things, 
then, may be determined without being predictable."^
1. A.R. Lacey. 'Free Will and Responsibility'. P.A.S. Vol. LVIII, 1937-58.
pl6
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Sometimes the prediction itself can affect the situation and falsify 
itself. For instance it is not difficult to conceive a predicting machine 
which will predict its own movement and at the same time assimilate the 
prediction as a further piece of information and change its movement to the 
opposite to what is predicted. Hence, it can be concluded that the absence 
of predictability does not really mean the absence of causality.
The criticism that actions are difficult to predict can be raised in 
the case of physical causes as well. Predictive uncertaiinty cannot be 
completely eliminated from there. Even in a simple case like a storm's 
causing a bridge to collapse, we cannot predict with absolute certainty 
that the event is going to happen. Again take the instance of an earth­
quake. We can say what is the cause of an earthquake but cannot predict 
where or when it will happen. It can be argued that we cannot predict in 
the case of the earthquake because we do not know when the cause is present# 
But exactly the same thing can be said regarding reasons for actions. In 
the midst of various reasons which one often has for performing an action, 
it is difficult to ascertain the strongest reason or balance of reasons 
which will cause the action.
D.F. Pears mentions various sources of uncertainty in making true 
predictions in the case of human actions, like an external impediment, a 
change in the circumstances which produces a change of mind etc. But 
such uncertainties are equally present in the case of physical causation.
An external impediment, a change in the circumstances, can make true pred­
ictions in the case of physical causation equally difficult. These 
factors cannot bar us from saying that predictions of human behaviour from 
psychological generalisations are possible.
1. D.F. Pears. 'Predicting and Deciding*. Proceedings of British Academy.
p222. 1964
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II Predictions on the basis of character-traits
One important point to note concerning generalisations and predict­
ions of human behaviour is that quite often predictions are made about other 
people's behaviour based on the knowledge of their characters. Such know- 
lafee can be of the individual's personal character-traits, education, up­
bringing, aims, desires, ambitions etc., as well as of the group the 
individual belongs to. On the basis of such knowledge it is often possible 
to predict how a particular individual will behave in a particular situation.
A.C» MacIntyre and predictions based on character-traits
A.C. llacIntyre in his article 'Determinism' suggests that predictions 
of human action based on character-traits are not causal predictions. He 
distinguishes between two sorts of predictions. "....we may predict succ­
essfully how a man will behave from knowledge of factors other than and 
antecedent to his own present and past decisions, preferences and consciously 
motivated behaviour. Such is the prediction that an infant deprived at a 
certain age of maternal care will prove in later life incapable of genuine 
love-relationships. But other predictions may be of a kind that can only 
be made on the basis of data that include knowledge of a man's decisions, 
preferences and so on.
According to MacIntyre the prediction of a man's action from his
decisions, preferences, character etc., is not a causal prediction. On
the contrary, in his opinion, such predictability is compatible with and
2
required by rational behaviour©
1© A.C. MacIntyre. 'Determinism'. Mind. 1957* P57 
2© Ibid
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Like many other philosophers Iflaclntyre cannot get rid of the idea
that there can be only one sort of cause of action viz., that which operates
independently of our deliberation. And in this sense, MacIntyre holds
'free action' or 'rational behaviour' cannot be given a causal explanation.
"....if a man's behaviour is rational it cannot be determined by the state
of his glands or any other antecedent causal factor."^ MacIntyre tliinks
that/certain alternative attempt to explain rational behaviour in causal
terms will be a tautology. The tautology will consist in taking anything
2
which influences behaviour as a cause of behaviour. Ihe causal theorists 
however do not claim in such an unqualified way that anything which influences 
behaviour is a cause of behaviour. What they claim is that wants, desires 
etc. are causes of actions. But as this leads on to the general issue of 
the thesis there is no need to discuss it separately.
I would like to argue that MacIntyre's criterion of rational behav­
iour on the one hand fails to distinguish between rational (i.e. free and 
uncaused) behaviour and non-rational (i.e. caused) behaviour and on the other 
hands fails to differentiate among various types of free behaviour, and 
therefore, his claim that predictions of rational behaviour are non-causal 
cannot be established on the basis of his distinction between rational and 
non-rational behaviour.
To understand MacIntyre's argument it is first necessary to under­
stand what he means by 'rational behaviour', and here I believe he gives us 
a completely confused account. According to him, behaviour is rational, 
"....if, and only if, it can be influenced, or inhibited by the adducing 
of some logically relevant consideration.He maintains that the 'can'
1. Ibid. p55
2. Ibid. p38
3. Ibid. p54
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in the definition of rational behaviour means 'can, in principle', and 
thinks that this definition of rational behaviour "does not lead to the 
paradox that a free act is never a foolish act." "To say that a man's 
behaviour is open to alteration by logically relevant considerations is 
not to say that he alters his behaviour in actual fact." In this sense, 
according to MacIntyre, reflective or non-ref le ctive and impulsive behav­
iour, sensible or foolish behaviour, can be equally rational behaviour 
because they are open to being affected by rational considerations.
MacIntyre holds that in contrast with rational behaviour non-rational 
behaviour is not open to logically relevant considerations. For non- 
rational behaviour he cites the example of the hypnotized man who walkes 
out of the room ignoring the logically relevant considerations for staying 
in the room. "If no matter how good the reasons we offered him he persisted 
in leaving it, we shall have to say that his behaviour was causally deter­
mined."^
In the context of what MacIntyre says above it seems that though he 
brings in 'can in principle* to cater for actions where people may not 
accept good reasons and act foolishly, what he is really committed to 
saying is that a person acting rationally will in fact accept good reasons 
if offered. He suggests that where people acted foolishly, they would not 
have done so if reasons had been offered. "There may in fact be no time 
to adduce any considerations at all, but we can in principle distinguish 
the nvLn who would leap in any way from the man who would be stopped by the 
information that what was in the water was a log...«"^ Such a criterion 
of rational behaviour confuses foolish actions with actions done from 
ignorance. It is true that when a man acts foolishly, if logically
1. Ibid. p36
2. Ibid. p38
3. Ibid PP34-35
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^relevant considerations are offered he may change his behaviour* But 
it is equally true that he may completely ignore any such considerations - 
no matter how good the proffered reasons are. Yet, he may still be acting 
rationally i.e. his behaviour will not be determined by factors independent 
of his deliberation.
ifaclntyre * s definition can explain such an action as rational only 
if he sticks to his 'can in principle'. But if he thinks (as his remark 
suggests) that a man acting rationally will in fact accept the logically 
relevant considerations if offered, then his criterion of rational behaviour 
fails to distinguish between the case where a man ignoring proffered 
logical reasons acts foolishly, and the case of the hypnotic patient who 
walks out ignoring proffered good reasons for iiying in a room. Similarly, 
the criterion also fails to include cases where some one acts foolishly 
though logical reasons are offered simply because he is not intelligent 
enough to appreciate them. Yet in the ordinary sense of the term 'free* 
such an action would be a free action.
Another important point in this connection is what should be counted 
as 'logically relevant considerations'? The phrase is not only vague but 
highly relative. In the words of Ikiclntyre "what is logically relevant 
will necessarily vary from case to case."^ Therefore, an attempt to 
decide on the basis of this vague relative property whether a piece of 
behaviour is rational or non-rational and consequently free or caused, is 
highly dubious. This becomes apparent from MacIntyre's example of non- 
rational behaviour. He considers certain types of behaviour found in 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (due to indoctrination, brain washing, 
mass propaganda etc.) as non-rational. But from another perspective such 
behaviour can well be described as rational or free behaviour. In sit­
uations like these what is counted as a logically relevant consideration 
depends on what we believe in.
1. Ibid. p34
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Like R.S. Peters* 'deviations from the purposive rule-following
model', MacIntyre's 'non-rational behaviour* is also a pretty mixed bag.
It includes behaviour caused by glandular states,^ behaviour caused by the
2lack of a mother-figure in early childhood, behaviour caused by brain­
washing and indoctrination,^ and the behaviour of a man who will spend "a 
great deal of time thinking about what he should do and yet refuse to 
entertain a great many logically relevant considerations. According to 
MacIntyre these are all instances of non-rational behaviour because they 
are not open to logically relevant considerations.
It seems that what llaclntyre confuses here are the different mean­
ings of the term 'rational'. He fails to see that in one sense rational 
behaviour means voluntary deliberate behaviour and this is the sense with 
which he starts; and in another sense it means sensible behaviour, and 
this is the sense with which he ends. He confuses these two meanings and 
classes the behaviour of the Nazis with the behaviour caused by hypnotic 
influence or glandular trouble. His definition of rational behaviour 
excludes the latter type of behaviour but does not exclude the former type, 
though he quite happily suggests that both these types are non-rational.
If they are both non-rational, they are so in two different senses.
The behaviour of the Nazis is non-rational in the sense that they 
are prejudiced; the behaviour arising from glandular trouble is non- 
rational in the sense that it is not voluntary or deliberate behaviour. 
According to MacIntyre as both these two types of behaviour are non- 
rational, therefore they are causally explicable in terms of factors indep­
endent of one's deliberation. But he fails to see that the behaviour 
arising from glandular trouble may be explicable in terms of factors
lo Ibid. p35
2. Ibid. p37
3. Ibid. p 36 
4* Ibid. p55
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independent of one's deliberation but not the behaviour of the Nazis.
The behaviour due to indoctrination and brain-washing or the behaviour 
due to the lack of a mother-figure at an early age cannot be given causal 
explanations in terms of factors completely independent of one's deliberation.
In the context of MacIntyre's remark that "....to show that behav­
iour is rational is enough to show that it is not causally determined in 
the sense of being the effect of a set of sufficient conditions operating 
independently of the agent's deliberation or possibility of deliberation."^, 
it is difficult to classify certain kinds of behaviour as rational or non- 
rational - free or caused. For instance, how one should classify the 
behaviour of a neurotic person who has been set free from his inner com­
plexes by means of mechanical treatment like an operation in the brain, 
electric shocks, drugs etc. Such treatment makes a person's behaviour 
amenable to reasons, though not necessarily only to good reasons. From 
this perspective, his behaviour can be classified as rational or free. But 
from another perspective his behaviour is non-rational or caused because 
what makes such a piece of behaviour possible is something which operates 
independently of one's deliberation. Then again how should one classify a 
person's behaviour when desires and motives are manipulated not by mechan­
ical devices but by psychological devices - as is done by advertisement 
techniques?
MacIntyre mentions 'giving of a reason' as being causally effective. 
"You may act as a result of my reasoning with you, but it may be on account 
of the passion in my tone or as a result of forgotten associations of the 
words that I used that you were moved to act." What is 'causally effective* 
in MacIntyre's example is not 'the giving of a reason' but 'the passion of 
tone' or 'the forgotten associations of the word'. Now, if these things
1. Ibid. p35
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are causally effective, then, following MacIntyre's line of argument, they 
operate independent of one's deliberation and therefore the behaviour or 
action induced by them is caused. But at the same time, it will be wrong 
to say that such actions, because they are so caused, are not open to 
logically relevant considerations. It is conceivable that even if a 
person acts on account of the passion in some one else's tone, his behav­
iour is still open to the influence of logically relevant considerations. 
Hence, on the one hand the actions seems to be caused and on the other hand 
free.
MacIntyre's primary mistake is his refusal to accept that causal 
explanation can be more extensive than explanation in terms of sufficient 
conditions independent of one's deliberations. He fails to see that 
behaviour could be causally determined in the sense of being the effect of 
a set of sufficient conditions which include the agent's deliberation - 
his wants, beliefs, desires etc. This isn^hat happens in the case of an 
individual being deprived of maternal care in his infancy - or in the case 
of people who are instigated by a certain type of propaganda - religious, 
political or any other kind, though MacIntyre's analysis suggests that in 
such cases the role of the agent's wants, beliefs or deliberations is insig 
nificant. He also thinks that the behaviour involved in such cases cannot 
be altered by logically relevant considerations. This seems to be an 
over-simplification of the situation. It is not inconceivable that the 
behaviour mentioned above can be altered by logically relevant considerat­
ions. This does not, however, mean that wants, desires etc. can be causes 
only in the absence of proffered logically relevant considerations. Wants, 
desires etc. can be causes even when logically relevant considerations are 
offered.
139
It can be concluded that certain kinds of behaviour which niacin tyre 
is willing to call 'causal* do not really emerge from conditions operating 
independently of the agent's deliberation. To say that a piece of 
behaviour is caused is not always to say that it is caused by something 
extraneous to one's own deliberation. On the contrary it can emerge 
from certain desires or wants of the agent which in their turn are again 
conditioned by some psychological, physical or physiological factors. If 
this is the case then the line between two sorts of predictions of human 
behaviour - as drawn by DIacIntyre is certainly very hazy.
Ill Are generalisations necessary for causal explanations?
I have mentioned before that one way of answering the anti-causal 
theorists would be by showing that a general law is not essential for a 
causal explanation. In the case of reason and action the causal question 
is more concerned with the difficulty of discovering generalisations than 
with applying generalisations in particular cases. We do apply general 
laws to explain human action and these general laws are in terms of 
reasons; but difficulty arises when we try to discover generstl laws from 
particular cases of human behaviour. This becomes especially acute when 
we try to generalise from cases like 'I bought the car because I wanted to.' 
It seem^^hat there cannot be any generalisation either to the effect that 
in future I shall behave in a similar fashion or to the effect that in the 
past I have behaved in a similar fashion. If we consider statements like 
•I bought X because I wanted to* as causal, then quite obviously the question 
will arise, are such statements known through induction or are they non- 
inferential?
The main characteristic of the Humean version of causality is its 
generality model. Both in the Treatise and in the Enquiry emphasis is put 
on 'regular sequence'. To Hume an event or an object is the cause of
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another event or object when events of the first sort are regularly followed 
by events of the second sort. Thus a singular causal statement is not 
complete unless it is supported by a general law. An event is causally 
explained by showing that the singular statement which describes the event's 
relation with its antecedent can be supported by a general proposition to 
the same effect. The singular causal statement is usually a direct 
instance of the general law, as is in the example 'the blue litmus paper 
turned red when put into acid because all blue litmus paper turn red when 
put into acid.*
Basing themselves on this Eumean version of causal regularity, anti- 
causal theorists argue that in the case of ordinary physical causation it 
is always possible to say that if the circumstances were repeated the same 
effect would follow; but that this cannot be said in the case of the 
reason-action relation. As Hart and Honore put it, "The statement that 
one person did something because, for example, another threatened him, 
carries no implication or covert assertion that if the circumstances were 
repeated the same action would follow;"^
It seems quite obvious that the sort of generalisation Hart and 
Honors'^  mention above cannot easily be found in the case of action. Besides 
even if we are provided with such a generalisation, it will be superfluous 
in the sense that ordinarily one knows directly that one's action follows 
from one's want and it does not require any generalisation for the agent 
to know it except of course in the case of unconscious motivation.
I have already mentioned that one way of facing the question of 
generalisation in this particular issue is to claim that a singular causal 
statement does not necessarily entail a law. However I am not going to 
defend this claim. On the contrary, I would like to show that reason- 
action statements involve generalisations.
1. H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honored Causation in the Law. p52. 1959* Oxford
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Let us first discuss the point that in the case of reason and 
action we cannot say that if the circumstances were repeated the same 
action would follow. At first it seems completely improbable that in 
similar circumstances, given similar reasons, people will ever behave 
similarly. But this improbability is only apparent. The improbability 
arises only from the fact that in the case of physical causation we always 
take account of whether the ceteris paribus clause is satisfied, i.e., 
whether the circumstances are exactly the same as before, and this is what 
the anti-causal theorists often overlook in the case of reason and action. 
In the case of physical causation, we can say for instance that in all 
cases acid turns blue litmus paper red, if the ceteris paribus clause is 
satisfied. Thus if in a particular case a piece of blue litmus does not 
turn red when put into acid, we search for an interfering cause like the 
presence of a neutralizing agent. Whenever a physical cause fails to work 
we always assume that the circumstances are not exactly the same. When we 
say that the wet condition of the road caused an accident, we imply a 
general law that given the same circumstances the effect would occur, and 
if no other accident did happen we assume that the circumstances did not 
repeat. 7/e never think that the general law in this case does not hold.
Now, 'the circumstances* in the case of reason and action are more
extensive than mere physical conditi^^& not only include the physical 
conditions in which the action takes place, but also the psychological and 
physiological conditions of the agent. Thus the repetition of the 'same 
circumstances' here means the repetition of the physical, physiological 
and psychological conditions in which the previous action took place. Thus, 
that a person acts in a particular way because some one threatens him 
carries the implication that if the circumstances were repeated he would 
behave exactly in the same way provided the relevant conditions as ment­
ioned above remained exactly the same. In the case of human action
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circumstances do not always repeat exactly in the same way. Y/e tend to 
overlook the point that one's experience of a threat in one case acts as 
an added causal factor in the second case of threat. Therefore, when the
circumstances repeat they do not repeat exactly in the same way. For
instance in one case a person may yield to a threat because he is frigh­
tened. The situation occurs ^ain but he does not yield to the threat 
though he may be just as frightened as before. This happens because his 
previous experience of threat in a similar situation acts as an extra 
causal factor and helps him to be on his guard. This extra causal element
makes the circumstances different in the second case.
However, this does not mean that in the cases of reasons and actions 
circumstances never repeat. On the contrary most of our reason-action 
explanations carry the implication that if the circumstances were repeated 
the same action would follow. People do behave similarly in similar cir­
cumstances; a particular individual having similar reasons behaves repeat­
edly in the same way. Were this not the case it would have been impossible 
to carry on our everyday life. Thus exactly as in the cases of physical 
causation, and explanation like 'I did x because I wanted to do. x' carries 
the implication that if the circumstances were repeated, I would behave 
exactly in the same way. If I do not that will mean that the case is diff­
erent from the previous one.
One important question about reason and action is: what sort of 
generalisation do we really need here? Do we always need a general law 
of which the singular causal statement is a direct instance, as the state­
ment 'the litmus paper turned red because it was put into acid' is a 
direct instance of the general law 'acid always tumsblue litmus red'?
It seems to me that in a causal explanation we do not need a straightfor­
ward general law like the acid—case where the singular causal statement is
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a direct instance of the general law. Quite often a singular causal 
statement describing a physical event satisfies only a remote general law.
In this respect it is worth referring to Davidson. Davidson says
that a weaker version of the generality model can be given to save singular
causal statements. The weaker version of the generality model is
causes B* entails that there exists a causal law instantiated by some true
descriptions of A and B".^ It is weaker in the sense that "....no
particular law is entailed by a singular causal claim, and a singular causal
2
claim can be defended, without defending any law." Davidson claims that 
this version suits reason-action statements quite well.
Davidson seems to be quite right in claiming that singular causal 
statements do not necessarily indicate "....by the concepts they employ, 
the concepts that will occur in the entailed l a w . T h i s  means that to 
state a singular causal proposition like *C is the cause of E* does not 
involve suggesting that there exists a causal law like 'All C's cause E's'. 
All that such a singular causal statement needs is that there is a law, or 
a set of laws - it does not matter how remote from the case concerned they 
are - which can causally explain the situation in question.
Strictly speaking the generalisations we use in causal explanations 
are usually abstract and devoid of all particular details. Thus the law 
which supports the singular causal statement explaining the movement of 
one billiard ball in terms of its being struck by another, has got nothing 
to do with billiard balls in particular. On the contrary it is an ab­
stract law of motion and energy. If this is the case with causal general­
isation in the case of physical events, then there is every possibility 
that such a generalisation can be found to support a reason-action 
statement.
1. D. Davidson. 'Actions, Reasons and Causes'. Free will and Determinism. 
p256o ed. B. Berofsky.
2. Ibid. p237
3. Ibid.
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In order to make a singular causal statement we must assume a law 
or we must have enough reasons to believe that there is such a law. To 
say this is to imply that a reason-action statement, if it is to be causal, 
must satisfy a general law. I think Davidson is right when he says that 
"Ignorance of competent predictive laws does not inhibit valid causal 
explanation...."• But one must be clear that ignorance does not mean 
absence. Even where we are ignorant of the right predictive laws we are 
in some sense vaguely aware of some predictive laws, perhaps distantly 
connected with the incident at hand. This means that in order to make a 
singular causal statement, one need not have to be in full possession of 
the supporting causal law; all that is required is that there should be 
reason to believe that there is a causal law covering the particular 
instance. If there is no such reason, one can not be so sure that the 
window broke because it was struck by a stone. For instance if it falls 
apart without any apparent visible cause and an explanation in terms of 
super-natural forces is given, we will refuse to accept it as a causal 
statement. This is simply because here we are not in command even of a 
vague distant law which can be associated with the happening in question; 
nor can we say that there is one; there is no regularity in any form which 
can connect the event concerned and a super-natural force (if any) as the 
effect and the cause. Thus a singular causal statement always needs the 
support of a general law, and a general law is essential for a causal 
relation.
IV Hart and Honore on Generalisation in causation
2Hart and Honore in their elaborate discussion of the problem of 
causation in law, have rejected the Humean claim that motives, desires, 
wants, etc., can be causes on the ground of lack of generalisations in such 
cases. For them a motive-explanation cannot be a causal explanation
1. Ibid. p256
2. H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honore. Causation in the Law. 1959
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because it does not involve generalisation* The causal relation “depends 
upon and implies the truth of one or more general propositions relating 
directly or indirectly events of these two kinds'*.
They first discuss their view about the demand of an ordinary singu­
lar causal statement for generalisation and then they discuss the case of 
reason and action in the context of inter-personal transactions. Their 
opinion is that though the relations between reason and action are often 
intelligibly called causal connections, they do not depend upon regular
2
connection or sequence as the causal relations between physical events do© 
Generalisation has a place here but a less central one.
They say that in ordinary discourse and in legal procedure, it is 
enough to say that some one has done something because someone else threat­
ened him or induced him to do that, and no one will be expected to produce 
a generalisation.
Later on, however, they try to specify the place of generalisation 
in the reason-action relations. They admit that some form of generalis­
ation is used in the case of the reason-action relation. “Of course 
generalisations about the way in which either the person in question or 
other persons respond, e.g. to threats, or by what reasons they are or are 
not actuated have an important place in such cases.
Again, “Hourly speaking, we recognise as a reason for action (and 
therefore as a given person*s reason on a particular occasion) something 
which is relevant to the promotion of some purpose known to be pursued by
1. The example under discussion is “A's blow caused B's death'*. Ibid. p9
2. Ibid© p48 
3» Ibid. p53
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human beings and so renders an action eligible by human beings as we know 
them. The concept of reasons therefore presupposes that, in general, 
human beings respond to certain situations in such ways as fleeing from 
danger, or conforming with social rules or conventions, etc."
Yet at the same time Hart and Honore declare that by this one is
not committed to any assertion that if the circumstances were repeated
the same action would follow. "All that is required is that, if the case
is to be one of a person acting for a reason, we must understand how it
promoted some objective analogous at least in some way to those which human
2
beings are known to pursue by action." This last line, however, shows 
again that although Hart and Honore are more inclined to think that a 
reason-action statement does not involve any generalisation at all, yet they 
cannot avoid the notion of generalisation completely. They indirectly 
admit that some sort of generalisation is needed to say that an action 
follows from a particular reason.
Hart and Honore tliink that the difference between a physical cause- 
effect relation and a reason-action relation is that in the case of reason 
and action the instances (viz., that an individual had a reason for an 
action) from which the generalisation is built up are known independently 
of the generalisation; whereas in the case of physical events, it is on 
the strength of a generalisation that one can speak of one event as causally 
connected with another. Apart from such generalisation they are only
3
"cases of succession between events".
1. Ibid. The emphasis is the authors'
2. Ibid. p55
3. Ibid
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Hart and Honore" have not made it clear what exactly is known indep­
endently of the generalisation. Presumably they do not want to say that 
in.the reason-action case what is known is that the agent had the reason 
and he acted. liYhat they want to say seems to be that the agent acted 
because of the reason which is known independently of the generalisation. 
Therefore, generalisation is superfluous in the case of reason and action.
Quite obviously this is the crux of the generality-question in the case of
/
reason and action, and Hart's and Honorés mentioning this difference between 
generalisations in a reason-action case and in a physical case is quite 
justifiable, though it seems that what they say in this connection is in 
conflict with their previous admission quoted earlier that the concept of 
reason presupposes that, in general, human beings respond to certain sit­
uations in regular ways.
It seems to me that what Hart and Honore overlook here is the two 
sources of knowledge which are available in the case of reason and action - 
the source which is open to the sgent and the source which is open to the 
observer. The agent usually does not wait for a generalisation to pron­
ounce that his action has resulted from the reason he has. I say fusually * 
because there are cases of unconscious motivation and cases where one takes 
the help of a generalisation to predict one's own behaviour. But the 
relation between reason and action is not only viewed by the agent from 
inside, it can also be viewed by an observer from outside. And here in 
order to explain an action in terms of reasons, there is only one source 
open to the observer and that is to appeaj^ to generalisation.
An important point to note is that such generalisations are not 
neurological or physiological, but psychological. The observer relies on 
generalisations concerning the behaviour of ordinary people - that when 
ordinary human beings have a particular reason they act in a particular way.
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If the observer is acquainted with the personal character of the agent, he 
ielies on generalisations concerning the agent's behaviour in the past - 
that when the agent acts in a particular way he usually has a particular 
reason for acting© Relying on these two forms of generalisation he can 
even predict the agent's action. This is what actually happens in our 
daily experience. We always rely on generalisations in order to know what 
other people's reasons for acting are or to predict their action© The 
explanation of action in terms of our wants, motives, desires is intellig­
ible to others because they are systematic and exhibit a general pattern.
A commedian can work out his jokes when he relies on the general pattern 
of what causes amusement. The appeal to the generality-model is so subtle 
that we are not consciously aware of when we make such an appeal© Perhaps 
generalisation is not required to understand the behaviour of a man driving 
a car when he raises his hand, because we are so used to it. But in any 
alien state of affairs where we do not understand things so quickly, we 
need a generalisation quite explicitly. Our acceptance of some reasons as 
the reason for certain behaviour and rejection of others as rationalisations 
shows that quite often we depend on the fact that there is a general conn­
ection between certain reasons and certain actions.
The difficulty arises with the agent's way of knowing an action and 
there it seems the appeal to a generalisation is completely redundant, and 
this is where the question of the role of generalisation in the case of 
first person singular reason-action statements arises.
V First person singular statements and generalisations
Generalisations seems to be redundant so far as first person singular 
statements of reasons for actions are concerned. It has been argued that 
the immediate knowledge of the relation between a reason and an action shows 
that it cannot be causal for the causal relation between two events or
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objects is known inferentially. It is important to note that the argument 
assumes that if a relation is known immediately it cannot be causal, i.e. 
whether a thing is a cause or not depends on how we come to know its relation 
to the alleged effect.
In the case of physical cause and effect we are always in the ob­
server's position. Therefore, a causal relation is known inferentially 
through repeated experiences. But so far as our personal observation goes, 
it seems that we do not usually need such regularity of experience.
There are cases other than reasons and actions where one appears to 
know immediately that something is the cause of something else. For instance, 
I find that I cannot concentrate because of my headache. To know the 
causal relation between my headache and my lack of concentration I do not 
have to go through a process of research. I may not be aware of what is 
going on in my neuro-physiological make-up, still I can say that my headache 
is the cause of my feeling distracted, and perhaps taking a couple of 
aspirin will prove that I am right in my diagnosis of the cause.
The same sort of immediacy can be observed in cases like 'I fell down
because he pushed me', or 'the liquid in the bowl burnt my finger'. Thus
it seems that not only in the case of reason and action do we come to know
a causal relation immediately, but sometimes in cases where reasons are 
not involved we can make a singular causal statement immediately. The 
singular statements mentioned here are not something that has been rejected 
from the observer's standpoint as not causal© On the contrary, they are 
considered from the observer's perspective as causal statements. Otherwise 
the statement 'my headache is causing my distraction' would have been com­
pletely incomprehensible to others.
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However, the immediacy involved in these cases needs consideration. 
Are these singular causal statements completely independent of any general­
isation whatsoever? Does their immediateness guarantee the relation they 
state? If the answer is affirmative then it will be true to say that even 
when the general statements corresponding to the singular statements are 
false the singular causal statements remain true. In other words the 
falsification of the general statement will not imply the falsification of 
the singular statement. This seems to be a violation of the Humean prin­
ciple of causation according to which generalisation in causation means 
that under similar circumstances similar causes produce similar effects and 
if in any case a singular causal statement does not imply such a generalis­
ation, it cannot be a causal statement. Things seem to be reversed in the 
case of reasons and actions. Here even if the generalisation turns out 
to be false, it is difficult to prove the falsity of the singular statement. 
If a person sincerely states that he did x because he wanted to and if no 
similar instance can be found in his past or future behaviour, still the 
truth of his statement appears to be beyond doubt. The absence or falsif­
ication of the generalisation does not seem to interfere with the truth of 
the singular statement.
Yet, can one be so sure that the truth or falsity of the singular 
statements about reasons for actions or of any other similar statements 
made immediately does not imply the truth or falsity of a generalisation? 
Are these singular statements self-sufficient and not needing the support 
of a general law or are they causal hypotheses entailing a general law?
Let us first consider the singular causal statements which do not 
involve reasons and actions but are made immediately by the agent and acc­
epted by observers as causal statements e.g., statements like *I cannot 
concentrate because of my headache* or »the liquid in the bowl burnt my 
finger *. In both these two examples one can be mistaken quite easily in
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stating the «ause© It may not he the headache, hut something else - per­
haps the thought of something else which is in my mind or perhaps the noise 
of the drilling machine outside - that causes my distraction© Similarly
it may not he the liquid in the howl hut perhaps some invisible electric 
wire which causes the bum.
Hence though these statements are made immediately they are not self- 
sufficient. The agent cannot be absolutely sure about their validity. Such 
statements for their truth or falsity depend on some sort of generalisations© 
They Eire immediate no doubt but are not incorrigible. Because they are 
corrigible in the ordinary Humean way i.e. through generalisations, they 
are only causal hypotheses entailing a general law. In such a case the 
falsification of the generalisation will mean the falsification of the sin­
gular statement.
In the case of reasons and actions it seems that normally we do not 
make mistakes in our introspective reports, and if we do it is usually 
difficult to find out such mistakes. This however does not mean that one 
cannot be mistaken in reporting one's desire or want and in assessing its 
causal role. If there is such a mistake, the only way to find it out will 
be through generalisation. Here I would like to cite Pears as my chief 
ally.
B.F. Pears has mentioned various ways of making mistakes in assessing 
the role of one's desire in producing an action. According to him there 
may not be one desire at work. "....there may be desires of whose operation 
he is unconscious, and, even when he is conscious of the operation of 
several desires, he may make a mistaken estimate of their contributions."
1. B.F. Pears. Are Reasons for Actions Causes? Epistemology ed. A. Stroll.
1967. p222
1$Z
These possibilities of making mistakes obviously put doubts on the apparent 
incorrigibility of one's introspective assessment of the causal efficacy of 
one's desires and wants. In the context of the possibility of making such 
mistakes as those mentioned by Pears, it is logical to hold that although 
the reason-action statements are made immediately, they are not free from 
mistakes, and appeal to generalisations seems to be the only course to 
confirm or refute such mistalces. Therefore, in the case of reason-action 
statements it can be said that the falsification of the generalisation 
falsifies the singular statement in spite of its non-inferential character.
In actual practice, as Pears has pointed out,^ we quite often reject the 
singular reason-action statement on the ground that the general statement 
turns out to be false - and we do this not only from the observer's but also 
from the agent's perspective. Pears has however mentioned that "....the 
fact that we sometimes argue in this way is not enough to establish that 
singular statements of reasons carry this general entailment. Supporters 
of the thesis 2^ that reasons for actions are causes/need to establish that we 
have to argue in this way whenever the general statement is falsified."
Though this is difficult to establish a difficulty exists also on the side 
of the anti-causal theorists if they want to use the first argument* against 
the thesis that reasons for actions are causes. To quote Pears, "For what 
they need to show is that any suggested general entailment might be false, 
and yet the singular statement of the reason for the action might still be 
true."^
1. Ibid. p224
2. Ibid
* The first argument is; "....any general statement which supporters of the 
thesis might suggest as the entailment of a singular statement of a 
reason could turn out to be false, and yet it would not follow that the 
singular statement of the reason was false." Ibid. p207
3. Ibid. p227
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Pear's analysis shows at least one thing which is that though the 
reason-action statements are immediate they are not incorrigible. Since 
they are not incorrigible their immediateness does not interfere with their 
causal character. Though they are immediate in nature they need the support 
of a general law for their truth or falsity. Without the support of a 
generalisation they are only causal hypotheses.
A generalisation is also necessary to determine the truth or falsity 
of a first person reason-action statement when the agent himself is in 
doubt about his reason for his action. We have also seen before that we 
need generalisations to understand why a person behaves in a particular way. 
Thus a third person reason-action statement is causal if it entails that 
there is a law to support it. Therefore, it is logical to argue that a 
first person reason-action statement can be causal only if it entails that 
there is a general law to support it.
There is an important point which is particularly relevant in this 
issue of reason-action statements entailing a general law. The point is; 
if the reason-action relation like the ordinary causal relation involves a 
generalisation then can a reason be known by the agent on the basis of such 
a generalisation? In other words can a person know his desire or intention 
for acting inductively? Let us clarify the question. %at the question 
actually means is whether an agent can ever come to know that a certain 
action will follow from a certain desire or intention on the basis of obser­
vation and generalisation in the same wa^'' in which he comes to leam that on 
a particular occasion acid will turn a piece of blue litmus paper red? The 
answer to this question is at a first glance negative, for one knows one's 
desire for acting immediately and to come to know one's own desire for 
acting involves desiring. This point is controversial. Without going 
into the details of the problem I would like to mention that though in most
1. The question of incorrigibility will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter.
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of the cases we know non-inferentially that a certain action follows from 
a certain desire, sometimes such knowledge is based on inductive foun­
dations.
Two cases should be differentiated here: one where the person knows 
or predicts something about his reasons and actions immediately, but his 
immediate knowledge has an inductive foundation; two, where a person's 
knowledge of his own desire or want is really inductive.
Let us take a situation where the first contention holds good. A 
student wants to do research and decides he will do it provided there is 
no external or internal impediment. He then can say with certainty that 
he will do research. He can make this statement immediately in virtue of 
his intention to act in a certain way. But his assessment of the causal 
efficacy of his intention has an inductive foundation. He can say with 
certainty that he will do it only because his past experience of his own 
decisions, desires, and intentions, if not in exactly the same, yet in sim­
ilar situations has taught him that he will not change his mind in moments 
of frustration; on the contrary he will reinforce his intention with newly 
formed intentions and desires; he will not be tempted by less strenuous 
projects of life and will carry on his project as intended. A person's 
self-knowledge is not a conglomeration only of immediate incorrigible per­
sonal statements, but also of inductive statements like 'whenever I had 
such and such an intention or desire I never failed to act accordingly*. 
Therefore, though a person can make a statement like 'I will do x because 
I v/ant to' immediately his assessment of the causal efficacy of his want or 
desire is based on his experience and observation of his ovm self. I do 
not want to maintain that a personal intentional statement is always based 
on past experiences of similar intentions and actions; all that I want
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to maintain is that sometimes such statements rest on an inductive found­
ation.
The second contention is that a person often comes to know his own 
intention and desires inductively and can predict them on that basis. He 
can consider the past experiences of his own mental states and feelings and 
his behaviour arising out of them and become certain that in a certain sit­
uation he will in fact behave in a certain way, though at the present moment 
he has no intention of behaving in that way. For instance a person may 
notice that in the past a certain human relationship though appearing 
pleasant and exciting at the beginning, made him feel bored later on, and 
he intended to break off the relation. If this has happened several times 
in his life, and if he becomes involved in a similar relation again, he 
cannot help to predict that he will feel bored once again and will break 
off the relation. Such a prediction will be purely inductive by nature. 
Here the man has certain knowledge (inductive certainty) of what he will 
do, though he has not formed any intention to do that. The role he has 
is more of an observer's than of an agent's. The forming of his intention 
depends on the experiences and feelings he will have at a particular point 
of time. And these experiences he has not experienced when he predicts his 
intention and action.
Such inductive predictions of our own decisions, intentions and 
desires we make more often than we might think. A large section of our 
self-knowledge is based on observation and experience of our own feelings 
and behaviour. For instance, I may find that though I often want to see 
intellectual thought-provoking serious films, I end up by selecting a flashy 
James Bond-type film; or, I want to go and see my boss, though I can 
predict almost with certainty that as soon as I am near his room, I shall 
have an intense desire not to go in, and that I shall give in to such a
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desire. Much, of our dispositional knowledge is in this sense observat­
ional. A person comes to know his dispositions, traits and characters 
almost in the same way in which he comes to know those of others. If this 
is so, to quote P.L. Gardiner, "....what....is to prevent him from utilizing 
such previous experience as a means of, or guide to, predicting what he 
will do, or try to do, when situations similar to those he has encountered 
in the past, present themselves to him in the future? In other words, can 
there be any objection in principle to such a man's saying that, knowing 
himself as he does, he 'expects' or 'foresees' that he will (or would) act 
in such and such a way in a certain contingency.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the argument that generalisations 
are essential in causal explanation and no such generalisations can be 
provided in the case of reasons and actions. I have tried to refute it 
by showing that there is nothing in the argument which can show that the 
concept of generalisation is inapplicable to the reason-action relation.
First of all, I tried to show that behvariour can be generalised and 
that generalisations are often used in the case of reasons and actions on 
the basis of which predictions are made.
In the second half of the discussion I tried to show that the causal 
contention, that if the circumstances were repeated the same effect would 
follow, applies to the reason-action relation exactly in the same way as it 
does in the cases of ordinary physical causation. Besides, the sort of 
generalisations we require in ordinary causal cases are quite often remote 
generalisations of which particular cases are only indirect instances. This 
ensures the point that in providing a generalisation to support a singular
1. P.L. Gardiner in ^Freedom and Knowledge i Freedom and the V/ill. ed. B.F. 
Pears. p82
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reason-action statement we do not have to look for a law which will be a 
generalisation of the agent's behaviour© Lastly, in the context of gen­
eralisation, I discussed the question of first person singular causal 
statements. I tried to show that the immediacy of knowledge in such cases 
does not contradict the idea that such first person singular causal state­
ments entail that there is a law. Like other causal statements first- 
person singular statements also need the support of a general law.
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Chapter VII
The incorrigibility of reason-action statements
In the previous chapter I referred to the point that a person 
directly knows that his action follows from his desire or want without 
going through a series of observations. Quite often another argument goes 
hand in hand with this argument, which is: reason-action statements are
not only immediate, they are also incorrigible; in contrast with them 
ordinary causal statements are always corrigible by further experience, 
and therefore reason-action statements are not causal statements. In this 
chapter I shall consider this argument.
It is necessary to make sure at the beginning what the term 'incorr­
igible* means.* Literally it means 'cannot be corrected'. But in this 
particular issue of reason-action statements the anti-causal theorists use 
the term in a more specified, though not necessarily the same, sense. Some­
times they argue that reason-action statements are incorrigible because 
it does not make sense to say that one can be mistalcen in thinking that 
one's action follows because of a certain desire. Sometimes they say that 
when a person sincerely states that he went to Liverpool because he wanted 
to see his mother, he cannot possibly be mistaken and therefore his statement 
does not leave room for further correction. If the statement is like an 
ordinary causal statement, then it would make sense to say that he had been 
mistaken in thinking that he went to Liverpool because he wanted to see his 
mother. I shall try to show in this chapter that in whatever sense the 
term 'incorrigible' is used, reason-action statements cannot be claimed as 
incorrigible.
O0cu.,v
* I shall return to this pointy in Sec. Ill of this chapter.
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The question of incorrigibility comprises a wide area* Not only reason- 
action statements are claimed to be incorrigible, but any sincere avowal 
of pur current sensations and feelings appears to be incorrigible. Per­
sonal reports of one's feeling sad or depressed or of having a pain, like 
the reports of reason-action relations, do not seem to be corrigible by 
further experience. The advocates of the incorrigibility thesis claim 
that one cannot make mistakes in reporting such feelings and sensations.
In normal circumstances it is senseless to doubt whether the agent is having 
such feelings when he sincerely says that he is having them.
This line of argument (though not identical with) is derived from 
Wittgenstein's comment on the use of such expressions as 'I know I am in 
pain'. I shall not pursue the various questions concerning the 
Wittgensteinian view about the privacy of our sense-experiences and first- 
person reports of such experiences. I shall try to concentrate only on 
the limited field of the question of incorrigibility concerning reason- 
action statements, and statements the discussion of which will throw li^t 
on the nature of reason-action statements.
Philosophers have often talked about a number of statements which, 
though they are not exactly like reason-action statements, are quite rele­
vant to this present issue. These statements concern pleasure, belief, 
depression, amusement etc. The relevance of these statements to this 
issue consists in the fact that like reason-action statements they are said 
to be incorrigible. Moreover, they present a strong causal element. The 
feelings described in the statements appear to be caused by the objects of 
the feelings. For instance *I am depressed because of my unemployment',
'I am pleased because I have inherited a fortume'. The arguments which 
critics put forward against these statements is that they are incorrigible 
no doubt, but they are not causal. Hence nothing can be gained from their 
resemblance to reason-action statements.
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Such a thesis has been, put forward by Prof. B. Williams in his 
article 'Pleasure and Belief'.^ In this chapter I shall first discuss 
Williams' view that belief-statements cannot be causal because they are 
incorrigible. Then, in contrast to this view I shall discuss B.F. Pears' 
view that similar statements are causal and corrigible in the Humean way.
I shall agree with Pears' main thesis in this matter without agreeing with 
some of his individual arguments. Lastly, I shall try to show that it is 
not meaningless to say that one can be mistaken in thinking that one's 
action follows from a particular desire, and therefore that a reason-action 
statement can be corrigible in the ordinary Humean way.
I B. Williams and belief-statements
Williams rejects the idea that belief-statements can be causal. He 
focuses his attention mainly on pleasure-statements where the object of 
pleasure appears to be the cause of pleasure and observes, "If anyone is 
tempted to think that the object of my pleasure - what I am pleased by, or
2 7
at - is the cause of my pleasure this type of case should discourage him". 
This conclusion Williams generalises so that it becomes applicable to other 
statements of the same type. To quote Williams, "Statements of the form 
'he did it because he believed that P' are, like comparable statements about 
pleasure, ultimately based on the man's own statement, taken to be sincere, 
of the form 'I did it because P'; and statements of the latter form are, 
again, not open to the charge of being straight-forwardly mistaken.
The conclusion which Williams reaches in this article, that the relat­
ion between pleasure and its object is one of attention, does not concern 
us very much. We are more affected by the negative aspect of his con­
clusion, that the relation is not causal.
1. B. Vfilliams. 'Pleasure and Belief. PASS7 XXXIII. p57> 1959 
2# Cases of pleasure accompanying a false belief.
3. Ibid. p57
4. Ibid. p59
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He presents several arguments including the argument arising from 
the element of incorrigibility. In the long run it is this last element 
that he emphasizes most to establish that the relation is not causal.
According to Williams the object of pleasure viz., an inheritance in 
the example 'I am pleased because I have inherited a fortune* (when I 
really have not) cannot be the cause of the pleasure because it does not 
exist. If it is said that I was pleased because I thought or believed 
that I had inherited a fortune, then also it cannot be a causal statement, 
for the thesis that belief can be a cause raises the following difficulties.
First of all, Williams says that if belief in an inheritance is to 
be the cause of pleasure then it must be so in virtue of some law. Then 
he asks "But what law? Evidently the belief in an inheritance is not the 
cause of any pleasure, but, at best, of pleasure at an inheritance; yet 
it is this last notion that the causal account was supposed to explain".^
It is difficult to understand what exactly Williams wants to mean here. It 
seems to me that the circularity suggested above will be involved only if 
one emphasizes the necessity of a law in the form: a belief in an inheritance 
is the cause of pleasure at an inheritance. This sort of straight-forward 
general law, as we have seen before, is not really necessary in a causal 
relation. General laws used in a causal situation are often remotely 
connected with it. In order to say that my belief in an inheritance is the 
cause of my pleasure at an inheritance, I donot need the support of a law 
exactly in the form in which Williams suggests one does.
Another point which Williams suggests here is that pleasure at getting
an inheritance cannot be identified separately from the belief which is
2
supposed to cause it, and if I substitute pleasure in general for pleasure
1. Ibid. p57- Emphasis is the author's
2. This argument about separate identity has been discussed before (Chap.IV). 
The question of a separate identity can be avoided by describing the 
effect in general terms which Williams himself has suggested. But the 
point is this: that an effect is individuated together with its cause, 
may be due to various reasons and need not necessarily mean that the
relation is a non-contingent one.
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at an inheritance, I shall always have to start with a false belief (that 
it is the inheritance and not the belief in it that causes my present 
pleasure) for the true hypothesis that the belief caused my pleasure to be 
true. This point Williams presents in the form of a dilemma: either it
is always belief that caused the pleasure or belief did not always cause 
the pleasure, and then he tries to show that both these two disjuncts are 
logically unacceptable.
Williams says that if belief is not always the cause of pleasure then 
there will be two incompatible causal hypotheses regarding the pleasure in 
question. One, I am pleased because I have inherited a fortune (l really 
have), and two, I am pleased because I believe I have inherited a fortune. 
Williams' argument is this, that at the time of believing in the inheritance 
we cannot make a distinction between these two causal hypotheses. However, 
the retrospective description of the situation in terms of a true belief- 
statement (l was pleased because I thought etc.) is based on one's sincerely 
thinking at the time "I am pleased because I have inherited a fortune", 
"....thus it appears that a necessary condition of the assertion of the true 
hypothesis would be my previous belief in or assertion of a false one, and 
this is absurd."^
The absurdity lies in the fact that one of the two incompatible caus- 
al-hypotheses, the false one, is made the condition of assertion for the 
other, the true one. Thus the condition of asserting a statement like 
"....because I believed such and such", is to assert first a statement which 
later on turns out to be false.
I agree with Williams that in certain cases of asserting a belief 
statement, particularly one expressed in the past tense, the difficulty 
mentioned above arises. In such a case it is true to say that the asser­
tion of a true causal hypothesis is based on the assertion of a false one.
1. Ibid. p58
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But two things should he pointed out here: one, it is not the case just
that a false statement is taken to be the condition for asserting a true 
one, but that a false statement regarded as true is taken to be the con­
dition for asserting the true one; two, this is not universally the case. 
One can make a true causal hypothesis in terms of belief without making a 
false one the condition of assertion. For instance, a religious person 
who had gone through a period of doubts and argumentations could say 'I am 
pleased because (at last) I believe in God.*
A continuation of these arguments is used by V/illiams in connection 
with the first disjunct of the dilemma viz., that belief is always the 
cause of pleasure. Williams argues that here one is not in a position to 
arrive at the correct causal hypothesis and there are two incompatible 
causal hypotheses viz. (l)....because I believe I have inherited a property 
and (2)....because I have inherited a property. Itshould be noted that at 
the time of making the causal hypothesis, one does not face two incompatible 
causal hypotheses but one viz. ....because I have inherited a property.
The incapacity of the person to distinguish between what he thinks is the 
case and what is the case, does not mean that he thought or belief cannot 
cause his pleasure. It is not difficult to imagine people with better 
powers of thinking and judgement who can easily distinguish between these 
two incompatible causal hypotheses right at the beginning. Williams him­
self has made this point when he says that the choice will require philos­
ophical reflection which most people presumably don't indulge in.
Williams also argues that it is impossible to see what evidence one 
can have for the hypothesis that the belief caused the pleasure. I admit 
that here we are not dealing with an ordinary causal statement for which 
one can collect evidence through observation and experiment. This sort 
of causal statement is made immediately. The only evidence here is that
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of one's own belief. One is in a position to know (though not incorrig­
ibly) that the belief is the cause of pleasure because it is one's otvn 
belief. Compare this with the case of a headache and feeling distracted.
What evidence do I have to say that 'I cannot concentrate because of my 
headachy? Yet one can describe it as a causal statement.
Last, but not the least, the stronghold of Williams' position and. 
the main point at issue in this discussion is the argument that the state­
ment 'I am pleased because I believe I have inherited a fortune' cannot be 
causal for it is incorrigible. Williams says "....since the statement in 
question expresses, on this view, a causal hypothesis, it would be corrigible, 
and it would make sense to say that I had just been mistaken in thinking 
that it was a certain belief that caused my pleasure; but in general no 
sense can be attached to this."^ Then he concludes "....the whole idea 
of a man's beliefs' being a cause in such cases is a fiction,, aided, 
though not inspired,by a misunderstanding of the form of words, "he was 
pleased because he believed..."." Williams wishes to extend this thesis 
to cover other similar cases, particularly action. "....this form of words,
and perhaps a similar misunderstanding, occurs also in another connection -
2that of a man's having mistaken grounds for action." The point raised 
by Williams has been answered, to a certain extent, by B.F. Pears.
II B.F. Pears and the incorrigibility of some nsychological statements 
B.F. Pears^ holds that certain statements about our psychological 
feelings and reactions though they appear to be incorrigible are causal and 
corrigible in the ordinary Eumean way. As Pears' theory is intended to be 
an answer to the question Williams has raised it will be worthwhile to 
discuss it.
1. Ibid. pp.58-59
2. Ibid. p59
3o B.F. Pears. 'Causes and objects of some feelings and psychological 
reactions'. Philosophy of I^ Iind. ed. S. Hampshire. pl45« 1966. London
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Pears points out that the specific question of corrigibility con­
cerned here is "....whether it might he incorrect for a person to say that
it was his lack of money that depressed him....".
Pears says that an ohject-statement which is also a causal-statement 
(like *I was depressed because of the lack of money') presents three alter­
natives before us:
1. We can take these statements as non-causal;
2. We can say that Hume was wrong in assuming that all causal statements
are corrigible by negative instances;
3. We can claim them as causal and corrigible in the Humean way.
Pears favours this last alternative. He says that these statements 
lie at the intersection of two different conceptual schemes - the conceptual 
scheme of feeling and object and the conceptual scheme of ordinary causation, 
and they are causal and corrigible in the Humean way. Pears does not offer 
us one straight-forward answer to the question at issue. According to Pears 
the Object-statements which are also causal-statements form a sort of 
spectrum to which the question of incorrigibility is applicable in different 
variations of strictness. Some are more incorrigible, some are less in­
corrigible. At one end of the spectrum are depression-statements as 
instantiated in the example 'I am depressed because of the lack of money'.
Such statements are less strictly incorrigible. Here Pears points out the
2
various possibilities of making mistakes about the object of depression.
One may be mistaken in identifying the object and therefore, the cause of 
depression. This makes the depression-statements open by correction by par­
allel negative instances. In this connection Pears mentions that if a person 
does not know what is the object of his depression, then he will not be so 
certain about the cause of his depression. Certainty about the cause comes 
from the certainty about the object.^
1. Ibid. ppl44-145
2. Ibid. ppl52-155
3. Ibid. pl50
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I do not quite agree with Pears on this point. Suppose that I took 
a drug knowing full well that it would cause me depression. When I became 
depressed, I was not sure about the object of depression, though I knew it 
was not my talcing the drug. As a matter of fact I was depressed in a 
general way and not about any particular thing. I knew perfectly well 
what was the cause of my depression though I did not have any object of 
depression. Conversely, suppose that I came out from the Professor's room, 
quite depressed about my studies, but not so certain about the cause of it -
4 /
which could be my philosophical naivete or the brilliance of the Professor.
Of course. Pears says that the depression-concept does allow a certain 
vagueness about the object of depression.
However the possibilities of mistaken identification in the case of 
depression, as mentioned by Pears, are quite significant in the sense that 
similar possibilities of mistaken identifications can be found in the case 
of reason and action. This establishes the closeness of these two types
of statements. Just as one may be wrong in identifying the object and/or 
the cause of depression, in a similar way one may be wrong in identifying 
one's wants or desires as reasons for one's action. One may be wrong in 
believing that a particular want is one's reason for an action. For instance, 
one may think quite sincerely that the reason for one's regularly dropping 
into a particular pub is the desire for a pint of beer, while it can be 
pointed out that one can easily get a pint of beer in the local pub and need 
not walk a mile for this one, and the real reason is not beer but the glam­
orous bar-maid.
A man's reason for acting in a particular way need not necessarily be 
'the reason' for the action. If there is not a complete mistake, there 
may be a partial mistake. The reason which a man gives for his action may
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not be the sufficient reason for his action. But he may be quite unaware 
of this. It is not uncommon in experience that we are completely unaware 
of bur real motive, intention, desire, want etc., until someone draws our 
attention to it; as soon as a person's attention is drawn to the real 
reason for his action, he gives up 'his reason' and ceases to mention it as 
'the reason'. Thus although it sounds incredible at the beginning that a 
person may be mistaken in thinking that a certain desire has caused him to 
act in a particular way, it is not totally without sense to say that he can 
be mistaken in stating what his real desire, intention or motive for action 
is.
It is obvious that psycho-analysis has much to contribute to this 
effect. It can show that a person's alleged reason for an action has no 
real foundation, by bringing out the hidden motives and desires from the 
unconscious level. I agree that the conclusions reached by psycho-analysis 
cannot always be generalised. But the possibility of such psycho-analytic 
explanation at least shows that one can be mistaken in giving one's reason. 
In this connection it should be pointed out that one must not think that 
psycho-analysis always brings out the motives and the desires which the 
agent is otherwise incapable of knowing. Often it happens like this, that 
psycho-analysis makes the agent focus his attention on desires and wants, 
the existence of which he is aware of but he is not aware of the connection 
between a certain desire and a certain action.
At the other end of the spectrum according to Pears, are statements 
to which the notion of incorrigibility is fully applicable. These state­
ments are immune from mistakes. They are statements like 'I am amused 
because of his remark', 'I feel pleased because the money has arrived* etc.
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As we have seen before, Pears favours the Humean conception of 
cause and wants to adhere to the notion that if a statement is to be a causal 
statement it has to be corrigible by negative instances. As to the question 
how an object statement which is immune from mistakes can also be a causal 
statement, he says "....this problem can be evaded only when it can be shown 
that the identification of the object is liable to be mistaken",^ and the 
attempt which he makes to resolve this problem, though a compromise, is 
quite novel.
According to Pears, so far as psychological feelings like pleasure, 
amusement, etc., are concerned, there are two different sorts of mental 
states; one, a momentary reaction and two, a steady and persistent feeling. 
In the latter case Pears says there is a possibility of makingmistakes, but 
not in the former. Therefore a pleasure-statement or amusement-statement, 
so long as it describes a steady feeling, is not immune from mistakes. But 
at the furthest end of the spectrum, where lie statements which describe a 
momentary reaction, no mistaken identification is possible, because, to quote 
Pears, ".... a momentary feeling or reaction does not get any chance to 
collect other things on other occasions which the person would then be 
equally ready to identify as its object." ...."Therefore, a momentary feel­
ing or reaction, unlike a persistent one, lacks alternative candidates for 
2
this position." This, according to Pears, explains the inconceivability 
that one can be mistaken in such cases. Hence, at one end of the spectrum 
we still get object-statements which are incorrigible. As Pears does not
want to retract from the Humean notion that a causal statement is corrigible, 
he ascribes the inconceivability to a contingent fact, and here I believe 
his answer is a compromise - perhaps to some extent obscure too. He says, 
"For it is plausible to suggest that it /the contingent fact we are looking 
foÿ^is the contingent fact that at one end of the spectrum the thing to
1. Ibid. pl6l
2. Ibid. pl63
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which the feeling or reaction is linked by the connection signified by the 
weak sense of 'about** is always its cause". Thus "....though the poss­
ibility of a mistaken identification of the object is not allowed for by 
the conceptual scheme at this end of the spectrum, it still exists in the 
sub-structure of this conceptual scheme".^
It is quite evident that Pears* analysis of the problem and its sol­
ution rest to a large extent on a special meaning of the word 'about*. He 
says that "....there is a very weak sense of the word 'about', according to 
which, if a person is depressed, he is depressed about everything that he 
thinks about in a depressed way." It is weak because, "....it is very non-
selective; it does not pick out one thing that is thought about in a
2depressed way rather than another." It is on this weak sense of the word 
'about' that Pears' defence of the thesis that some object-statements 
(which are also causal) are corrigible is built. But it seems to me that 
Pears' analysis of the meaning of the word 'about' is to some extent, 
confused.
It appears from Pears' analysis, though he himself has not explic­
itly distinguished them*, that there is not just one weak sense of the word 
'about', but two: the non-selective sense in which one does not have a
definite object of depression, and the insufficiently selective sense^ in 
which one does not pick out the most important object. Pears suggests 
that in both these senses correction of object-statements in the Humean 
way is possible. As we are concerned here with object statements the sort 
of mistake expected is a mistaken identification of the object. At the
^ The weak sense of * about' will be explained shortly
1. Ibid. pl65
2. Ibid. pl54
* He does talk of variations in the selectivity of the word 'about' Ibid.pl55
3. Ibid. pl55
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same time in this particular issue ohject-statements are also supposed to 
he causal statements, and therefore a mistaken identification of the object 
will mean a mistaken identification of the cause*
So far as the non-selective sense of the word *about* is concerned 
Pears says that a statement like *he is depressed about everything’ can be 
corrected by a statement with a more specific object like 'he is depressed 
about money'. But does it really correct the statement concerning the 
cause?
In the non-selective sense a feeling or reaction is, as Pears des­
cribes it, 'free-floating', i.e. there is no definite object of feeling. 
Therefore, when it is said that a person is depressed about everything, it 
really means that the person is just depressed, period. The statement 
'he is depressed* or 'he is depressed about everything' reports only a 
psychological feeling of the agent. The cause of such a psychological 
feeling sometimes can be, as Pears says, physiological like talcing too much 
aspirin or non-physiological like having a period of excessive excitement. 
Hence in such cases the correction of the object-statement by specifying a 
definite object of depression will not really correct the statement con­
cerning the cause. This is because, as Pears himself points out "....a 
statement that something is the object of a feeling does not seem to be 
reducible to a causal statement."^ Thisirreducibility is more observable 
in cases where 'about* is used in a 'non-selective*, 'free floating* sense.
I am not however denying that the causal statement here viz., his 
depression is caused by too much aspirin or excessive excitement can be 
corrected in the Humean way. 7/hat I am denying is that such a statement 
can be corrected by a more specific object-statement like 'he is depressed 
about money*, because, even if he is depressed about money and not just 
depressed, his depression still may be caused by excessive aspirins or 
excitement.
1. Ibid. pl48
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Secondly, there is a sense in which a statement in the non-selective 
sense of 'about' like 'I am depressed, or depressed about everything' cannot 
be corrected by a statement in the selective sense of 'about' like 'I am 
depressed about money'* The reason for this is that, in the non-selective 
sense of the word 'about' one cannot make a mistaken identification of the 
object as there is no object to be identified. How could a person make a 
mistaken identification of an object of depression when he is not depressed 
about anything particularly, but just depressed? To a certain extent.
Pears admits this point. To quote Pears "....in this weak sense of the 
word it would almost certainly be true that the person was depressed about 
the object that he stated first, even if he later admitted that he was 
really depressed about something else, this time using a more selective sense 
of the word."^
This leaves us with the insufficiently selective sense of the word 
'about'. Pears says one can be mistaken, in a partial way in identifying 
the object of one’s feelings. It need not be a total mistake. One may 
not be able to pick out the most important aspect of the object. As a 
matter of fact the possibility of making a total mist alee is ruled out al­
together from the weak sense of the word 'about' in general* For in the 
non-selective sense no mistakes are possible; in the insufficiently selec­
tive sense only partial mistakes are possible. Thus the only mistake which 
Pears' analysis really allows is a partial mistake in the insufficiently 
selective sense of the word 'about'. But this means that even when we are 
partially mistaken in identifying the object of our depression, there is a 
sense in which the statement we make still remains incorrigible. I may be 
mistaken in describing which aspect of a particular joke amused me, but I 
am not mistaken in saying that the.joke amused me. The element of incorr­
igibility cannot be completely ruled out from this weak sense of the word 
'about'.
1. Ibid. pl55
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It is interesting to note that Pears tries to explain the incorrig­
ibility of some of the object-statements in terms of an element of duration. 
Pears' point made about 'duration' appears to me more effective for the 
defence of his thesis than that about the weak 'sense^ of the word 'about'.
The notion of the variations of duration plays an important role in the 
situation that some object statements are incorrigible. In the cases of 
feelings and reactions there are variations in duration. It is therefore 
quite reasonable to say, as Pears says, that the momentary feelings or 
reactions are never "free floating"; "the person himself can always claim 
to identify its object".^ Here the connection between the object and the 
feeling is apprehended unmistakably because, to quote Pears, "....a mom­
entary feeling or reaction does not get any chance to collect other things on
other occasions which the person would then be equally ready to identify as 
2
its object." This account, although it does not explain away the incorr­
igibility of the statements concerned, yet explains why the incorrigibility 
is there.
It is now possible to come to a conclusion so far as Pears is concer­
ned. On the basis of Pears' analysis it can undoubtedly be claimed that 
some object-statements and similar other statements are not necessarily 
incorrigible. On the contrary they are corrigible in the ordinary Humean 
way. Pears is also right in emphasizing the role of 'duration' in this 
particular issue.
I think that this element of duration plays an important role (per­
haps not exactly in the same way as Pears describes it) so far as the question 
of an incorrigible statement about our introspective states is concerned.
Y/hen we raise the question of the incorrigibility of the statements
1. Ibid. pl65
2. Ibid
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describing our introspective states, the answer to the question depends 
upon whether these statements are describing a past, present or future 
mental state. Theoretically, statements about our reactions, feelings, 
desires, wants, etc. can be mistaken if they describe something past or 
something future. I can be mistaken in making a statement such as that 
yesterday I was depressed about my studies. It might not be my studies 
but something else that made me depressed and my statement might be just 
an ordinary case of the failure of my memory. I might not have been dep­
ressed at all. Similarly I may be mistaken in making a statement about my 
future state of depression simply because I may not have sufficient data 
to make such a statement. This may happen in the case of reason and action 
as well. I can be mistaken in thinking that the cause of my action was the 
desire which I had yesterday while as a matter of fact it was caused by the 
one I had the day before yesterday. Similarly I have every possibility of 
making a mistake if I want to describe some future desire which I have not 
yet experienced and the action that will follow from it.
This rules out the question of incorrigibility so far as our past or 
future introspective states are concerned. This question arises only when 
we describe a present mental state. Truly speaking the word 'present' 
here means only instantaneous; when a feeling or desire is more than 
instantaneous, it has the possibility of being mistakenly identified. As 
P.M. Armstrong describes the situation "....during that instant we know 
indubitably what is going on in that instant; but past instants are only 
remembered and future instants are only foreseen, so that doubt would be 
at least meaning&l".^
The problem with which we started has now become limited. The 
question of incorrigibility arises particularly with statements describing 
present introspective states. Our problem is even narrower than this. We
1. P.M. Armstrong. A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. pl05
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are concerned with the problem that statements which describe the causal 
relation between a present introspective state and its result, are incorr­
igible. These statements can be descriptions of the relation between a 
belief or a thought and the subsequent feelings or reactions, or of a 
desire or a want and the action or behaviour that follows.
Ill Various points raised by the Incorrigibility-thesis and Reason-
action statements
So far I have been discussing two views held by an advocate and an 
opponent of the incorrigibility-thesis. One is the view of Williams who 
holds that certain statements (belief-statements and also reason-action 
statements) cannot be causal because they are incorrigible. The other is the 
view of Pears who holds that certain statements (object-statements which 
resemble reason-action statements), though they appear to be incorrigible, 
are causal and corrigible in the Humean way. The discussions of these 
various types of statements by Williams and Pears show that on the one hand 
both these kinds of statements are not as incorrigible as they are talœn to 
be and on the other hand they are not as straightforwardly corrigible as an 
ordinary statement about physical causation. Though the discussions of 
these statements are quite relevant, yet each set of these statements must 
be examined separately. Therefore it will be helpful if we consider now the 
main arguments of the incorrigibility-thesis in the context of reason-action 
statements only.
I have mentioned before that the anti-causal theorists do not always 
use the term 'incorrigible* in the same sense. Therefore, they are not 
always unanimous as to what is meant by the incorrigibility-thesis. There 
are different versions of it. The strong version seems to be that of 
Wittgenstein's. According to this version, as W-ittgenstein puts it, such 
locutions as 'I know', 'I doubt', 'I am mistaken' etc., are not applicable 
to first person reports of introspective states. It is meaningless to say
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that *I know I am in pain* or 'I doubt I am in pain*. The locution *I 
know* or *1 doubt* does not perform its usual function here. Therefore 
it is also meaningless to say that they can be corrected. The notion of 
corrig’ibility applies only where there is a possibility of making a mistake 
or of being in doubt. In a way it may seem paradoxical to describe this 
version as the incorrigibility-thesis. Because, according to this version 
both the concept of corrigibility and that of incorrigibility do not apply 
to first person reports of current sensations.
The weak version of the incorrigibility thesis is; first person 
reports of sensations and feelings are incorrigible because they cannot be 
corrected, though such reports may or may not be true. For instance if I 
say that I have dreamt/]^^aimt last night, I cannot be corrected though I 
may be mistaken in thinking that I have dreamt/my aunt last night.
The version which is neither so weak nor so strong and is usually 
favoured by the anti-causal theorists is the one which suggests that the 
incorrigibility of first person reports of current sensations not only 
means that such reports cannot be corrected, it also means that one can 
never be wrong or mistaken in reporting one's current sensations, i.e. when 
a person sincerely says that he is in pain, he is in pain. In short, it 
means that such reports cannot be corrected and therefore, they are correct.*
It must be noted that the incorrigibility argument is primarily con­
cerned with reports of sensations and feelings, and a full consideration 
of the argument needs detailed analysis of reports like *1 am in pain'. 
However, as I said before, I shall restrict myself only to the question 
whether the main points raised by the various forms of the argument are 
applicable to reason-action statements.
* B. Williams has used 'incorrigibility* in this sense. See B. Williams. 
•Pleasure and Belief*. PASSV XXXIII. 1959* p59
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Let us first consider whether locutions like 'I know*, *1 doubt* 
etc., are inapplicable to reason-action statements, i.e. whether in this 
particular case they perform their usual assertive function. In this conn­
ection certain general observations can be made. I think it is a gross over­
simplification of the situation if it is said that in our language-game, 
because certain locutions are not used to describe certain sensations in 
certain circumstances, such locutions cannot be used to describe other sen­
sations and feelings, or the same sensation in other circumstances, v/hat 
seems plausible in the case of first person reports of pain does not seem so 
obvious and plausible in cases other than pain. It seems that in the case 
of reason-action statements it is not entirely meaningless to doubt or to 
question one's own reason for an action, and the claim of knowledge ('I know 
that* etc.) is quite well placed with such assertions. For instance, 
statements like 'I know that my reason for looking after my old aunt is not 
my love for her, but her money* or 'I am in doubt whether my reason for 
sacking him is his incompetence or his colour* are meaningful statements 
and the assertive function which locutions like *I know* or *I doubt* 
usually have, seems quite fulfilled here. This is also true about the use 
of such locutions in the case of statements concerning psychological 
feelings and reactions. As we have seen in Pears' example, it is quite 
appropriate to say that *I doubt if it is money I am depressed about and 
not something else.'
The point made in the third version of the incorrigibility-thesis 
viz., that one cannot be mistaken in reporting one's current sensation, 
one is always correct, is often over-emphasized by its advocates. It is 
often claimed that whenever one sincerely states one's reason for an action, 
one cannot be mistaken. Thus if one sincerely says that one's reason for 
joining the army is to serve the country, it is not only senseless to doubt 
or to say that he might be mistalcen, he cannot be mistaken.
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This I think is utterly false^ One can sincerely state one's
reason for an action and at the same time he mistaken. Psycho-analysis
for instance provides evidence to the effect that sometimes people are
mistaken in identifying the real reason for their actions. In chapter 
2
VI in connection with first person singular statements of reasons for 
actions, we have seen various possibilities of making mistalces which show 
that the first person statement of a reason for an action cannot be used as 
evidence for the agent's having unmistakably that reason for that action.
In ordinary life we accept such a reason-action report as evidence of one's 
having a particular reason for a particular action because under the cir­
cumstances it seems to be the best available evidence. But the best avail­
able evidence is not necessarily conclusive evidence. This criticism also
applies to the weak version of the incorrigibility-thesis. Even the first 
person reports of dreams can be corrected by further evidence - as for 
instance provided by a sophisticated dream-detecting device. The diffic­
ulties one faces to correct cases like reports of one's own dreams are 
empirical difficulties.
Sometimes the supporters of the incorrigibility argument claim that 
utterances like 'I am in pain' do not report the occurrence of a sensation 
or a feeling, but are expressions of sensations and feelings - they are 
behaviour-substitutes. If we want to apply this argument to reason-action 
statements then they too should be considered as behaviour-substitutes.
1. In this connection J.J.C.Smart's comment on sensation is worth quoting: 
"....the sincere reporting of a sensation is one thing and the sensation 
reported is another thing. Now as Hume said what is distinguishable is 
separable. It is therefore logically possible that someone should sin­
cerely report an experience and yet the experience should not occur." 
J.J.C. Smart. 'Brain processes and Incorrigibility'. Australian Journal 
of Philosophy. p69. 1$62
A similar argument has also been put forward by D.M. Armstrong.
D.M. Armstrong. 'Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?'. The 
Philosophical Review. Vol. 196$. p422
2. See Chapter VI. Sec. V. f
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I should like to point out here that there is an unmistakable 
difference between the reports of reason-action relations and the report of 
a pain. If the utterance * I am in pain' is a behaviour-substitute then 
not only can a grimace, cry or groan be substituted by the utterance *I 
am in pain', but also conversely 'I am in pain' can be substituted by a 
grimace, cry or groan. This condition for being a behaviour-substitute 
seems to be quite in place with utterances like 'I am in pain'. If I say 
'I am in pain', or I groan both will express, though not exactly in the 
same way, the sort of sensation I am having. But this does not seem to be 
the case with reasons and actions. This is because what is in question 
here is not the report of just a want or desire but the report of a relation 
between a certain desire and a certain action, e.g., I look after my aunt 
because she is rich. It is difficult to see what sort of behaviour these 
reports or utterances could substitute for.
Even if it is a report of a desire or want and not of a relation 
between a desire and an action, it is still difficult to see how such a 
report can be a behaviour-substitute. Y/hat statements of desires or wants 
express are reasons for behaving in a particular way. Therefore, they 
themselves cannot be behaviour-substitutes.
I have mentioned before that the question of incorrigibility is more 
acute with the introspective reporting of the immediate present. In 
carrying out one's intention, it seems that one knows unmistakably that 
one's action is following from one's intention. For instance the statement 
'I am going to Liverpool because I want to see my mother' seems to be 
irrefutably incorrigible.
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However I think that there is no reason why such a reason-action 
statement should be incorrigible* The main argument against the incorrig­
ibility-thesis are applicable to such a statement as well* The statement 
*I am going to Liverpool to see my mother' can be doubted and questioned and 
be prefixed with locutions like 'I know' or 'I doubt'. Such statements 
when uttered are not behaviour-substitutes, nor are they expressions of 
particular sensation. Just as one can be mistaken in saying 'I have/stomach 
ache because of that ham sandwich', one can be mistaken in saying 'I am 
going to Liverpool because I want to see my mother'.
Conclusion
It is now possible to sum up the result of the arguments of this 
chapter. ¥y aim here has been to show that reason-action statements are 
not incorrigible. What is claimed to be incorrigible here is an agent's 
sincere statement that his action follows from his desire or want.
In this connection I have introduced Williams' and Pears' analyses of 
certain types of statements which appear to be causal and incorrigible at the 
same time. I have tried to show that some of the possibilities of making 
mistakes, as mentioned by Pears in the case of some object-statements, are 
also true of reason-action statements.
It has appeared in the course of discussion that the first person 
reports of the instantaneous present seem to be irrefutably incorrigible, 
and that while a person may be mistaken in stating his past or future reasons 
for actions, he cannot be mistaken in knowing his reason while actually 
carrying it out. But I have tried to show that the various points raised 
by the advocates of the incorrigibility-thesis about first person reports of
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the instantaneous present, do not apply to an immediate reason-action 
statement, just as they do not in other cases of reason-action statements.
The conclusion is that there are various possibilities of making a 
mistake in stating one's reason for an action, some of which I have dis­
cussed in this chapter and some in the previous chapter. A reason-action 
statement is not an incorrigible statement. Therefore it cannot be said 
that a reason-action statement cannot be causal because it is incorrigible.
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Conclusion
The conclusion of a thesis on philosophical problems could be any­
thing but conclusive. In philosophy it is difficult to give a final decis­
ive answer to a question. There is always room for counter argument.
However, in philosophy it is more important to ask a significant question 
than to offer a final solution. This is particularly true of the causal 
explanation of human actions in terms of reasons. It is more easy to argue 
that a reason cannot be a cause than to argue that it can be. The question 
whether a reason can be a cause is difficult to answer because of two 
reasons. On the one hand desires, wants, intentions etc., are not exactly 
like ordinary physical causes; on the other hand, it cannot be denied that 
an analysis in the Eylean or Meldenian line of the term 'because' in 'he 
did it because he wanted to' fails to explicate the full implication of the 
relation between a want and the subsequent action which follows from the want. 
As D.P. Pears puts it, "On the one hand, Wittgensteinian discussions of this 
problem fail to do justice to the force of the word 'because' in 'I did it 
because....'; and, on the other hand those who do justice to its force 
usually understate the differences between reasons for decisions or actions 
and other kinds of causes."
The anti-causal theorists emphasize the difference between reasons
and causes and claim that reasons cannot be causes. Their claim is based
2
on a misconception as to what sort of concepts and laws are involved in a 
causal explanation. If a causal explanation, as they think sometimes, is a 
mechanical explanation then obviously it cannot include reason-action explan­
ations. But, as I have tried to show, causal explanations are not
1. D.F. Pears. 'Predicting and Deciding'. Proceedings of the British 
Academy I964. p21$
2. This point is discussed in Chapter I
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synonymous with, mechanical explanations and cause as a generic concept in­
cludes more than what the concept of physical cause can denote. If this 
contention of mine is correct then the causal explanations of actions need 
not he mechanical explanations. In order to explain an action causally one 
does not have to reduce actions to movements. The causal explanation of 
actions can he given in terms of reasons. To say this, however, is not to 
invoke the traditional theory of an act of will. Desires, wants, intentions 
etc., are not performances, nor are actions movements caused by our desires, 
wants, intentions, etc. Actions almost always involve movements, but they 
are not movements. They are changes caused by our desires, wants etc.
The point I have tried to make in this thesis is that unless the 
relation between reasons and actions are considered as causal the full implic­
ation of the relation cannot be brought out and something important remains 
unexplained. To quote Davidson, "....the agent has certain beliefs and 
attitudes in the light of which the action is reasonable. But then some­
thing essential has certainly been left out, for a person can have a reason 
for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason 
why he did it. Central to the relation between a reason and an action it 
explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the 
reason."^
If we want to do justice to the force of meaning of 'because* by 
taking it as causal, the first thing we clash with is the Humean notion of 
cause. I have tried to show that it is a mistake to suppose that because 
reasons cannot always satisfy the Humean criterion of a cause, the relation 
between reasons and actions cannot be causal. The arguments which philos­
ophers often offer against this position, from the perspective of Hume's
1. D. Davidson. 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes'. Free will and Determinism, 
ed. B. Berofsky. p226. The emphasis is the author's.
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formulation of causal, criteria, are not irrefutable. These arguments can­
not show conclusively that there is an unsurmountable categorial difference 
between reasons and causes and that an explanation in terms of reason cannot 
be a causal explanation.
So far as the argument that the reason-action relation is non-con­
tingent because a reason cannot be described without a reference to an action 
is concerned, I have tried to show that Melden is wrong in assessing the 
strength of this argument. This argument can be avoided by showing that the 
agent can identify his desires, wants etc., in advance. Besides, if reason- 
action relation is a logical relation, it will be possible to deduce the 
exact action from the description of the reason. But it is not always 
possible to deduce from the description of the desire or want what sort of 
action is going to follow, or whether it will follow all. This shows 
that the relation between reason and action cannot be a non-contingent 
relation.
Melden*s argument that all causal explanation is of events or happ­
enings and items of reason are not events, is another hasty conclusion. The 
Humean argument that cause is an event is a too-restricted characterisation 
and I have tried to show that to be an event need not be a necessary crit­
erion of a cause. Besides, wants, desires etc., can sometimes be treated 
as happenings.
The two other characteristics with which the notion of reason seems 
to clash are the generality and the corrigibility of a causal statement. So 
far as the question of generality is concerned I have maintained that a 
general law is essential for a causal relation and that like ordinary 
causal relations, reason-action relations can be generalised. This applies
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also to the first-person singular statement of a reason for an action. The 
difficulties one faces in making valid predictions in the case of reason- 
action relations are empirical difficulties. Besides, a thing can he 
caused without being predictable. The question of causality and the 
question of predictability are not necessarily the same questions.
The problem really seems unresolvable so far as the incorrigible 
nature of a reason-action statement is concerned. The assumption here is 
that a man always has genuine incorrigible knowledge of his own wants, des­
ires and intentions. He could not help knowing unmistakably what his 
introspective states are, because, it is assumed, they are exactly what 
they appear to be. This certainty of knowledge does not need any evidence.
This argument is one which philosophers often consider to be unques­
tionable. But there is absolutely no reason, as David Pears^ has pointed 
out, why our knowledge of such a complex state of affairs should be 
incorrigible.
This argument assumes that an agent's awareness of such a mental 
state satisfying a certain description is a necessary and sufficient con­
dition for the correct ascription of the description to his mental state.
Such an argument obviously ignores many possibilities where an agent could 
be mistaken. We have seen that the agent's report of his introspective 
state is likely to be indubitable when he describes his present mental 
state. But when his description is not limited within his present mental 
state he is liable to make mistakes. There the possibility of making a 
mistake cannot be ruled out. There is also no reason to suppose that he 
cannot be mistaken about his present mental state. The hypothesis of the 
unconscious mind and the contribution of psycho-analysis support this position,
1. D. Pears. 'Causes and objects of some feelings and psychological reactions'. 
Philosophy of Mind, ed. S. Hampshire. pl69
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It has sometimes been suggested that psycho-analytic explanations 
cannot be causal (in the mechanical sense) because they contain purposive 
elements. But the purposive elements in psycho-analytic explanations 
are the unconscious motives and desires which instead of excluding causal 
explanation, support it. Besides there is no need to think that psycho­
analysis only explains why a certain reason is a man's reason for acting; 
based on the same principle, it can also explain why a man's reason is his 
reason and not the reason for acting. The latter possibility shows that 
psycho-analysis can reveal an apparently incorrigible reason-action state­
ment as corrigible.
In this thesis I have not discussed many aspects of the problem of 
action, which should be discussed before one reaches the conclusion that a 
piece of human behaviour can be causally explained in terms of reason.
Again in this thesis I have treated want, desire, intention etc., as items 
of reasons without clarifying or mentioning their specific differences, and 
I believe that were such differences made, one or two of the items of 
reasonswould have appeared as more causally effective than others. I also 
have not discussed the possibility of 'what goes on in the brain' being the 
cause of overt behaviour and what we describe as desire or want being a 
mere epiphenomenon of such brain-processes.
The point which I have tried to make in this thesis, is that human 
behaviour described as action can be understood only if it is caused by a 
certain intentional element. The causal explanation of human behaviour in 
terms of physical changes leaves out this element involved in action. This 
is the reason why such an explanation is often considered as contradicting 
teleological forms of explanation altogether. The advantage of a causal 
exnlanation of action in terms of reasons is that it does not exclude a
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teleological explanation of action so long as the latter means nothing 
but that an action is desired, intended or wanted. On the contrary, being 
an explanation in terms of wants or desires it takes full care of the ele­
ment of purpose involved in a purposive explanation of human action.
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